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Forensic Uses of DNA

Michele Z. Allen
Introduction

I

N State of No. Carolina v. Pennington, the defendant was charged with,
among other things, first degree rape, arson, and assault with a
deadly weapon . In Commonwealth of Virgina v. Spencer, the defendant is
currently on death row following a conviction for capital murder. In State
of Texas v. Glover, the defendant was charged with and later convicted of
aggravated sexual assault. In each of these cases, the defendant was convicted of a violent crime using the new legal evidentiary tool of DNA
fingerprinting. 1 The admissibility of the DNA evidence was crucial in
obtaining the guilty verdicts, each of which were affirmed on appeal.
DNA fingerprinting has been credited as the most significant breakthrough in solving crime since the introduction of conventional (skin)
fingerprints as evidence early in this century.2 To date, evidence obtained
by using this new forensic technique has been introduced in over a
thousand criminal cases in the United States .3
The use of DNA fingerprinting as evidence, however, has not gone
unchallenged since its debut in 1985 as a legal tool 4 Civil libertarians are
already concerned that the widespread use of and dependence upon
forensic DNA fingerprinting will violate a citizen's Constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure . It is the libertarian's concern
that people will be arbitrarily detained due to a mass DNA search, intimidated, and their privacy violated. Prosecutors and police investigators, on
the other hand, advocate that the use of such identification techniques
will serve to deter crime and increase convictions, both of which, in their
view, balance out possible infringements upon Constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. 16
DNA fingerprinting has the potential to be an epoch-making event in
the legal field. Its advantage lies in its potential ability to distinguish individuals by analysis of relatively small amounts of tissue , such as blood,
semen, and hair, which are often more prevalent at crime scenes than
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conventional fingerprints. Because skin fingerprints can be chemically
altered or concealed, the variety of samples that can be analyzed by DNA
fingerprinting techniques offers investigators a wider range of potential
evidence. In general, compared to proteins, enzymes, and antibodies that
are the usual targets of conventional forensic blood and serologic
analyses, DNA is remarkably resilient to degradation 4 _ 6 Moreover,
DNA fingerprinting tests can be performed on samples that are dried,
contaminated, and even several years old, albeit with increased technical
difficulty.
Prosecutors are not the only proponents of this new technique. In the
case of Yarris v. Fulcomer, 11 it was the defendant, acting as his own counsel,
who appealed to the U.S . District Court of Pennsylvania to request that
his case be reopened to hear new evidence. This evidence consisted of
DNA tests on clothing from the crime scene and on a vaginal sample
obtained from the victim. Due to legal technicalities, the petition was
denied, but this case was significant, because in it the defendant asked to
use the DNA fingerprinting technique to prove his innocence of rape and
murder. In a similar case, Ricky Lobdell appealed his conviction and 80year sentence for rape and burglary on the grounds that his attorney
erred by failing to pursue DNA fingerprinting as exculpatory evidence
on his behalf.12 However, the U.S . District Court for the Central District of
Illinois dismissed the issue of DNA fingerprinting in Lobdell's appeal,
noting that such investigatory techniques had not been discovered until
two years after his trial. 13
The crux of the problem surrounding the use of DNA fingerprinting in
legal matters is that the technology involved is, at best, poorly understood by the public-the very pool from which juries are chosen.
Likewise, legal professionals also encounter difficulty in understanding
the scientific premise upon which the technique is based. Indeed, in one
case the prosecuting attorney's lack of understanding of the procedure
and interpretation of the results resulted in a mistrial. 3 • 13 Upon retrial and
proper showing of legal precedent for introducing the process of
statistical analysis of forensic results, however, the defendant was convicted of rape, battery, and burglary.
In order to properly evaluate the legal validity of evidence, it is essential that judges, attorneys, and jurors understand the nature of this evidence. Although DNA has become a firmly entrenched acronym in our
language, too few citizens possess even a cursory understanding of its
paramount importance to life and why this molecule can be utilized for
forensic purposes.
The Biologic Basis of DNA Fingerprinting
DNA is the acronym for deoxyribonucleic acid, a molecule contained in
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Figure 1: Diagrammatic representations of a short segment of a DNA molecule
(a) A segment of the DNA double helix which has been "unwound" demonstratng the ladder analogy to the structure of DNA. The sugar-phosphate backbone is represented by the boxed "rails". The letters represent the four different
nucleotides which form the "rungs" of the ladder. (b) The double helix. Note in
both (a) and (b) the complimentary base pairing and the parallelism of the single
strands, which when linked together by bonds formed between hydrogen atoms
of complimentary nucleotides, form double stranded DNA.

the cells of every living organism. DNA is the repository for genetic
information, conveying the instructions that guide life processes. The
building blocks of DNA are four small molecules called nucleotides,
which when joined together by the millions form the tremendously long
double-stranded DNA molecule . The four different nucleotides are
called adenine (A) , thymine (T), guanine (G) , and cytosine (C). There is a
slight chemical difference between the four such that they only pair up in
a complimentary fashion: across the space between the opposing strands,
G always pairs with C and T always pairs with A. For example, a short
stretch of one strand may be ... A AT C G CAT T T C; the complimentary strand would then be ... T TAG C G T A A A G (Figure 1). Genes in
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fact are stretches of specific nucleotides of varying length that specify the
instructions to make a particular protein . In humans, not all of the
nucleotides present in the DNA molecule are genes; there are long
stretches of nucleotides that do not encode a particular gene at all.
However, the slight differences in nucleotide sequences within these
non-gene sections are highly variable between different individuals. It is
this hypervariability that is exploited in DNA fingerprint analysis.
Alec Jeffreys, a molecular biologist at the University of Leicester, was
the first to realize and develop genetic probes (explained below) that
could be used forensically to detect the highly variable sequences of DNA
between genes in different individuals. In 1984, Jeffereys coined the term
"DNA fingerprinting" (now also called "DNA typing") to describe the
unique pattern of spots left on a piece of X-ray film when the DNA of different people were subjected to the analytical technique he pioneered.
Subsequently, other probes and variations on the basic technique have
been developed, all of which are based on a method to discern the slight,
but hypervariable differences in the DNA of different individuals. The
essential aspects of this method are outlined below and depicted in
Figure 2.
DNA can be extracted from nearly any tissue, which contributes
greatly to its utility as a forensic specimen. Whole blood is the preferred
specimen, but DNA can be extracted from dried blood, bits of tissue,
saliva, semen, and vaginal swabs-the kinds of samples that can be
obtained in the aftermath of a violent crime. In the laboratory, the DNA is
extracted from cells in the specimen and purified. Next, the DNA sample
is cut into fragments of predictable size by a class of enzymes which
recognize specific nucleotide sequences and cut the double-stranded
DNA at precisely that location. In effect, these enzymes, known as restriction enzymes, act as a molecular scalpel, allowing the biologist to cleave a
DNA sample into smaller, more easily analyzed fragments . The solution
containing the DNA fragments is then separated by length (and hence
size) by placing the samples in wells cast in one end of a slab of gelatin
and then applying an electric current to the gel, which causes the DNA
fragments to migrate out of the wells and sort themselves out by size in a
lane below each well. The fragments are then transfered from the gel to a
nylon membrane where they become bound and immobilized.
A short synthetically-produced sequence of nucleotides called a
"prob e" is then added to a solution of chemicals in which the nylon
membrane is placed . Because of complimentary base pairing, the probe
will attach (biologists say the probe will "hybridize") to any nucleotide
sequence present in the DNA fragments that is complimentary to it. If a
radioactive isotope is attached to the probe, any binding of the probe to a
sequence in the DNA sample can be visualized by exposing the nylon
membrane to a piece of X-ray film for a number of hours. The radiation
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Figure 2: Flow chart diagram showing the essential steps in the processing of a
specimen for forensic DNA fingerprint analysis. See text for details of the
procedure.

emitted by the labelled probe then exposes the film leaving a tell-tale pattern of spots on the film. When developed, such a film is called an "autoradiogram." The pattern of spots (called "bands") in the autoradiogram
resembles a supermarket bar code which gave rise to the term "DNA
fingerprint." In actual practice, DNA from suspects, the victim(s), and
others known to be unconnected in any way to the crime (who act as controls for the procedure) are compared in a single autoradiogram. A match
is declared when a pattern of bands from an individual is identical to that
obtained from a forensic sample. However, for various reasons, a match is
not always easy to call. For example, bands can become misaligned or be
so close together that reliably distinguishing between them is
problematic.
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Legal Uses of DNA Fingerprinting
DNA fingerprinting may be used in a myriad of forensic applications. It
also has application to paternity cases 14 _ 16 and is even being used in
cases of wildlife poaching and the illegal importation of animals. 7 In
criminal investigations, as discussed above, DNA may be recovered from
the scene of the crime to link the suspect to the criminal act in the absence
of physical evidence. Such tests are crucial to so lving rape and sexual
abuse cases, as well as to distinguish copycat from serial crimes. In 1986,
there were 90,000 forcible rapes reported in the United States, with
arrests in only 52 per cent of the cases. 17 ln 1988, there were 92,490 rapes
and 20,680 homicides 2 DNA fingerprinting has the potential to
dramatically increase the number of arrests and subsequent convictions.
DNA acts not only as an evidentiary measure to link the suspect to the
crime scene, which may serve as a deterrent to criminals, but it is also an
encouragement to victims because the tests would confirm their
testimony in court. It is hoped by some prosecutors that this use of DNA
may bolster the resolve of rape victims to bring charges.
Conversely, DNA analysis can also serve to exonerate an innocent
person . The other widely used forensic tools, such as conventional
fingerprinting, have limited reliability as they may only circumstantially
relate a suspect to a weapon or crime scene and fail to show a connection
to the crime itself. However, when faced with DNA fingerprint evidence,
defense attorneys and defendants may be more interested in plea
bargaining to reduce their ultimate sentence or to avoid trial when they
face an almost certain conviction. Recent statistics indicate that a substantial number of defendants, when confronted with DNA test results which
implicate them in a rape or other criminal situation, are more likely to
plead guilty. 12 Ninety to 95 per cent of criminal cases already result in plea
bargaining of the charges and sentences, and DNA evidence may
expedite this proce ss. 18
DNA can also be used in cases involving parentage issues. Since
people receive half of their DNA from each of their parents, DNA can be
compared to determine whether two people are related. DNA fingerprinting evidence was relied upon recently in a case involving disputed
parentage. In Tipps v. Kiser, 19 the U.S. District Court in Texas held that the
DNA fingerprinting results and the testimony of expert witnesses,
together with other evidence, provided clear and convincing evidence
that the deceased man was not the biological father of the minor plantiff,
who, through her guardian, was contesting her rights to a portion of the
estate.ln another recent case, DNA typing was used to convict a 19-yearold college student in Lawton, Oklahoma, for the murder of her newborn baby, who was found in a nearby garbage dumpster. 20 Taking this
method of investigation one step further, DNA typing can also be used to
8

identify the remains of victims and military personnel lost in battle. 3 Until
now, identification of severely decomposed or otherwise deformed
bodies has had to depend on dental records.
Demand from the legal community has fostered the growth of several
private laboratories engaged in forensic DNA analyses. The first private
firms in the United States to offer forensic DNA tests were Cellmark
Diagnostics of Maryland, Lifecodes Corporation of New York, and Forensic Science Associates in California. By the end of 1988, these laboratories
assisted in providing DNA testing results in approximately one thousand
criminal cases and thousands of paternity cases. 5 In fact, Cellmark
Diagnostics has since specialized in paternity determinations (see U.S. v.
Two Bulls 27 ). Each firm reports that inconclusive test results are often
obtained due to the quality and/ or quantity of some of the samples they
are given to analyze. Thus, when the sample size is small, limited, or perhaps contaminated, the reliability of this form of evidence can become
questionable, which has led to legal disputes regarding its validity.
Another problem with the forensic use of DNA typing concerns questions related to statistical validity. One concern raised in People v. Castro 28
was that the laboratories had not tested their techniques sufficiently to
support their statistical claims for reliability. It is one thing to show, based
on DNA typing evidence, that a certain individual can be reasonably
excluded or included as a suspect in a particular case; it is another matter
en~irely to definitively establish that a suspect is, without question, linked
to a crime. Initially, it was believed that DNA typing was so individualspecific that the chance of a set of bands on an autoradiogram matching
by random chance alone were so astonishingly small that essentially the
chance factor could be ignored. For instance, Cellmark Diagnostics,
which holds an exclusive North American license to market Jeffreys's
technique, claimed that there is "only a one in 30 billion chance that any
two persons' DNA prints will match and create a false positive result
(except in the case of identical twins) ." 23 However, such claims have come
under fire from various sources for lacking reliable statistical support. 30 - 32 This shortcoming has been increasingly recognized, and more
carefully conducted studies have begun to examine the limits of the
statistical probability of a band match being due to chance alone. 21 • 23
Essentially, the initial statistical assumptions were invalid because they
failed to consider the vagaries of human population genetics. Because of
the way hypervariable sequences are inherited and distributed in a
population, it is possible that some hypervariable regions in a given
population may occur at higher frequencies than originally supposed.
Thus, it cannot be broadly assumed that an apparent band match in different lanes on an autoradiogram shows that the samples were from the
same person. Before any definitive conclusions about a match can be
made, one must consider the source of all samples loaded onto the gel:
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the bands must be interpreted in view of the frequencies of hypervariable
regions in the population-or populations-from which they were
obtained.
In 1988, in response to concerns related to the growing use of DNA
fingerprinting in criminal investigations, the FBI stepped in.28 It began to
investigate DNA fingerprinting by visiting private laboratories in the
United States and England and launched a program to develop its own
DNA typing facilities. In addition, the FBI coordinated various informational seminars and established a team of 31 scientists from the U.S. and
Canada as a Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods
(TWGDAM) to study proposed standards for forensic genetic analysis. 29
TWGDAM recommended comprehensive guidelines, including professional qualifications of personnel, proficiency testing, validation of
analytical and evidence handling procedures, and establishment of internal quality control methods. Simultaneously, several state, county, and
city crime laboratories sought funding for the acquisition of equipment
for DNA typing and the training of personnel in the techniques used. 3
Santa Clara County, California, has recently received funding for genetic
services within the Family Support Division of the Superior Court.
Because of a 15 per cent increase in the number of requests for testing in
paternity suits and the accuracy of DNA typing results over conventional
blood testing (which can only exclude relationships and not definitively
establish them), the county has opted to use the DNA typing method .30
Subjectivity in interpretation of a DNA fingerprint may be the greatest
hazard in reliance on this type of evidence. Even with standardized
laboratory procedures, the test results must be interpreted by qualified
experts. The scientific experts who perform and evaluate the tests are as
prone to error and bias as any other human being. Despite their qualifications, scientists's interpretations are still somewhat subjective. An important consideration in this respect is that "ex perts" pitted against one
another in a courtroom situation may so und equally persuasive to nonscientifically trained jury members . Thus, an additional legal dilemma is
created when lay people accept science as a source of immutable answers.

Advantages of DNA Fingerprinting
DNA typing has certain advantages and disadvantages, the understanding of which will lead to increased awareness of the limitations of
any scientific test.
The main advantage of DNA typing as a legal tool is its remarkable
ability to potentially provide positive identification with the use of almost
any type of forensic sample. Such samples include, but are not limited to,
blood stains, semen (obtained from vaginal swabs or dried onto fabric),
tooth pulp, saliva (which contains cells from the mouth), bone marrow
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(the source of blood cells), flesh (i.e., obtained from under fingernails or
bitten off an attacker), organ tissue, and hair (as long as the hair bulb is
intact). Since each cell contains the genetic code of an individual, any
sample of cells from anybody tissue could provide the same DNA typing
results. Another advantage is that these results are much more accurate
than traditional blood, semen, or hair-typing tests. Thus, DNA typing is
considered more versatile than other biologically-based forensic
identification methods because of the range of forensic samples that it can
test. Even samples that have dried and aged can give successful typing
results, unlike the case in traditional laboratory testing. This factor allows
investigators the flexibility to reopen old cases or compare forensic
samples from various crimes.
In addition, due to the nature of the bar code structure resulting from
DNA fingerprinting, the band pattern from autoradiograms can be
optically scanned and globally computerized in a database similar to
those currently utilized for conventional fingerprints. The FBI plans to
create such a database. Called CO DIS, (CObined DNA Index System), the
system is seen as a means to link data from various laboratories to
suspects. 3 Presumably, substantial investigative time could be saved in
analyzing forensic evidence by using computerized DNA typing data. In
fact, some states have begun collection and storage of blood samples of
persons convicted of certain crimes. 3 As a condition for release from jail,
sex offenders in Colorado must submit a blood test to be used for DNA
typing. Similar legislation has been enacted in King County, Washington.
In 1989, California's attorney general sought mandatory blood testing
from criminals convicted of violent crimes (assault, murder, rape, or
other sex crimes) .
The cost of such genetic surveillance is substantial. California officials
estimate the cost of setting up a state-wide computer system for retrieval
and analysis of forensic samples to be around $3 million, with the annual
cost of $2.5 millon to conduct the approximately 8,250 tests a year.3 Officials regard the cost as justified because it can reduce crime investigation
time and may even deter violent criminals. The availability of computerized DNA fingerprint data may also stimulate the enthusiasm of
prosecutors for pursuing the "harder-to-prove" cases, such as rape and
abuse.

Disadvantages of DNA Fingerprinting
Despite the support by law enforcement professionals that DNA
fingerprinting is enjoying, there are limitations to the technique. DNA
typing requires considerable expertise and experience to perform,
analyze, and interpret. The size of the sample recovered is crucial in
obtaining reliable results. Forensic samples in cases of violent crimes can
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be notoriously hard to collect in sufficient quantity for DNA typing . In
contrast, in paternity cases, plenty of source material is available in the
form of a clean blood sample obtained from each of the parties involved .
Moreover, in criminal cases, DNA samples are often degraded to some
degree, making the amount of usable DNA all the more limited, which in
turn necessitates extra prudence in handling and processing the sample,
since once used for typing, there is often no more DNA available for
further analysis. 6
As a method, DNA fingerprinting was born in a modern research
laboratory. The DNA samples used in development of this technique
were in sufficient quantity, from known sources, un-degraded, and
uncontaminated . Indeed, the preferred specimen for analysis is fresh,
whole, unclotted blood -obviously not a feature at crime scenes.
Although compared to other forms of biologic evidence, DNA is remarkably resilient, it nevertheless can be degraded, e.g., by exposure to the elements (humidity, temperature, sunlight), time or dilution by other
substances.
Material may be submitted to the laboratory by police officers who are
not skilled in the collection of samples used for biologic purposes.
Contamination of forensic samples at crime scenes is probably the rule
rather than the exception. Some of the more common sources of contaminants are dirt or filth present on articles of clothing, carpet, or other
fabric. Microorganisms present in large numbers on body surfaces and
cavities may contaminate the sample with their own DNA. Dyes used to
color clothing or fabric may chemically alter the DNA present. Proteins
which are also present in large amounts in body secretions of all types
may also contaminate the specimen. The disturbance of a body by
animals may also cause contamination with the animal's DNA and
proteins. In rape cases, samples, although collected at a hospital, are often
composites of the rapist's semen and the victim's own cells. Thus, the
DNA of the two become mixed and must be sorted out before analysis.
Contaminated samples can result in spurious bands on the autoradiogram, making interpretation problematic . Moreover, all bands on the
resultant gel must be accounted for, in order for an interpretation to be
valid. The combined effects of contamination lead to problems in the
process and , therefore, interfere with proper interpretation. Finally, from
a statistical standpoint, to make a firm conclusion about a set of band
matching entails that the examiner know something about the frequency
of the hypervariable regions in the population from which the samples
are drawn.
Other disadvantages to DNA typing are not unique to this method but
rather are inherent problems that may affect any laboratory test. Poor
specimen handling in the laboratory can result in mishandling,
mislabeling, or loss of a valuable specimen. Improper instrument set-up,
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calibration, or use can cause unreliable results. The hope is that the
quality control procedures introduced by the FBI laboratory will reduce
these problems to a minimum.
Legal Limitations
Despite the enthusiasm of investigators, prosecutors, and federal officials, questions about the reliability of DNA fingerprinting remain . Both
state and federal courts generally evaluate the reliability and
admissibility of innovative scientific tests by two standards. The first is set
forth in the case of Frye v. United States. 32 In evaluating polygraph ("lie
detector") tests, the Frye court stated that "(an] emerging scientific test
should be generally accepted in its own field before it can be admitted by
a Court" thereby ensuring the test's legal credibility. The second, and
more permissive standard, is set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
Section 702, which favors the admissibility of all relative evidence by
treating scientific evidence similarly to any other expert testimony.
On November 6, 1987, Tommie Lee Andrews became the first person
in the United States to be convicted of a crime based on evidence from a
DNA test. 3 In this case, DNA from a semen sample recovered from the
rape victim was matched to a sample of DNA from Andrews's blood 3 • 4 • 13
Thereafter, similar convictions based on evidence provided by DNA
analysis have been obtained throughout the country. The Andrews case
set the legal precedent for the admissibility of DNA evidence.3 In a few
states, due to increased use of DNA typing as evidence, as well as to
increased familiarity with the procedure, courts have ruled that there is
no longer a need for Frye hearings, as the technique is now generally
accepted 17 However, until state and federal jurisdictions agree and set
the legal precedent for the reliability of DNA fingerprinting, the party
offering the DNA evidence still has the burden of proving its
admissibility. 16
Legal controversy has forced the courts to take a closer look at the
forensic use of DNA typing. For instance, in the recent New York case of
People v. Castro, 22 the forensic report from Lifecodes Corporation was submitted to prove that the defendant murdered Vilma Ponce and her twoyear-old daughter. A sample of blood was obtained from the defendant's
watch. However, two defense attorneys successfully challenged the
admissibility of the DNA tests and, in fact, contributed to a dispute over
typing techniques between two competing DNA laboratories. The legal
community was concerned about the effects of the Castro verdict on the
future forensic uses of DNA typing. Courts in New York and Minnesota
ruled in late 1989 that DNA fingerprinting evidence was inadmissible in
all cases in their respective jurisdictions until further scientific studies can
be performed to address the questions that remain with regard to the
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procedure. 4 Standardization of methods, improved statistical foundations, and quality controls imposed by the FBI should help alleviate
future inadmissibility dilemmas. Through the continued introduction of
such evidence in the various state courts, uniformity in legal precedent
can be expected to develop.
Between 1988 and 1990, DNA evidence was admitted in state courts in
Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota (which had previously not
allowed it) , New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and
Virginia . Frye was the most frequently used admissibility test in these
courts. 21 Further support for DNA typing has come from the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, which found that "DNA tests are
valid and reliable in forensics when performed and analyzed properly by
skilled personne!." 36
In criminal cases, some questions about DNA fingerprinting may arise
regarding rights protected under the Federal Constitution. The U.S.
Supreme Court for example, has ruled that the state is often required to
provide indigent d efendants with the necessary tools for an effective
defense and appeal. In Britt v. No. Carolina,37 that necessary tool was
alleged to be a copy of a court transcript. Although the court deemed the
transcript in this case to be unnecessary for an effective defense, it acknowledged the principle established in Griffin v. lllinois 38 that the State
must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent persons with the
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other people. While the scope of this principle is unclear
with respect to DNA fingerprinting, it would seem proper that if a
prosecutor were to use D NA fingerprinting evidence, the defense should
be able to present a rebuttal or its own DNA evidence. Accordingly, in an
effort to provide equality under the law, despite the high cost of DNA
fingerprinting, as well as the costs of retaining expert witnesses, states
may be compelled to pay for such testing.39
Another Constitutional concern is that DNA fingerprinting can mean a
greater invasion of privacy than other biochemical tests, because it
exposes a person's genetic makeup. Howeve r, the autoradiographic patterns which are created in the DNA fingerprinting process do not by
themselves reveal anything about intelligence, behavior, or outward
physical appearance. Essentially, other conventional biochemical tests,
which are routinely available, reveal information that can be considered
as personal or sensitive as any revealed by DNA analysis. 39 Moreover, the
technology does not yet exist to analyze the entire genetic repertoire of a
person's DNA. Taken togeth er, these facts tend to mitigate questions
about unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
While the admissibility of DNA evidence is still a controversial matter
in the courts, the potential uses for this new technique are promising.
Legally, however, DNA fingerprinting can currently only be used in the
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same manner as conventional fingerprinting-that is, reliable results
cannot always be guaranteed and, therefore, must be considered in light
of all other available evidence. Until the scientific community refines the
questionable aspects of the technique, the legal community will have to
address the admissibility of the testing on a case-by-case basis.
Few other discoveries in science have had such far-reaching consequences as the elucidation of the structure of DNA by James Watson and
Francis Crick in 1953. Because of technological advances spurred by this
discovery, it is clear that society will be irrevocably altered. The
extraordinary power of DNA technology will forever alter the science of
forensic identification. The legal and sCientific communities have an
obligation to carefully evaluate the consequences of indiscriminate use of
this technology. Clearly, DNA typing is already changing the way in
which certain civil and criminal cases are pursued in the courts. The legal,
social, and political implications of the widespread use of this technique
have only recently begun to emerge. When scientific evidence takes the
central position in a court of law, it may be difficult to bring the inherent
uncertainties of science into proper perspective .
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Monis111: Oriental and
Occidental Perspectives

W

Marc Herman and Mary Tookey
ORLDWIDE, natural resources dwindle, and concern for the

environment grows. The words "economy of plenty" are rapidly
becoming only a historically interesting phrase . Perhaps the world as a
whole can learn from Orientals what they have known how to do for
centuries-to submerge self-interest. The Western ideal of the "self-made
man" who rises in society by gaining unessential material luxuries at the
expense of nature, family, and fellow citizens seems an even Jess suitable
model for human conduct than the self-mortifying hermit holy man
described so frequently in Eastern literature. The latter, at least, harmed
only himself. In the future, Eastern thinking may be able to aid the people
of the world to do as the English writer Thomas Carlyle suggested: satisfy
their desires by wanting less rather than by obtaining more . Some degree
of the detachment advocated by Buddha may be required to dampen the
fire of human frustration in a world that is at last understood to be finite.
The future will need human beings who not only can realize the
interrelatedness of all things and people but who also can identify emotionally with the whole-who can make the welfare of all, their welfare.
Thus, the world will need the kind of people who can by at least some
definitions be termed Monists.
Monism, which has existed throughout human history and in various
parts of the world , reached Americans in the 19th century through
writers such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman, both of whom
openly acknowledged cultural kinship with the Orient as well as with
Europe. Lines from one of Whitma n's less well known poems, "Chanting
the Square Deific," illustrate his Monism. His symbol of the square echoes
with a difference the Oriental circle, which has the same symbolic
meaning:
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Chanting the square deific, out of the One advancing, out of
the sides,
Out of the old and new, out of the square entirely divine,
Solid, four-sided, (all the sides needed) from this side Jehovah
am I,
Old Brahm I, and Saturnius am;
Not Time affects me-l am Time, old, modern as any ... .
Monism, typically a minority belief, has not only been widespread in
history but has also had advocates with remarkably diverse religious
backgrounds. Monists have been Pagan, Taoist, Hindu, Buddhist,
Moslem, Jewish, and Christian. Since Monism has survived diverse
physical and cultural environments, one may conclude that some factor
or factors universal in human nature have caused its existence. This essay
will first explore the temporal and geographical ubiquity of Monism and
the differences in the cultures in which it has thrived. Next, explanations
of its persistence and extensiveness will be discussed in relation to essential characteristics of the human mind. Finally, in order to understand
more fully the present and future value of Monism, it will be examined in
the light of several therapeutic theories of 20th century psychologists.
Definitions of Monism have varied somewhat according to time, place,
and individual. Some thinkers have insisted that all things (people
included) are really identical in substance and kind, any apparent distinctions being illusory; others have been content to stress the interrelatedness, thus the unity, of all. However, according to all Monists, the unified
whole includes not only all humanity but all life and the entire inanimate
universe as well. Despite variations, emphasis on the essential oneness of
the universe has distinguished Monists throughout history.
Origins of Western Monism can be traced back to Ancient Greece
where Parimenides, as well as other philosophers, advocated it.
However, European soil was not as fertile ground ground for Monism as
was Asian, and Monism did not become well known in Europe until considerably after the Renaissance.
At least as early as in Greece, Monism existed in China. The following
quotation from the Tao Teh Ching is an illustration:
The holy man embraces unity
And becomes for all the world a model.
Not self-displaying, he is enlightened;
Not self-approving, he is distinguished;
Not self-asserting, he acquires merit;
Not self-seeking, he gaineth life .
The Tao Teh Ching, a major work in the literary and religious history and in
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the oral traditions of China, is thought to have been first committed to
writing in the fourth century B.C. by a scholar, Lao Tzu.
The above passage is only one of many demonstrating Monistic thinking that may be found in early Asian literature. Asians may have accepted
Monism more e nthusia stically than Europeans because of its compatibility with an Oriental idea of creation stated in the pre-Hindu
Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. This scripture, which dates from about 700
B.C., says that God was originally one and created the universe by
dividing God's own self. As Joseph Campbell says in Thc Masks of God:
Oricntal Mythology, "In the Indian version it is the god himself that divides
and becomes not man alone but all creation; so that everything is a
manifestation of that single inhabiting divine substance: there is no other;
whereas in the Oudeo-Christian] Bible, God and man, from the b eginning, are distinct." (p. 1 0)
Early Hindu Monistic belief may be illustrated by quoting from the
Hindu "Bhagavad-Gna" ("Song of God"). That lyric, itself a book-length
work, is a part of the Indian epic, the Malzabl!arata. This poem, the longest
epic in the world's literary history, tells a mythological story, probably
containing a mixture of factual truth and imagination. It has been considered sacred by the Hindus from pre-history to the present. Its first
written form has been attributed to a poet named Vyasa, who lived about
300 B.C. Krishna , a highly popular Hindu Divine incarnation, is sometimes referred to as one of the Hindu gods since Hinduism can seem, at
least to outsiders, to function as a polytheistic religion, especially with
worshippers among the common people. However, the more intellectual and philosophical Hindu thinkers tell us that Hinduism is not polytheistic and that Krishna is only one of many manifestations of the
Supreme Being. In the excerpt below, Krishna is speaking to the human
hero Arjuna, a son of a king, on the eve of a battle with his cousins who are
wrongfully trying to get the throne. Krishna tells Arjuna that he must do
his duty as a member of the warrior caste and assures him that he should
not feel guilty about killing blood relatives . Krishna says:
That which is non-exi stent can never come into being, and
that which is can never cease to be. Those who have known
the inmost Reality know also the nature of is and is not.
That Reality which pervades the universe is indestructible.
No one has power to change the Changeless.
Bodies are said to die, but That which possesses the body is
eternal. It cannot be limited or destroyed. Therefore, you must
fight.
Some say this Atman
Is slain, and others
Call It the slayer:
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They know nothing.
How can It slay?
Or who shall slay it?
Know this Atman,
Unborn, undying,
never ceasing,
Never beginning,
Deathless, birthless,
Unchanging forever.
How can it die the death of the body?
Knowing It birthless,
Knowing It deathless,
Knowing It endless,
Forever unchanging.
Dream not you do
The deed of the killer
Dream not the power
Is yours to command it.
The term At man has not been translated because there is no way of translating it accurately in short compass. The word refers to the essential,
immortal being as it exists within a person . That being is believed to be
one with all being, including Divinity. Sometimes Atman is loosely translated "godhead," "soul," or "spirit." However, none of those terms quite
fits. The above passage, especially when the significance of the term
Atman is understood, clearly shows a belief in the existence of something
all-encompassing. The one whole is identified by the three capitalized
words "Reality," "Changeless," and "Atman ." Thus, Monism is a central
concept in this epic of outstanding importance in both the literature and
religion of India. However, Krishna's advice on the eve of battle may
seem more chilling than comforting. He says that, because existence is
one changeless whole, the warrior Arjuna can kill without compunction
because doing so has no real effect.
One who thinks critically about Monism may ask, if reality is one and
unchanging, what is all the diversity, multiplicity, and change apparent in
the daily world? Early Hindu thinkers considered such appearance to be
illusion but paid less attention to the apparent contradiction than did the
founder of a related religion. In India in about the fifth or sixth century
B.C., Gautama of the Siddhartha family was born and reared a Hindu.
Thus, out of Hinduism has grown another of the world's great religions,
Buddhism . It is Buddhism that has given the concept of Monism most of
its followers and much of its explanation. As Rudolf Otto says when dis-

21

cussing Buddhism in Mysticism : East and West, "The soul of man, the
'inward Atman,' is nothing less than the one eternal, unchangeable
Brahman itself. Through the enigmatic power of Mayathere arises in the
soul 'advidya'-not knowing (or, better; false knowing). Maya
'superimposes' (adhyaropa) upon the reality of the One Being the deceptive multiplicity of the world." (pp. 19-20) Buddhism has, of course,
spread widely since its founding, co-existing with other religions, especially in Asia. The view of the illusory nature of the world (Maya) is illustrated in the following poem written by the Buddhist Priest Manei in
Japan in about 720 A.D.lt is a part of the Japanese collection entitled the
Gogenshu:
To what shall I compare
This world?
To the white wake behind
A ship that has rowed away
At dawn.
Anyone who aspires to be a buddha, (which means "the enlightened
one") must try to strip his or her thinking of illusion, thus promoting the
realization that an individual is not truly separate but in reality one with
the Supreme Being. Buddhism has perhaps done more to spread Monism
than any other religion or school of thought, and its importance persists
to the present, especially in the Orient.
Asian soil, however, was not alone in providing fertile ground for
Monism, nor were the Asian religions the only ones compatible . The
mystical Sufi thinkers of Islam embraced the belief that religious experience is not complete without a sense of union with God. Some tried to
achieve that sense through poetry, some through music, and some
through dance. In the following lines from the poem "The Grief of the
Dead," the Persian poet Rum !goes further than desiring union with God :
The grief of the dead is not on account of death; it is because
they dwelt on the phenomenal forms of existence
And never perceived that all this foam is moved and fed by the
Sea.
When the Sea has cast the foam-flakes on the shore, go to the
graveyard and behold them!
Say to them, 'Where is your swirling onrush now?" and hear
them answer mutely, "Ask this question of the Sea, not of
us ."
How should the foam fly without the wave? How should the
dust rise to the zenith without the wind?
Since you have seen the dust, see the Wind; since you have
seen the foam, see the Ocean of Creative Energy.
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In the above passage, the words "Sea" and "Ocean of Creative Energy"
indicate Monistic concepts. The poem speaks of the illusory nature of the
world perceived by the senses and expresses the writer's desire for union
with the one whole . The Iyric is from the MathnawT, an Islamic Sufi classic
from the 13th century A.D. Although mystics are a small minority among
Moslems, Sufi poetry is highly regarded by most Moslems and often considered second only to the poetry in the Qu'ran itself.
Opinions vary as to whether the Sufis were influenced by Oriental,
especially Buddhist, thought. There is little doubt, however, that
European and American thinkers, especially the Transcendentalists,
were so influenced. And it was nearly their time before Monism became
well known in Occidental thought. In the 17th century, Baruch Spinoza's
interest brought Monism into intellectual respectability in Europe. In that
same century John Donne, a poet and a priest of the Church of England,
writes in his Devotions this often quoted statement:
No man is an Iland intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the
Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by
the Sea, Europe is the lesse,as well as if a Promontorie were, as
well as if a Mannor of thy friends or of thine own were. Any
mans death diminishes me, because I am involved in
Mankinde. And therefore never send to know for whom the
bell tolls. It tolls for thee.
By the 19th century, Monistic ideas and symbols became frequent in
Western thought on both sides of the Atlantic, thanks in large part to the
Transcendentalists. Twentieth century writing shows continued,
although less frequent, reference to the concept that all is one unified
whole. For example, T. S. Eliot uses the dance to symbolize the unity in
these lines from Four Quartets:
At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor
fleshless;
Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is,
.... Except for the point, the still point
There would be no dance,and there is only the dance. (p. 119)
Thus, Monism has been a part of human thinking throughout history, it
has been one bridge over the gap between Eastern and Western thinking, and it has had adherents from among all the world's major religions.
What has caused such wide appeal? In seeking an answer, one may turn
to 20th century psychology. The motivation for Monistic thinking seems
to be the desire to identify oneself with a universe that is one unified
whole. In the personal history of every human being there was once a
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union with another, who, as far as he or she knew, was the whole universe. That state of union ended when the infant was thrust from the
womb. Freud and a number of more recent thinkers have believed that
experience in the pre-natal state, although it cannot be dredged into consciousness, remains imprinted in the unconscious mind of the adult.
Psychologists theorize also that, although the infant physically
becomes an individual immediately upon birth, several months must
pass before he or she becomes an individual psychologically. Margaret
Mahler believes that the first three years of normal childhood development are divided into three stages. The first two months of an infant's life
are necessarily given to the establishment of internal homeostasis. The
second stage, two to five months, Mahler refers to as the period of
symbiosis with the mother. According to this psychologist, the infant
becomes conscious of the mother but is not aware of her as distinct from
himself or herself. The two are enmeshed in a mutuality based on
interreaction. The baby views self and mother as a single, omnipotent
unit. Only after five months does the infant construct mental concepts of
self and begin to think of himself or herself as a separate person, an individual human being. Mahler's belief that this early infant symbiosis with
the mother is a necessary stage in human development and that a sense of
individual identity develops only following this stage is shared by Erik
Erikson, the psychologist associated with the concept of "identity
crisis."
One may ask, is the Monist's view that the universe is one all-inclusive
whole a result of a wish to return to the symbiotic state, to the nurture and
safety of union with an omnipotent being? An affirmative answer to this
question places Monistic thinking in a negative light. First, development
is not facilitated by holding onto the symbiosis. According to Roger
Gould, the niche between child and parent carries with it a fantasy, "the
illusion of absolute safety." The illusion is that one will be safe as long as
mother or father is near. The proximity can be physical or psychological.
He believes that a person too comfortable in the supposed security of the
relationship with parents would be reluctant to leave the protected, psychological space and thus fail to achieve full individuation.
To find a Monistic perspective also means leaving self-centered thinking behind. From Mahler's perspective, narcissism represents a failure to
individuate. The narcissist seeks to recreate the symbiosis, centering
attention on gratification of his or her own needs. Perspective taking, the
ability to take the perspective of another person, is subsequently not
engaged in except as associated with the ulterior motive of satisfying
one's wants. This sharp limitation disrupts the development of perspective taking. The growth of the capacity to take the perspective of others
appears critical to interpersonal growth, moral development and subsequent Monistic values. Thus, Monistic thinking seems opposite to
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infantile self-centeredness. A legend of a Buddhist monk comes to mind.
He found himself uncovered, having slept on a cold night on the side of
the road . His coat was gone, apparently stolen. He thought that it was
good that someone would be kept warm by that coat.
Psychological findings about adults suggest there is great risk in
concentrating one's focus as a basis for one's identity. For example, persons who were highly work-oriented (who '1ived to work") found it difficult to retire, according to Lowenthal. (p. 318) And Lopata's study of
widows found that the group at most risk for disorganization following
their husband's death were the women who based their identity on their
marriage. (p. 92) This finding brings to mind Buddha's warning that
craving a thing leads to suffering. Obsession is a craving and represents
another illusion of safety which blocks self-growth .
Finally, Monism, viewed as a desire for renewed symbiosis with the
mother, would be a desire to move backward rather than forward .
Certainly an adult who regressed to age five months would be psychotic.
One must admit that some "holy men" do fit the pattern of psychosis. For
example, in the drama Shakuntalawritten by the Hindu Kalidasa in sixth
century India, a "holy man" is described as follows:
. . . the hermit, horridly austere,
Whom clinging vines are choking, tough and sere;
Half-buried in an anti-hill that has grown
About him, standing post-like and alone;
Sun-staring with dim eyes that know no rest,
The dead skin of a serpent on his breast:
So long he stood unmoved, insensate there
That birds build nests within his mat of hair.
However, most persons viewed as holy in both Oriental and Occidental cultures by no means fit such a description . Many have withdrawn from society, but their withdrawal can be likened to that of a
person in a museum who places distance between himself and a work of
art in order to see it better. Jesus withdrew to the Garden of Gethsemane
but then returned to humanity. Mahatma Gandhi fasted alone but did so
to better the lives of his fellows. A young Buddhist who seeks Nirvana is
encouraged by the example of his master to postpone his entry into that
state so that he can show others the "middle path ."
Thus, the concept that the universe is one entity only and the desire for
a sense of oneness with that whole cannot be adequately explained as
stemming from a wish to return to the infantile symbiosis with the
mother. However, Monism can be viewed as a seeking for a new kind of
symbiosis, not with the mother but with the entire universe . Considered
in this light, Monistic thinking can be related to the stage of life which was
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thought by Erikson to be the last stage, integrity versus despair. He
speaks of this final stage as following the secure establishment of individual identity and usually occurring late in life. In Identity : Youth and
Crisis, Erikson speaks of the ability to lose oneself in others and adds:
In the aging person who has taken care of things and people
and has adapted himself to the triumphs and disappointments of being, by necessity, the originator of others and the
generator of things and ideas-only in him the fruit of the
seven stages gradually ripens. I know no better word for it
than integrity. (p. 139)
Monism may also be related to Lawrence Kohlberg's sixth and final
stage of moral development, a stage attained by few. Those who attain it
base their behavior on the total effects of their actions. People who reach
this stage of morality are capable of sacrificing their individual desires even their individual lives -for the greater good, for the good of the
whole. (pp . 270-274) Their sense of the whole and their devotion to it can
be considered Monistic in the broader definition . Thus, the Monistic
concept of unity can be viewed as characteristic of exceptional maturity
rather than regression and as of great potential benefit .
The concept of interrelatedness has recently been introduced into
Western thinking in areas as diverse as archery (Herrigel) and abstract
physics (Capra). From arrow to bull's eye, atom to atom, energy to object,
all things are connected, are one. In the field of psychology, substantial
influence has been gained in seeing persons as interconnected, as one-a
family system (Guerin, p. 21) -and as ecologically connected with larger
and smaller systems-the community and the internal organ, respectively. (Bronfenbrenner p. 7) We are in the fold of historical contexts as
well. (Rosnow and Georgoudi, p. 4) These perspectives and theories are
encompassed by the contextual model , which was established as a result
of the tensions between organismic and mechanistic world views. The
model goes beyond the two by suggesting that a thing or an event cannot
be viewed as separate from a context. Therefore, even inner experience
(mind) is connected with the body and outer events.
These conjectures of psychological theories are in line with Alan
Watts 's Westernization of Vedanta philosophy. As he puts it:
Now when God plays hide and pretends that he is you and
I, he does it so well that it takes him a long time to remember
where and how he is himself ... . That is why it is so difficult
for you and me to find out that we are God in disguise,
pretending not to be himself. But when the game has gone on
long enough, all of us will wake up, stop pretending, and
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remember that we are all one single Self-the God who is all
that there is and who lives for ever and ever. (p. 14)
In modern times, the Occident, with its high priority on individualism,
has given much to the Orient in the way of material progress. Perhaps in
the near future the Orient, with its historically greater emphasis on the
whole than on the individual, will guide the Occident to great concern for
interrelationships and for the value of all.
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Bertrand Russell
at U.C.L.A.: a
Rellliniscence

I

Fenwicke W. Holmes

N the Fall of 1939, Bertrand Russell came to the University of California at Los Angeles (U .C .LA .) to serve on the faculty as a professor
of philosophy. At the time it was a requirement of the university that, in
addition to teaching graduate and upper division courses, all faculty
members must teach a share of lower division subjects. It was campus
rumor at the time that Lord Russell was told that, because of his fame and
distinction, he would be excused from that requirement. "Oh, no!"
Russell was reputed to have said, '1 should rather like to teach a course in
freshman logic."
True or false, he did teach an introductory course in logic that year.
Either because of lack of detailed preparation or, perhaps, because it was
just his style, Russell would appear at the le ctern and "wing it." 1 Logic it
was, but freshman logic it was not . At any moment in his dissertation he
might take chalk in hand and cover the board with equations of Boolean
algebra, leaving his class slack-jawed and with eyes aglaze .2 The fame of
this philosophical tour de force spread across the U .C .L.A. campus and to
other campuses. It was not uncommon to see a row of philosophy
professors from universities as far away as Seattle, sitting in the back of
the classroom just to audit the course .
It was my good fortune in th e spring of 1940 to take, as part of my
philosophy major, an upper division course under Russell on
"Philosophic Ideas in Practice ." This was an amazing series of lectures.
Without a single note before him, he would trace a philosophical concept
from its earliest Greek beginnings and show the impact of that idea
through history on subsequent philosophers and on art, literature, and
human events . The cumulative effect of these lectures was an in-depth
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look, not at philosophy alone, but at the panorama of Western civilization itself. Perhaps it was his self-confessed lack of preparation that forced
him to draw on the totality of his study and reflection to produce these
stunning lectures . They certainly seemed to be ad lib performances since
no note of any kind was ever evident. Surely few, if any, could have had
the resources to make the interconnection between philosophy, the arts,
and history come so vividly alive . Each lecture was an intellectual performance displaying rapier wit, extraordinary erudition, deep insight,
and incisive logic, counterbalanced with gentle humor and an evident
love for the best that humanity can be .
The reading list for this course was distinguished by its range and
variety. Unfortunately I preserved no copy. However, from memory, the
following list gives a general idea of its scope : Saint Augustine
(pronounced : "Au-GUS-tine" by Russell), The City of God; Byron, Don
Juan (pronounced '1EW -an" by Russell; Carlisle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship,
and the Heroic in History; Carroll, Alice in Wonderland; Dante, The Inferno;
Hegel, Philosophy of History; Hitler, Mein Kampf; Machiavelli, The Prince;
Locke, Treatises on Government; Shelley, Frankenstein; and Shaw, Man and

Superman.
The period when this course was given should be recalled to place it in
context. Hitler had invaded Poland in 1939. The "Phony War" had lasted
through the winter of 1939-40. In February, Russia first got bloodied and,
then, chewed up tiny, but heroic, Finland. In April, Norway was invaded .
On May 10 came the Blitzkrieg through the Low Countries and, at the end
of that month, came the British evacuation from Dunkirk. France was
tottering. The aerial blitz of London had not yet begun, but the outlook for
England and, in fact, the entire English-speaking world, was bleak. The
Spanish-speaking world of both hemispheres, with its string of dictators
from Franco in Spain to Argentina's pre-Peronista leader, Ramon
Castillo, was openly sympathetic to the Hitler-Mussolini Axis. In and out
of the classroom the clouds of war were everpresent.
Russell, with his predisposition toward and long identification with
pacifism, felt the agnst of the times most keenly. There was no evident
hope of salvation of the Old World by the New. In the United States the
prevailing sentiment seemed to be summed up in the words "America
First:' And then, even if America could be prodded into action, a long and
bitter war would be needed to defeat Hitler.
Because of Russell's underlying ethical relativism, he could not take the
doctrinaire position that war was absolutely wrong in all times and
circumstances. In fact, as early as 1915 during World War I, Russell wrote
in "The Ethics of War": "I cannot believe that war under all circumstances
is a crime". 3 Although a declared conscientious objector to World War I,
Russell had expressed sympathy with the Russian Revolution and had
justified bloodshed in that instance: "If the 'sacredness of human life'
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Photographs of Bertrand Russell in the classroom were taken in Spring, 1940, by
the author when he was one of Russell's students at U.C.L.A .
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means that force must never be used to upset bad systems of government,
to put an end to wars and despotisms, and to bring liberty to the
oppressed, then I cannnot honestly subscribe to it."4 So, whatever his
popular reputation, Russell was not a doctrinaire or knee-jerk pacifist.
In the early months of 1940, Russell had not publicly taken a position
regarding the war in Europe although he had in private letters, as early as
January of that year, stated that he could no longer "be a complete pacifist
about it."5 In a letter to Kingsley Martin (editor of the New Statesman) on
May 13, 1940, he wrote: "Ever since the war began I have felt that I could
not go on being a pacifist; I have hesitated to say so, because of the
responsibility involved. If I were young enough to fight myself, I would
do so, but it is more difficult to urge others." He was not to go public with
his support of the British war endeavor until June, 1940. During the
months in which he conducted his lectures at U.C.L.A., Russell was thus
wrestling with his rejection of doctrinaire pacifism but was still reluctant
to go public with his new viewpoint.
Russell's abhorrence of Hitler and Stalin was based as much on
philosophical grounds as it was on love of country. He saw, in the possible defeat of England and the English-speaking world, the onset of a
new dark age, bringing with it the potential loss of the greatest achievements of Western civilization . These achievements he boiled down to a
quintessence of two: the "Liberal Locke Tradition" (i.e., democracy) and
the "Free Spirit of Scientific Inquiry" (i.e., science). These two ideas,
democracy (to be free to live and think) and science (to be free to inquire
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and make empirical evaluations) were, to Russell the greatest and at the
same time most fragile achievements of the Western world. He was possibly more concerned over the real danger to these basic and hard-won
freedoms than he was over the military defeat of Great Britain .
Russell held that democracy and science could exist only in their pure
form. Any attempt to qualify these terms by the use of an adjective could
only serve to twist, distort, or diminish their meaning .
In the realm of science, for example, the use of a qualifying adjective
gives rise to Lysenko's practice of a "Socialist Science," something
particularly condemned by Russell. The skewing of laboratory results to
"prove" some element of Marxian (or any other) doctrine was anathema
to him. It was, of course, important to the Soviets to be able to prove that
environment could influence heredity; else how could one accept the
doctrine that, once the dictatorship of the proletariat was established, the
state would wither away, human nature thus having been changed by its
environment? Russell could see no harm in testing an element of Marxist
theology as a scientific hypothesis. The harm arose in conducting the
inquiry in an unscientific way: selecting only favorable results, altering
measurements and readings, and reaching conclusions not supported by
the evidence .
Russell saw the painful emergence of science from the world of
received truth and of deductive reasoning to be a crowning achievement
of Western man. Inductive reasoning from observed and measured
phenomena, without fear of political or religious intervention, was a
jewel to be nurtured and cherished.
Similarly, any attempt to modify the word "democracy" by appending
a qualifying adjective could only serve to limit and diminish. A Socialist
democracy would be as suspect as an Islamic or Catholic democracy.
Even if one were to speak of "true democracy" the specter of a hidden
agenda would be raised by the very presence of the adjective.
Russell, in those ominous times, felt a real danger that the lights of
Western thought could be going out and that, with such a demise, the two
great intellectual achievements of Western civilization, free scientific
inquiry and the Lockean tradition, could be extinguished forever. He
taught that the preservation of those two traditions should be of primary
concern to all their beneficiaries .
More as a metaphor than as an exact parallel, Russell compared the
situation at the onset of World War II with the conditions under which
Saint Augustine (A.D. 354-430) wrote The City of God. Rome had fallen to
the Visigoths under Alaric in 410. Although Alaric was ostensibly a
Christian, the capture of the Eternal City was an omen of far worse things
to come. In 430, as the Vandal armies were in seige outside the walls of
Hippo on the North African coast (Annaba in modern Algeria), Saint
Augustine lay dying within. Russell suggested that the danger to civiliza-
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tion at the time of the fall of the Roman Empire was no more real than the
danger confronting the Western World as the decade of the 1940s
began.
The parallel between these two historic crises had even greater substance . Augustine saw human history as the struggle between the City of
God or the world of faith and the Pagan City, the world of unbelief. In the
darkest times the City of God, the world of faith, endured as a faint spark
nurtured in secret by a coterie of true believers.lt was only shortly before
the period of Saint Augustine that Constantine the Great (280-337 A.D.)
had made Christianity the official religion of Rome. The spark nurtured in
secret in the catacombs had become the open flame of faith and promise.
However the invading pagan hordes, by the time of Augustine, showed
that that resurgence was tenuous and that the flame was once again in
peril and could easily become extinguished. To Russell the twin faiths of
the liberal Lockean tradition and of free scientific inquiry were, like
Augustine's City of God, in danger of being extinguished. He felt that the
believers in these faiths might well face persecution and martyrdom and
be forced to go underground to some safe haven where the flames might
flicker but not go out. We were all challenged by Russell to go, figuratively, to the catacombs to keep the torch burning. To give the metaphor
historic substance, Russell pointed out that, in the Dark Ages, the Irish
monasteries did, in fact, serve as custodians of Christianity when its light
was all but extinguished on the continent of Europe . An examination of
The City of God may fail today to give the metaphor the full power of
analogy, however, in the light of the grim period in which the metaphor
was drawn, it seemed to be apt on the poetical if not the philosophical
level.
The Book Burners
In his Autobiography, Russell relates that, "late in the academic year" of
1939-40 he was invited to become a professor at the City College of New
York'. The controversy over the New York City College appointment is
well documented. Russell's Autobiography devotes 59 pages to the action
taken against his appointment 8 in New York City but gives no space to his
treatment by the media in Los Angeles. The local press, particularly the
Hearst chain's Los Angeles Evening Herald and Express, stirred up a West
coast fire-storm that was no less virulent than that on the East coast. The
controversy over Russell's fitness to teach centered on his atheism ("the
central dogmas of .. . religion find no support in science .. ..") and his
liberal views on sex ("sexual relations are a purely private matter which
does not concern either the state or the neighbors . ...") . Tame stuff in the
1990s but in the 1940s sufficiently provocative to rally churchmen, politi cians, and the law to seek to rescind the appointment.
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A culminating event in California, not mentioned in Russell's
Autobiography, was the attempt in late April to oust him from his post at
U.C.L.A. This action, reported in the Herald-Expresss on April 30, was
taken by I. R. Wall, a former Fresno minister, who sought a writ of
prohibition in the District Court of Appeals. The writ was directed against
"the board of regents in the University of California, Governer Culbert L.
Olson, Ellis E. Patterson, lieutenant governor; Paul Peek, secretary of
state, and Robert Gordon Sproul, head of the University of California."
The action echoed the charges made in New York City stating, in part :
... Wall's petition, in effect, asks that the court decree that the
contract of employment entered into with Dr. Russell "was
and is immoral, in its performance, unlawful, and that the
opinion, beliefs and doctrines of Bertrand Russell are
malicious, immoral, in violation of the law, un-American and
unconstitutional." ... The petitioner, Wall, set forth that he is
the father of two children, a boy, one year old, and a girl, six,
and that his interests and rights are jeopardized and that the
issues involved affect the rights of himself and his family ....
This West coast attack on Russell was, however, short-lived . On May 2,
the Herald Express reported that the "District Court of Appeals today
denied the petition of Rev. I. R. Wall, formerly of Fresno, to oust Dr.
Bertrand Russell, professor of philosophy at the University of California
at Los Angeles . . .."The article continued: "In its opinion the court held
that the Board of Regents of the university to whom the petitioners writ of
prohibition was directed, was a constituted corporation and that the
courts had no right to interfere in the absence of charges of fraud or of any
charges of oppression ...."And there the matter rested .
Strangers on Campus
In March, the Herald Express, in a front page story under the caption,
"Curious Strangers in Dr. Russell's Classes Told" reported "recently
'curious strangers,' evidently 'snooping for gossip,' have been
frequenting Dr. Russell 's classes, his examination reader, Hans Meyerhoff, said today." 9 I saw them, too. As the semester progressed, gaggles of
little old ladies would come on campus to parade in the halls where
Russell was due to lecture, hoping, somehow, to sneak in to the back of
the room . I remember being cornered by one grey-haired harridan who
wanted a '1ist of the dirty books" that Russell was advocating . I didn't tell
her about Hitler or Marx but did tell her about Lewis Carroll and Saint
Augustine . She wrote both the names and their book titles down in a
crabbed hand. She had obviously never heard of either .
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Support by Academia
Support of Bertrand Russell by the administration and the faculty
during his period of trial would make, by itself, an excellent vehicle for a
dissertation on the anthropology of academia. The individual who comes
off best is U.C.L.A. Provost Earle I. Hedrick who, in a February 3 interview quoted above, dismissed the whole matter, saying, '1f I fired everyone who was objected to by someone, I'd be the only person here."James
Bryant Conant, President of Harvard University, failed to use highly
public fora on academic freedom to mention a real-life case in his own
back yard. To his credit, however, he did honor Russell's appointment in
Fall, 1940, as the William James lecturer at Harvard. Robert Gordon
Sproul, President of the University of California, on the other hand,
talked out of both sides of his mouth . Publicly he was four-square for
academic freedom . Privately, however, he refused to renew an appointment that had become controversial. Politics prevailed over matters of
conscience.
On April 11, 1940, four of Russell's colleagues in the philosophy
department did take a position in a letter to Harry W. Laidler of the
League of Industrial Democracy, inviting him to make the letter public if
he saw fit. This letter, which is quoted in Russell'sAutobiography, 10 is interesting for its tentative tone, like the witness who says, 'Well, I didn't see
anything bad ." This caution may well have been prudent in an institution
headed by Robert Gordon Sproul. The letter, in its entirety, is quoted so
that its nuances may be interpreted by the reader:
Dear Mr . Laidler:
The undersigned members of the Department of
Philosophy at U.C.L.A . are taking the liberty to answer your
letter of inquiry addressed to Miss Creed. We have all
attended lectures or seminars conducted by Mr. Russell on
this campus, and have therefore first hand knowledge of the
character and the content of his teaching here. We find him to
be the most stimulating teacher we have known, and his
intellectual influence upon the student is remarkable. The
general effect of his teaching is to sharpen the student's sense
of truth, both by developing his desire for truth and by leading
him to a more rigorous application of the tests of truth. Also
unusual is the influence of Mr. Russell's moral character upon
the student. It is impossible to know Mr. Russell without
coming to admire his complete fairness, his unfailing and
genuine courtesy, and his sincere love of people and of
humanity.
We may add that there has not been any criticism of Mr.
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Russell's teachings on this campus. This Department, in
recommending Mr. Russell's appointment, was aware that
there would be some criticism on the part of outsiders of such
action by the University. But in no case has there been any
objection based on Mr. Russell's work here. In inviting Mr.
Russell to join us we did so in the faith that the individual
instructor is entitled to his individual opinions on political,
moral, and other social issues, and that unorthodox opinions
in such matters are no ground for banning an individual from
public life .
You may use this letter in any way you think fit.
Yours sincerely,
HANS REICHENBACH
ISABEL P. CREED
J. W. ROBSON
HUGH MILLER, Acting Chairman
Russell's View of U.C.L.A.

In his Autobiography, Russell treats his academic year at U.C.L.A. in two
paragraphs:
The academic atmosphere was much less agreeable than in
Chicago [where Russell had lectured in 1938-9); the people
were not so able, and the President [Robert Gordon Sproul]
was a man for whom I conceived, I think justly, a profound
aversion. If a lecturer said anything that was too liberal, it was
discovered that the lecturer in question did his work badly,
and he was dismissed . When there were meetings of the
Faculty, the President of the University used to march in as if
he were wearing jackboots, and rule any motion out of order if
he did not happen to like it . Everybody trembled at his frown,
and I was reminded of a meeting of the Reichstag under
Hitler.
Toward the end of the academic year 1939-40, I was invited
to become a professor at the College of the City of New York.
The matter appeared to be settled,and I wrote the President of
the University of California to resign my post there. Half an
hour after he received my letter, I learned that the appointment in New York was not definitive and I called upon the
President to withdraw my resignation , but he told me it was
too late. Earnest Christian taxpayers had been protesting
against having to contribute to the salary of an infidel, and the
President was glad to be quit of me .11
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Luncheon with the Russells
It was during this trying period that I, with one of my classmates, summoned up a high enough degree of bravado to invite Lord and Lady
Russell to lunch. We were assured that they would be delighted and, on
the appointed day, with our nerves very much at the breaking point, we
met the Russells at Mrs. Gray's Inn, an establishment at the corner of
Westwood and Wilshire that has long ago been supplanted by a highrise .
Our guests were gracious and made us feel immediately at home. I
remember Patricia ("Peter") Russell as being a handsome woman, much
younger than her husband, and as having improbably auburn hair. What
any of us ate I do not remember. Conversation inevitably shifted from the
war in Europe to the war that was going on in the press about Russell . I
said that I was gratified that Robert Gordon Sproul had made such a
spirited defense of Russell and of academic freedom . "Oh yes!", said
Russell, "But, just this morning he told me that he was truly terribly sorry
but he could not renew my contract!" This was my introduction to the
political side of the university: please the faculty by defending academia
but be pragmatic about renewing a controversial appointment.

Vignettes
Leftwing thought in 1940 and 1941 was heavily constrained by the
Hitler-Stalin detente . One could scarcely support the Allied cause in the
war in Europe without, also, undermining the formal position oflnternational Communism . The more radical students at U.C.L.A., who seemed
to have ready access to the editorial pages of The Daily Bruin, found themselves to be uncomfortable bedfellows with the America Firsters and the
Anglophobes of the extreme right. There was, of course, the occasional
peace rally, but the energy for great excitement was lacking until Hitler's
attack on Russia which did not come until June 22, 1941. As a result the
campus was a large hotbed of apathy in that day. The peace movement
and other liberal causes were confused and lacked direction . Perhaps for
this reason, the student body did not become particularly excited about
the Russell case and the assault on academic freedom being waged in the
press, although note was taken of it in the pages of The Daily Bruin. Rather
than feeling menaced, we were mostly amused by the witch hunt going
on around us . We did , affectionately, refer to Russell as "Dirty Bertie" and
more or less let it go at that, although we did engage in the usual ineffectual signing of petitions .
*

*

*

One morning Russell started his lecture with: "Ladies and gentlemen, I
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have told you that all philosophers are essentially muddleheaded and
that in order to understand a philosopher one must first understand his
muddle. Today we examine Georg Frederick Hegel, but first we must
explore his particular muddle ." Later, as the lecture progressed with a
thorough exploration of Hegel's boyhood and hardships, Hegel's
philosophy could be seen as an almost inevitable result of his personal
struggles. Somehow Russell made Hegel 's life itself appear as a dialectical process from which a view of history as a dialectical process was the
ultimate synthesis.

..

..

..

How did "Alice in Wonderland" fit into a course on Philosophic Ideas
in Practice? Russell, of course, had known Alexander Dodson (a.k.a.

Lewis Carroll) . Both were mathematicians of the first rank and, though
Carroll was of Oxford while Russell was from Cambridge, Russell held
the older Carroll in considerable esteemY Russell's fascination with the
whimsies of Alice 's adventures was both ethical and epistemological. His
recognition that mores were not absolutes but should befit the time and
place supported his ethical relativism . For example, an ethical outlook
appropriate for post-World War I England, when the ranks of males of
breeding age had been decimated by war, might not be an appropriate
ethic for a society where the male-female ratio was in balance . A similar
relativism may apply to a theory of meaning where there are no absolutes. There is a resonance in Alice's adventures supporting a relativistic
outlook. When Alice challenges Humpty Dumpty on the misuse of a
word, he replies, 'When I use a word it means exactly what I choose it to
mean -neither more nor less .. . The question is, which is to be masterthat's all." 13 In any event, it was clear that Russell, who, with Whitehead in
the Principia Mathematica, moved beyond symbolic to mathematical logic,
never failed to recognize Carroll's genius and contribution to the
development of the science (or philosophy) of Logic.
When one looks at the photographs of Bertrand Russell, which I took,
the resemblance to the mad Hatter of John Tenniel's Alice in Wonderland
drawings is striking. Russell was, of course, a far younger man when
Tenniel made his sketches, so one must ascribe the resemblance to mere
coincidence.

.

..

..

In his lectures, Russell spoke at length of the writings of the
philosophers and of the effect of those philosophies, directly or more
often by derivation, upon prose, poetry, and historic events . He seldom
mentioned music, although its transition from the formalism of the Age
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of Reason to the supercharged emotionalism of the Romantic Movement
pointedly illustrates the change in consciousness of the era. Russell had
few blind spots (although he publicly confessed to his inability to handle
the experimental side of science). Perhaps his childhood, which included
an hour at the piano keyboard following his early morning cold shower,
made him less appreciative of music than of other aesthetic forms .

..

..

..

A professor in the Philosophy Department at the time, Hans Reichenbach, who was due to become a formidable figure in American
philosophy, attended all of the lectures and associated himself so closely
with Russell that most of the students assumed that he was our reader,
although that honor actually went to Hans Meyerhoff who was less
memorable. 14 Russell refers to Reichenbach in a letter written in April of
1940 as "a German refugee who is a professor here, and whom I admire
both morally and intellectually." 15

The Romantic Hero
Russell taught that many of the problems besetting the Western world
were essentially an unfortunate outgrowth of the Romantic Movement.
This movement was not deeply seated in nor associated with the work of
any particular philosopher. Rather it was a quick swing of the general
consciousness from the ethos of the Age of Reason to a perception of
humanity rooted in emotion rather than reason; something darker and
more formless. One generally associates the Romantic Movement with
the arts rather than the field of politics. In literature, for example, there
came, late in the 18th and early in the 19th Century, a shift in artistic
themes from the classical world of Greece and Rome . The new poets celebrated the sublime in nature : No more pretty poems about shepherds
and shepherdesses in Acadian, sylvan settings. Rather, the ice falls and
ravines of the Alpine heights were celebrated, not as regions of dread but
as possessed of an emotion-stimulating majesty and grandure. Then
there was a shift to nostalgic national and ethnic themes. The legends and
sagas were reexplored and glorified. A sense of national pride in a mythic
past was fostered and shone brightly. An emotional energy was
generated that contrasted dramatically with the composed, rational, and
stylized works of the classic period.
In music the same revolution struck. The emotional rage of a
Beethoven took the orchestra out of the drawing room and into the public
arena. Old rules and forms were discarded and the hero-composer established his own milieu. Composers explored the airs and cadences of their
own countryside and created music extolling national forms and ideals.
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Liszt, the Hungarian; Dvorzak, the Czech; Sibelius, the Finn-all contributed to this pride in national identity. Wagner, the ultimate Romantic,
in his glorification of the Aryan super-hero Siegfried, helped to forge an
ethos of nationhood of all Germanic peoples, contributing to the demise
of the regional states and kingdoms of Hesse, Prussia, Wurtemburg, and
even of Bavaria, the stronghold of his besotted benefactor, King
Ludwig.
The world of art, also, moved from formalism to freer expression, abandoning repose for passion and classical motifs for national. The Romantic
Movement in painting and sculpture reflected what was going on in the
world of literature and music, further supporting the development of a
new consciousness about nationality and the romantic hero . In the world
of letters the romantic artist, as hero, rejected the classical, aristocratic,
subjects and forms to create works, following rules of his own creation,
that had more emotional, mass appeal and helped to support a sense of
national identity. Byron's death at the Marshes of Missolongi, while in
pursuit of Greek independence from the Turks, was a metaphor for the
whole Romantic Movement.
All over the continent, the old regional loyalities were being submerged in new national identities based on linguistic and, to a lesser
extent, ethnic lines. After Garibaldi, the kingdoms and dukedoms of the
Italian peninsula disappeared and Italy, as a nation, became a political fact
and a fact in the consciousness of the Italian-speaking people. Similarly
Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor, overcame regional loyalties to form the
German nation. What the French Revolution and the super-hero
Napoleon had accomplished for France at the close of the classic period
was true also for Germanic and Italian-speaking people . It is difficult,
now, in the 20th Century, to recognize that France, Germany, and Italy
have not always been there . But the fact remains that their origins as
modern nations were very closely associated with the Romantic Movement, which celebrated or became the proximate cause of their
creation .
The dark side of the Romantic Movement is the celebration of the
super-hero . To Russell, Don Juan was the archetype. The super-hero
rejects the rules and constraints of morality, establishes rules of his own
choosing and for his own purposes. Others may submit to a world of law
and ethics but that only makes it easier to use and manipulate them . The
super-hero has no regard for conventional morality nor the opinion of
others so long as he can gratify his own desires and achieve his own goals.
He never fears retribution, and if he does descend into Hell, h e goes
unrepentant.
The problem with having super-heroes, of course, is that you are
allowed to have only one at a time; otherwise they are at cross-purposes
and one or the other is destroyed . As a paradigm for human conduct the

40

concept of the super-hero is valueless since there can never be a society of
super-heroes. This does not mean that the super-hero cannot subvert or
coerce a class, or even a nation, to further his amoral interests. In doing
the will of the super-hero, an entire nation can act out his objectives, thus
magnifying the evils the super-hero may desire for his own ends. It is not
fear, alone, that causes a group or a nation to act amorally; appeals to race,
national pride, or, even, religion are a much more subtle and effective
lash.
It is ironic that the Romantic Movement which brought the world so
much beauty in the field of aesthetics brought it so much pain and
suffering through its anti-democratic, hero-worshiping demi-urge.
Russell's loathing for Hitler, the Teutonic super-hero, and Mussolini, the
super-Caesar, had cost him any degree of doctrinaire pacifism he might
have had remaining. "The Romantic Movement is one of the sources of
evil;' he was to write to Gilbert Murray.16 Stalin, Russell saw as a similar
super-hero, coming, not from the Romantic Movement, but from the
decay of an irrational dogma derived by Marx from Hegel. His view of
Stalin's corruption of the Socialist ideal is best expressed in Russell's
letter to Murray. "I should regard Socialism in its milder forms as a natural
development of the Christian tradition. But Marx belongs with Nietzsche
as an apostle of disruption, and unfortunately Marxism won among
socialists." 17
A Classroom Incident
During the difficult days of 1940, not long after the retreat from
Dunkirk, Russell delivered a rational dissertation, touched with emotion, about the great darkness that was threatening mankind through the
probable military success of the Hitler-Stalin Axis. Just as he was summing up before the bell, a student in the front row blurted out loudly, "All
of this may be very true but you haven't given me any reason to go out
and spill my guts on a foreign battlefield!"Russell reacted with shock and
dismay and dismissed the class.
As it chanced, I took a camera to the next session of the class. Russell
was slightly taken aback when the shutter first clicked but thereafter
ignored it. Illustrations for this essay include all of the photographs taken
that day and, although the negatives are a bit thin, the spirit, the wit, the
humor, and the profundity of the great man still shine through visually in
these candid shots.
Russell started out that morning-and the first frames reveal his grimly
serious mood-by referring to the remark that had been directed at him
at the close of the preceding session. He then went to the board and
wrote: "I do not know which side will win the war" and "I am not urging
that America should come into the war." After those opening disclaimers,
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he spoke of his personal belief that, although war was inherently evil, it
might sometimes be necessary to fight to prevent a greater evil. The
choice, however, must be personal but based on rational grounds. He
himself had chosen to go to jail for his consciencious objection to a
particular war at a particular time and would in all probability do so again.
But what, to him, was at stake at the present time was the survival or
extinction of the two greatest achievements of the West: democracy and
science. He spoke again of the necessity of keeping these two sparks alive
regardless of which side should prevail in the conflict. If necessary, the
course pointed out by Saint Augustine in The City of God would have to be
taken by keepers of these sacred flames, else all would be lost.
Russell insisted that he was urging no one to action but that he could
not in any honesty fail to point out the issues latent in the war and the consequences of an adverse outcome . He said that he could not under these
circumstances, remain a pacifist. This decision, we were made to feel, was
Russell's particular Gethsemane.
It was not in Russell's nature to hold a grim opening mood for long. As
he moved forward in his presentation, his wit, humor, and humanity
sparkled through the heavy clouds of his opening remarks . This transition can perhaps be sensed in the sequence of the photographs presented
here.

Envoi
To a casual observer of Russell's life, it would seem that the
philosopher, by the 1960's, had once agan become a doctrinaire pacifist.
Certainly, by the Viet Nam era, the issue of right and wrong was not as
sharply defined as it had been in the early days of World War II. Moreover, there was great logic and consistency in Russell's opposition to the
creation and the contemplation of the use of atomic weapons. Where
once the burning issue of war had been the preservation of ideas (i.e .,
science and democracy) , the issue by the time of the Cold War had
become the overwhelming need to preserve the genetic tissue from
which life itsef is formed. When Russell said, "Better red than dead," this
was not a signal that he had come to believe that Russian Communism
would or should succeed. Rather it was a recognition that humanity itself
was in danger of extinction, with no catacomb deep enough to preserve
the genetic spark. In the metaphor of Saint Augustine, which Russell had
used so tellingly many years earlier, there could this time be no one to
preserve the City of God.
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Notes
'In his Autobiography, Russell states about his lack of preparation: '1n the
summer months of 1939 we rented a house at Santa Barbara, which is an
altogether delightful place. Unfortunately, I injured my back, and had to lie flat on
my back for a month, tortured by almost unendurable sciatica. The result of this is
that I got behindhand with the preparations for my lectures, and that throughout
the coming academic year I was always overworked and always conscious that
my lectures were inadequate:' Bertrand Russell, Autobiography, The Middle Years
1914-1944. Bantam Books, Inc., New York, 1951, pp. 318-9.
2 Boolean algebra or Boolean logic was at that time seen as an intellectual
curiosity. However, within no more than ten years, it would become the basis for
computer programming.
3 Bertrand Russell, "The Ethics of War," International journal of Ethics, vol. 25
Oan .), pp. 127-142.
4 Ronald W. Clark, The Life of Bertrand Russell, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1976,
p . 332.
s Russell, Autobiography, p. 341.
6 Russell, Autobiography, p . 319.
7 Ibid., p. 322.
8 Ibid., pp. 319- 379.
9 Los Angeles Evening Herald and Express, March 30, 1940, p. 1.
10 Russell, Autobiography, pp. 334-335.
II Ibid., p. 319.
12 Carroll's contribution to the field of symbolic logic was not inconsiderable,
although, an Oxonian, he was out of the main stream of Cambridge scholarship.
His published book on Symbolic Logic, Part One, Elementary, 1906 was a
popularizing text that, drawing, as Russell did, on Boole and Venn, introduced a
new system of symbolic notation. Of and by itself, this volume could have been
regarded by academics as not sufficiently serious to be noticed. H owever, Part
Two, which was much more profound, was set in type before Carroll's death in
1898 and circulated piecemeal, for criticism, to logicians of the day. Russell
undoubtedly was familiar with this unpublish ed work. For more information on
this subject, the reader is directed to William Warren Bartley Ill, Lewis Carroll's
Symbolic Logic. Clarkson N. Potter, Inc, NY, 1977, pp. 3-36, Editor's
Introduction.
13 Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, Illustrated
Junior Library, Grosset & Dunlap, 1982, p . 238.
14 Hans Reichenbach (1891-1853) was then known principally for his work
published in German. He was to publish a number of highly-regarded works in
English, such as Elements of Symbolic Logic, New York, 1947; The Direction of Time,
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1956; The Rise of Scientific Philosophy,
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1953; and Modern Philosophy of Science,
London, 1958.
15 Russell, letter to Gilbert Murray, March 21, 1940, Autobiography, p . 361.
16 Russell, letter to Gilbert Murray, June 18, 1941, Ibid., p. 366.
17 Russell, letter to Gilbert Murray, June 18, 1941, Ibid., p . 366.
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Swing and a Myth:
Shoeless Joe Jackson
in Fiction

I

D. Mesher

T is not by chance that Jay Gatsby's favorite epithet is "old sport,"
because "the formless grace of our nervous, sporadic games" (p . 64)
is central to F. Scott Fitzgerald's quintessentially modern and American
novel. One of the most devasting metaphors of The Great Gatsby (1925)
comes from golf, the sport at which the "incurably dishonest" Jordan
Baker is accused of cheating by improving her lie. (p . 58) Yet Jordan is not
alone: almost all the characters of The Great Gatsby are caught improving
on the lies they tell or live, including Tom and Daisy, Gatsby, and even
Nick Carraway, the unreliable narrator of the novel. Polo and football are
also used ironically in the novel; but to personify the immoral center of
Gatsby's universe, Fitzgerald created Meyer Wolfsheim, "the man who
fixed the World Series back in 1919." (p. 74) More than three years after
the infamous Black Sox affair, Nick can still be amazed that "one man
could start to play with the faith of fifty million people."
The characterization of Wolfsheim-from the exaggerated accents of
such words as "business gonnegtion" and "Oggsfsord College" (pp . 712) to "the hair in his nostrils," (p. 173) -is an anti-Semitic travesty of
Arnold "The Brain" Rothstein, the American-born, dapper, and wellspoken gambler historically credited with the fix and perhaps suggests
the extent to which the novelist was infected by the American xenophobia of the Sacco and Vanzetti years (a case that also began in 1919) .1 If
the importance of the Black Sox scandal is sometimes overlooked by
readers of The Great Gatsby, that may be because the episode fits so well in
a novel that reverses traditional motifs of American literature; for
example, Fitzgerald's characters have all migrated eastward, toward the
"valley of ashes," (p . 23) instead of westward, toward the frontier, the
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"fresh, green breast of the new world." (p. 182) That change in direction
reflects the upheaval of the times, and in the betrayal of the American
pastime Fitzgerald found a striking correlative for such reversals.
Beliefs of an earlier America-the timelessness of the frontier, the
integrity of the self-created hero, the supremacy of financial success, and
the purity of sports-are all laid to rest in the short span of Nick's summer
in New York. Fitzgerald shrewdly brought order to his tale of the loss of
one system of belief by employing another, more formal system-as
Jerome Mandel argues-by using "the design, characters, details, and
distinguishing characteristics of medieval romance in composing The
Great Gatsby." 2 According to Nick, for example, Daisy is "the king's
daughter," (p. 120) who lives with Tom in one of "the white palaces of
fashionable East Egg," (p. 5) while Gatsby's house is "a factual imitation of
some Hotel de Ville in Normandy, with a tower on one side." (p. 5) The
apparent oddity of Fitzgerald turning to medieval sources for the underlying structure of this novel of the jazz age indicates the degree to which
he perceived contemporary dissolution. With modern values consigned
to the valley of ashes, Fitzgerald turned to an older system, anachronistic
but therefore stable; and in the stability of medieval romance, Fitzgerald
found secure references for his modern art, as T. S. Eliot had done before
him.
Sports generally, and baseball in particular, were never consigned to
the wasteland an increasingly sophisticated and cynical America
reserved for most of its 19th century ideals; indeed, the Black Sox scandal notwithstanding, professional baseball players, among other athletes,
soon took the place of the pioneers and frontiersmen as heroes in the
popular American imagination. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that,
30 years after The Great Gatsby, and shortly after a second world war, when
there was-not coincidentally-another "red scare," the most famous of
the Black Sox, Joseph Jefferson "Shoeless Joe" Jackson, underwent the
first of a series of fictional rehabilitations, in Bernard Malamud's The
Natural (1952), Douglass Wallop's The Year the Yankees Lost the Pennant
(1954), Philip Roth's The Great American Novel (1973), and W. P. Kinsella's
Shoe less Joe (1982). Even without his curious brilliance with the bat in a
World Series he is supposed to have thrown and without his rumored
playing later under assumed names, the duality of Shoeless Joe's
notoriety would be attractive as the basis for the characterization of a
post-modern anti-hero. He was, after all, one of the greatest players of all
time, and-until Pete Rose-the most famous of those ever to have been
banned from the game. 3 What is surprising, however, is how Malamud,
Wallop, Roth, and Kinsella, each in his own way, use the figure of Shoeless Joe not within the popular myths of American sport and culture, but
as a conduit for external myth, legend, and belief, in much the same way
that Fitzgerald utilized medieval romance: for Malamud, the grail; for
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Wallop, Faust; for Roth, a compendium of ancient and classical
mythology; and for Kinsella, Christianity.
The peculiar combination of baseball history and Arthurian legend in
The Natural was well-documented before critics began exploring the
similar but more subtle use of romance in The Great Gatsby. 4 Malamud's
protagonist, Roy Hobbs, is shot, as Eddie Waitkus was in 1949, by a crazy
Harriet Bird in her hotel room; like Babe Ruth in 1925, Hobbs eats himself into a huge stomach ache that could cost his team the pennant and is
hospitalized in a maternity ward for secrecy; and, like Ruth, Hobbs hits a
home run to cheer up a sick boy. Other events in the novel taken from the
history and lore of baseball recall legendary exploits of Rabbit Maranville,
Wilbert Robinson, Chuck Hostetler, and, of course, Joe Jackson. But Roy's
world is baseball fiction by way of T. S. Eliot and Jessie Weston: the
championship cup he is seeking has all the elements of the Holy Grail as
secularized by 20th-century literature. The team Roy joins as a
superannuated rookie, more than a decade after Harriet Bird's bullet
found its target, is the last-place Knights. Their manager, Pop Fisher,
bears the mark of the Fisher King's affliction in the athlete's foot on his
bandaged hands. The Knights's ballpark is a waste land, a "dusty field,"
where Pop's "heart feels dry as dust" and even the water fountain is
broken. (p. 45) Then Roy has his first at-bat. Told by Pop to "knock the
cover off of it," (p. 79) Roy does literally just that; as the ball unravels in
the outfield, a sudden downpour washes out the rest of the game, leaving
Roy "wading ankle deep in water." (p . 81) The drought broken, Pop
Fisher's hands begin to heal, and the Knights begin to win.
Roy is both hero and villain-not just Babe Ruth or Sir Galahad, but
also Joe Jackson . As such, Malamud offers a more authentic version of the
Black Sox scandal than Fitzgerald, who perpetuated the myth of American innocence by pitting the purity of the American game, its players, and
its fans against the insidious corruption of a gambler who would betray
them all. Malamud recognized that the formula for scandal included not
just Rothstein but Comisksy and Jackson, as well . In The Natural, Gus
Sands, the gambler, and Judge Goodwill Banner, the miserly owner of the
Knights, form an unholy alliance to corrupt the game and bribe Roy.
Hobbs, who wants all that is due him and more and who disappointingly
learns too late to set his goals higher than simply being "the best in the
game," (p. 156) takes the money. But he changes his mind in the final
inning of the season. Attempting to redeem himself in a last at-bat, he
strikes out against a rookie as he himself struck out the Whammer in the
first section of the book. The novel ends with an echo from the Shoeless
Joe legend: a newsboy pleads, "Say it ain't true, Roy." But "when Roy
looked into the boy's eyes he wanted to say it wasn't but couldn't, and he
lifted his hands to his face and wept many bitter tears." (p. 237) Roy's own
talent and innocence are no proof against suffering or mistakes-a lesson
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that the Hollywood film version, with Robert Redford, spectacularly
ignores, but one that clarifies Malamud's reincarnation of Joe Jackson as a
person victimized by himself, as are most Malamudian protagonists, and
not by the system.
Though at first The Natural may seem uncharacteristic of Malamud and
his later writings, there are in fact any number of consistencies between
the first novel and what came later. The opening image of Roy staring at
his own reflection in the train window and "surprised at the bright sight
of himself holding a yellow light over his head, peering back in," (p. 9)
recalls Malamud's frequent use of doubles and mirror-images, such as in
the opening of ''The Last Mohican" (1958). Roy's longing for Memo, after
a single, mistaken sexual encounter, is reminiscent of Frank Alpine's
desire for Helen Bober in The Assistant (1957). Similarly, Yakov Bok, the
protagonist of The Fixer (1966), describes his own sex life as "a long
season without rain." (p. 51) Nevertheless, when The Natural was published, Malamud was already known as a writer of ethnic, mostly Jewish,
short fiction, so that the novel's subject was unexpected. By combining
baseball and the grail, Malamud managed to delve into the underpinnings of American culture and Western literature, opening two areas
historically closed to Jewish writers. Professional sports, and baseball in
particular, have long been avenues by which immigrants and minorities
attain the social respect and financial rewards of the American dream; in
writing The Natural, Malamud may have been consciously traveling that
same road to mainstream American literary enfranchisement for himself
and other Jews. 5
Two years after the publication of The Natural, another novel mixing
baseball and myth appeared, featuring a ballplayer of singular abilities
who is mysterious about his past, a reporter anxious to uncover that
mystery, and a redheaded temptress. Any direct connection between the
novels is, however, unlikely, because for years the mythic dimension of
The Natural went virtually unrecognized. 6 In an updating of the Faust
legend, Wallop's protagonist, Joe Boyd, sells his soul to become Joe
Hardy, a young baseball phenomenon able to lift the lowly Washington
Senators (when there was such a team) past the Yankees, perennial
American League champions. The activities of one senator in particular,
Joseph McCarthy, form the subtext of Wallop's novel, just as they do in
Arthur Miller's play from the previous year, The Crucible (1953) . Near the
beginning of The Year the Yankees Lost the Pennant, for example, when the
devil Applegate mentions that a file has been kept on Boyd, and the latter,
not knowing to whom he is talking, objects that he is not a communist,
Applegate replies, "Communist! What memories that stirs!" (p. 18) The
case against Hardy, as presented by Luster Head, "columnist for the New
York Bugle," is one of McCarthyist innuendo and slander. Though Head
refuses to "identify his informant;' he claims, with the exaggerations of a
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demagogue, that "Hardy is guilty of conduct so insidious as to be almost
beyond belief." (p. 165) And Joe is rightly surprised at being asked to
prove himself: "Prove it?" he wonders. 'What am I supposed to prove?
He's the one making accusations." (p. 167)
Those familiar with Wallop's story only as the stage and screen musical
Damn Yankees may be surprised to learn that Joe Hardy has no nicknames, let alone "Shoe less Joe from Hannibal, Mo." There are, however,a
number of similarities connecting the novel's Joe Hardy and the historic
Joe Jackson : a great player is rumored to be involved in a scandal, a
hearing is held to ban him from baseball, and the player then vanishes
without a trace. Indeed, according to the novel's sports-page hyperbole,
the hoax Hardy "has worked on organized baseball makes the Black Sox
scandal look pale by comparison." (p. 165) Like the references to Joe
Jackson, the use of myth in the novel is neither creative nor thematically
consistent. After all, Joe Hardy is cheating just by playing baseballindeed, just by existing in the form created by Applegate. His abilities are
not natural but created by a performance-enhancing power more potent
than steroids: the devil himself. His "honesty" at the end of the novel, in
refusing to throw a game, should obviously matter much less in such a
context. Like Faust, Hardy is single-minded in striving for his goal,
literally to the final out. Like Faust, Hardy outwits the devil who, it turns
out, has been a Yankee fan for years, and Joe is changed back in the
process, saving his soul. The novel is not a triumph of virtue, but a paean
to professional sports, to winning at any cost. If Hardy is a hero within his
fiction, he is certainly a villain in the process of rehabilitating Shoeless
Joe: Wallop predicates the novel on the assumptions that cheating to lose
is reprehensible, but cheating to win can be admirable-especially if you
are a Washington Senators rooter, trying to defeat the Yankees. Roy
Hobbs ends his novel in tears; but Joe Boyd finds he can go home again,
and the absence of any moral pangs for what he has done tends to confirm, rather than reject, the situational ethics of the McCarthyism that
Wallop sought to lampoon.
Unlike Wallop, Roth was certainly familiar with The Natural when he
began to work on The Great American Novel. In a self-interview written
after the novel's publication, Roth makes mention of "some gifted
writers" of baseball stories, including "Ring Lardner, Mark Harris, and
Bernard Malamud particularly" and of his "admiration for their
ingenuity." (Reading, p . 86) Some of Roth's interests in the novel are
reminiscent of those of Malamud and Wallop . Like Malamud, Roth uses a
number of episodes familiar from baseball history within his fiction
including, as Richard Gilman has noted, "Pistol Pete Reiser cracking up
against a wall, Connie Mack breaking up his great A's team of 1929-31, or
Eddie Gaede!, all three-feet-seven of him, striding up to the plate."
(Gilman, p . 470) The Great American Novel once again mixes myth and
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baseball, though Malamud's subtlety becomes, with Roth, a tour de force
of not one, but a whole pantheon of myths. The lineup of his Port Ruppert
Mundys, for example, includes players with last names like Astarte,
Damur, Baal, Ptah, Rama, Hecket, Parusha, and Agni.7 While there is
humor in some of this-first baseman John Baal is the grandson of "the
legendary 'Base'" Baal (p. 104) and the son of "the infamous pitcher,
'Spit' "Baal (p. 105)-many of the gags are so forced that the tour sometimes loses its charm.
Like Wallop, Roth is concerned with cold war politics and demagogues,
as one might expect of a novel written in the final years of the Nixon
administration; the banned Babylonian ballplayer Gil Gamesh, for
example, returns as a Soviet spy, if not an American double agent. But
baseball for Roth, as for Malamud and Wallop before him, is essentially
American, the proper subject for a great American novel. ''Baseball made
me understand," Roth has written about his childhood elsewhere, "what
patriotism was all about, at its best." (Reading, p. 180) 8 Or as Tri-City
Tycoon owner Angela Trust tells Mundy star Roland Agni, "when
baseball goes, Roland, you can kiss America goodbye." (pp. 264-4)
If The Natural was written, in part, to establish Malamud's credentials as
a specifically American writer, Roth's novel seems designed to satirize
American literature. Roth once told a Sports Illustrated interviewer that he
had chosen baseball as his subject "because whaling was already taken,"9
and from the novel's opening "Call me Smitty," (p. 1) Melville and other
American writers are clearly on the author's mind. Roth takes the novel's
epigraph from Frank Norris: " . . . the Great American Novel is not
extinct, like the dodo, but mythical like the Hippogriff. .. ." Merely
recounting the facts and statistics of the game, writes the narrator Word
Smith in his Prologue, would not in the end produce "a compendium of
American baseball any more thorough than the one that Herman
Melville has assembled in Moby Dick on the American enterprise of
catching the whale." (p. 43) Indeed, Word Smith has earlier equated
Moby Dick with Ty Cobb, Ahab with Leo Durocher and John McGraw,
and Flask, Starbuck, and Stubb with "the Tinker, Evers, and Chance of the
Pequod's crew." (p. 41) In one way or another, writers from "Messrs.
Hawthorne, Melville, Twain, and James," (p. 35) to Ernest Hemingway,
are satirized by Roth . Unfortunately, there are not enough really funny
passages in the Prologue to excuse the coarse, intentionally offensive
sexual and racial epithets with which the novel is freely strewn nor even
to sustain the interminable alliterations of Word Smith, whose irritatingly excessive word play may be Roth's failed attempt at recreating in fiction the "highly alien but loving perspective" he enjoyed as a boy in Red
Barber's radio play-by-play of Brooklyn Dodger games. (Reading,
p . 183)
In fact, the book falls far short of The Great American Novel of its title;
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with its manic Prologue, its technically ingenious but unrealized tale, and
the multiple letters of rejection that form its end, this Great American Novel
comes much closer to John Barth than Herman Melville. In reviewing the
novel, Richard Gilman argued that
a tale such as this, if it is to be the creation of a usable myth, or
of a myth about mythmaking, has to unfold within a counterworld, a mock universe in which what exists and takes place
has all the plausibility, the specificity and detailed inevitability,
of actual history, but with a grand indifference to history,
which is, after all, only factual. (Gilman, p. 468)
But though mythic names are everywhere in the novel, Roth creates little
myth in terms of his characters or baseball.
A central exception to this indictment is Gil Gamesh, who as a 19-yearold threatens to become the greatest pitcher ever-literally threatens,
intimidating opposing players, fans, and umpires alike. Gamesh is a
flawed hero, with "the arm of a god, but the disposition of the Common
Man: petty, grudging, vengeful, gloating, selfish, narrow, and mean."
(p. 67) Like his Babylonian namesake, Gamesh's single-minded quest for
immortality is itself a violation of the true order: mortals do not become
gods, nor do pitchers call balls and strikes. The only one with the temerity
to oppose Gamesh is "the toughest, fairest official who ever wore blue,"
(p. 58) umpire Mike the Mouth. Their confrontation erupts at the end of
"the most perfect game ever ... conceived of by the mind of man."
(pp. 72- 3) But Gamesh, forced to re-pitch the last strike, gives up a hit,
ruining his perfect game, and in anger, on the next pitch, tries to kill the
ump with a fastball. Banished from baseball as a result, like Shoeless Joe,
Gamesh becomes a folk hero: "His name, his initials, his number were
everywhere ." (p. 79) His betrayal of the game, however, is not finished.
At the end of the novel, Gamesh, now a Soviet agent, having wandered
through a long list of American literary settings, from "Winesburg, Ohio,"
to "Black Hawk, Nebraska; Zenith, Minnesota; up in Michigan; Jefferson,
Mississippi; Lycurgus, New York; Walden, Massachusetts," (p. 360) is
reinstated in baseball as the Mundy manager, "the martyred intransigent, the enviable transgressor, and something too of the resurrected
who had died for their sins and returned ." (p. 360) With the unwitting
help of the House On-American Activities Committee and the Commissioner of Baseball, Gamesh now destroys the Patriot League by falsely
denouncing its players, coaches, and owners as communists.
Gil Gamesh's career only partly parallels that of Shoeless Joe, because
Roth has saved a key portion of the Jackson legend to be relived by
another of his unpleasant characters. On his way to the HUAC hearings
to face Gamesh's charges that he is a communist, 0. K. Ockatur, the 37-
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inch tall Mundy pitcher, is accosted by a weeping "midget in a
messenger's uniform," who calls out, "Say it ain't so, 0 . K.!" Unlike Roy
Hobbs or Joe Jackson before him, however, Ockatur is in fact innocentor, at least, he is not a communist. '1nnocent;' though, hardly describes
Ockatur, who has a "fierce hatred of all men taller than himself" (p. 197)
and who has previously blinded Bob Yamm, the popular midget pinchhitter of Frank Mazuma's Kakoola Reapers, after a well-publicized feud.
Yamm, perfectly formed in miniature, articulate, and representing such
basic American values as optimism and individualism, seems too good to
be part of Roth's novel, and he is. Yamm concludes a radio address with
the inspiration that "on high, there is but one God who made us all, and to
Him, all men are midgets." (p. 205) As uplifting as this sounds, it is
attacked by touchstone Angela Whittling Trust as simply untrue, since
"all men are not midgets." (p. 208) The issue here has little to do with
midgets. Bernard Malamud was once quoted as defending his fiction by
saying that "all men are Jews;' (Stern, p . 243) and critics have long
pointed out that Roth's use of Jewish characters can be summed up in the
phrase that "all Jews are men." It is fitting that Roth's position should be
represented in the novel by Ockatur, deformed in spirit as well as body;
0 . K.'s very deformities and his bitterness about them make him a more
realistic character than Yamm (until the latter is blinded) and earn him
that final Shoeless Joe Jackson reprise, just as Jackson's failings brought a
sense of reality to the game.
But what if Jackson had no failings? What if the charges that he threw
the World Series are wrong? In part, W. P . Kinsella's Shoeless Joe (1982), a
novel not long on realism of any sort, begins with such assumptions. The
father of Ray Kinsella, the novel's narrator, "insisted that Shoeless Joe was
innocent, a victim of big business and crooked gamblers," (p. 7) and while
Ray may have his doubts, he decides that when Jackson arrives, he "won't
put him on the spot by asking ... . It is likely that he did accept money
from gamblers. But throw the Series? Never!" (p. 9) Arrive Shoeless Joe
does, after Ray builds a left field in the middle of his Iowa cornfield, on the
instructions of a disembodied voice "of a ballpark announcer" that clearly
tells him, '1f you build it, he will come." (p. 3) Ray explains that "he, of
course, was Shoeless Joe Jackson," (p. 6) but Jackson is only the first to
arrive . As Ray completes the ballpark in his cornfield, kidnapping J.D.
Salinger along the way, others materialize, including the rest of the
Chicago Eight, and last of all Ray's own father, a minor-league catcher.
Ray's father, in fact, seems to be the true motivation behind building the
ballpark, as well as behind the narrative itself, which begins with the
words "my father." (p. 3) With him, Kinsella 's trinity is complete: father,
son, and ghostly Shoeless Joe Jackson.
This parody of Christian myth is surely intentional; and it marks an
important difference between the myths of Kinsella's novel and those of
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the other three. For the authors of Arthurian romances and Faustian
dramas, as for the cultures who worshipped the gods now wearing
Ruppert Mundy uniforms, these were essentially religious works. Yet
neither Malamud, Wallop, nor Roth treats his myth as religious in this
way; indeed, the only signs of Christianity in any of those works are
Roth's occasional allusions to Gil Gamesh as an ironic Christ-figure and
his satiric portrait of Mister Fairsmith, the missionary manager of
Christianity and baseball who is appalled to see the former cannibals,
whom he has taught to play baseball, eat their gloves when he refuses to
allow them to slide into first. Art and baseball seem religion enough for
these three writers: Roy Hobbs and Joe Hardy may wrestle with the devil,
but their victories cannot be seen as Christian affirmations; and if Roth's
portrayal of Christian missionaries is satiric, he levels no greater attack
against Christianity than against any other Western institution. But
Kinsella goes beyond using baseball to represent mythic North American values; his novel is a psalm to "the great god Baseball" (p. 6) and an
attack on Iowa bible-belt Christianity.
Early in the novel, it might seem that Kinsella is duplicating Christian
myth without disparaging it: in his theology not Jesus but "Shoeless Joe
became a symbol of the tyranny of the powerful over the powerless. The
name Kenesaw Mountain Landis became synonymous with the Devil."
(p. 7) Kinsella's religion needs "shrines in recognition of baseball greats:
Ty Cobb, Tris Speaker, Shoeless Joe Jackson, Ruth, Gehrig, Mantle, Mays,
DiMaggio, and a few dozen others. Not just at Cooperstown, but at
roadside shrines." (p. 34) Though the narrator compares such shrines to
"the cairns that commemorate cavalry battles, treaty signings, and Indian
uprisings;' it may be that Kinsella also has in mind those shrines to
Catholic saints that dot the roadsides in parts of his native Canada. And
the faithful are a new chosen people; Ray tells J.D. Salinger that "we're
not just ordinary people, we're a congregation. Baseball is a ceremony, a
ritual." (p. 84)
Baseball-as-religion seems innocuous enough: the ravings of a baseball
fanatic, fitting for a character that would build a ballpark in the middle of
his cornfield. The uninitiated - including, at first, Ray's twin brother
Richard, who asks "Is this some kind of religion?" (p. 199)-cannot see
the resurrected ballplayers, but the faithful in the left field stands are
enraptured. All this culminates in what could be called The Sermon on
the Bleachers, when Eddie Scissons, "wild and windblown, looking for all
the world like an Old Testament prophet on the side of a mountain,"
(p. 227) preaches that "the word of salvation is baseball." (p. 228)
As is often the case, Ray, the prophet of a new religion, has little
tolerance for the old. Though early in the novel he says, '1 try never to discuss religion or politics," (p. 124) he makes it clear that the kind of people
he "absolutely cannot tolerate are those, like Annie's mother, who never
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let you forget they are religious ." (p. 175) In fact, Annie's family-and
especially Ray's brother-in-law, Mark-are the real villains of the piece,
with their traditional admixture of evangelical religion and hard-nosed
materialism. Spiritual descendants of the Puritans, Ray's in-laws represent the other side of traditional American values, unalterably opposed to
pastimes and merry-making.
Chief among the modern-day Puritans, Mark "has brothers named
Matthew, Luke, and John" (p. 26) and even looks to the narrator '1ike a
villain from a 19th-century melodrama." (p. 72) In an updating of the conflict between dust-bowl farmers and the tractor from Steinbeck's The
Grapes of Wrath, the background struggle of Shoeless Joe is between the
small, quarter-section farmer and computerized agribusiness. Ray is the
romantic tiller of the soil, who says, "Once you've been touched by the
land, the wind never blows so cold again, because your love files the
edges off it." (p. 194) But Mark advocates what he calls "computer
farming" with "beady eyes blazing like those of a zealous evangelist"
(p. 193); and the last quarter-section he needs to acquire is Ray's. Of
course, Ray is ripe for bankruptcy: already behind in his mortgage, he
puts considerable time and money into constructing his playing field and,
in the middle of the summer, leaves the farm long enough to pick up
Salinger and Moonlight Graham, stopping for ball games from
Massachusetts to Minnesota. For Kinsella, Mark represents both sides of
the dour Puritan heritage: public, organized Christianity and destructive, grasping capitalism. The lack of imagination in both is what alienates
Ray. Mark may sarcastically tell Annie and Ray, "You're going to discover
diamonds in your cornfield," (p. 73) but that is exactly what they create .
When, at the beginning of the novel, Ray stands ready "to cut into the
cornfield, to chisel away a piece of our livelihood to use as dream currency," (p. 5) he is investing in a system far removed from that of Mark's
"money breeding incestuously, diversifying, multiplying" (p. 194)-he is
making a long-overdue down-payment on the American dream.
Kinsella's Shoeless Joe Jackson is made a martyr to that crass image of
the American dream, struck down by "the circumstances. The circumstances. The players were paid peasant salaries while the owners became
rich." (p. 9) Kinsella differs here from his literary predecessors. Roy
Hobbs, Joe Boyd, Gil Gamesh,and 0. K. Ockatur choose all too humanly.
Hoping, like Jay Gatsby, "to gulp down the incomparable milk of
wonder," they instead wed their "unutterable visions" to perishable
breath (Gatsby, p . 112) and become, like Shoeless Joe Jackson himself,
heroes of human frailties . Though Kinsella, like Malamud, Wallop, and
Roth, mourns a loss of romaticism or innocence in America, his Shoe less
Joe is an attempt to rewrite the lessons of the past, not to learn from them.
Through the forced optimism that pervades Shoeless Joe, Kinsella seems to
be compounding Jay Gatsby's famous error about repeating the past, as if
he were saying, "Can't repeat the pastime? Why of course you can!"
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Notes
1 An excellent example of the positive reception accorded the novel's antiSemitic portrait of Wolfsheim is Edith Wharton's praise for the character as the
"perfect Jew," in a letter to Fitzgerald. (Crack-Up, p. 310)
2 Jerome Mandel, "The Grotesque Rose: Medieval Romance and The Great
Gatsby," Modern Fiction Studies 34 (1988), p. 541. Other studies connecting
medieval romance and The Great Gatsby include Nancy Y. Hoffman, "The Great
Gatsby: Troilus and Criseyde Revisited," Fitzgerald-Hemingway Annual (1971), pp.
148-158; Robert E. Morsberger, "The Romantic Ancestry of The Great Gatsby,"
Fitzgerald-Hemingway Annual (1973), pp. 119-130; Letha Audhuy, "The Waste Land:
Myth and Symbol in The Great Gatsby," Etudes Anglaises 33 (1980), pp. 41-54; and
Elizabeth Morgan, "Gatsby in the Garden: Courtly Love and Irony," College Literature 11 (1984), pp. 163-177.
3 In ten seasons in the major leagues (1911-20), Jackson compiled a .356
lifetime batting average. In the 1919 World Series, Jackson hit .375 and, though
accused of committing gaffs in the field, played without an official error.
4 For discussions of baseball history and Arthurian myth in The Natural, see
especially: Earl Wasserman, "The Natural: Malamud's World Ceres;' The Centennial Review 9 (1965), pp. 438--{)0; Sidney Richman, Bernard Malamud (New York:
Twayne, 1966), pp. 28-49; Frederick W. Turner, "Myth Inside and Out: The
Natural," Novel 1 (1968), pp. 133-39; and Robert C. Lidston, "Malamud's The
Natural: An Arthurian Quest in the Big Leagues," West Virginia Philological Papers
27 (1981), pp. 75-81.
5 That Jews were still excluded from the literary establishment until World War
II is illustrated by the story of Lionel Trilling's experiences in the English Department at Columbia University, as recounted by both Norman Podhoretz, in Making
It (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968), p. 48n,and Alfred Kazin, in New York Jew (New
York: Knopf, 1978), pp. 42-3.
6 An early review of The Natural that recognizes the novel's mythic levels is
Norman Podhoretz's "Achilles in Left Field," Commentary 15 (1953), pp. 321-26,
but, as the title suggests, it discusses Malamud's purported Homeric, not
Arthurian, allusions.
1 Astarte is a Western Semitic fertility goddess; Damur may be a mistake for
Damu, a Sumerian vegetation god; Baal was the Caananite god of fertility and life;
Ptah was an Egyptian god associated with Memphis; Rama is one of the Hindu
god Vishnu's incarnations; Hecket, or Heket, was an Egyptian frog-headed
goddess; Parusha, or purusha, is the Hindu cosmic spirit; and Agni is the Indian
god of fire.
8 This feeling is perhaps the origin of the name of the novel's Patriot League.
Similarly, the Ruppert Mundys are apparently named for "Ruppert Stadium, a
green wedge of pasture miraculously walled in among the factories, warehouses,
and truck depots of industrial Newark" where the young Roth watched the minor
league Newark Bears play. (Reading, p. 181)
9 The quotation appears in Sports Illustrated March 12, 1973, p. 4, in an untitled
column in the issue containing an excerpt from the novel entitled "The Great
American Rookie."
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''And still the box is
not full'': East of Eden

Roy S. Simmonds

W

HEN, on September 19, 1952, John Steinbeck's eagerly-awaited
major novel, East of Eden, was published in New York by the
Viking Press, it was found to carry a somewhat unusual dedication in the
form of a short letter or note to the author's editor and friend, Pascal
Covici. The dedication must have puzzled many, if not most, of the book's
first readers.
Dear Pat [it read]:
You came upon me carving some kind of little figure out of
wood and you said, "Why don't you make something for me?"
I asked you what you wanted, and you said, "A box ."
"What for?"
"To put things in."
'What things?"
'Whatever you have," you said.
Well, here's your box. Nearly everything I have is in it, and it
is not fu ll. Pain and excitement are in it, and feeling good or
bad and evil thoughts and good thoughts- the pleasure of
design and some despair and the indescribable joy of creation.
And on top of these are all the gratitude and love I have for
you.
And still the box is not full.
JOHN'
What, one can imagine those puzzled readers asking, is this box to
which Steinbeck is referring? Is it an actual box? Or is it as might seem
likely, a symbol for the book itself? Why, whether it is an actual box or a
symbolic box, does the author consider it only partially full? Why, indeed,
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is he so concerned on this score as to draw attention to it twice in the brief
letter?
The readers of the Saturday Review of August 30 that year had been
given answers in advance to some of these questions. In her "Trade
Winds" feature, Laura Z. Hobson had devoted almost two columns to
providing some background information about Steinbeck's forthcoming
novel. She reproduced the dedication in full and, among other matters,
revealed:
Steinbeck writes longhand, on white foolscap with blue
lines, and as he turns a page, he often sets down, on its other
side, his own comment about what he has done, notes about
things to come, his personal thoughts and emotions, both
about the work in hand and about life in general. Thus, when
he at last delivered the thousand-page manuscript of his new
novel to Pascal Covici, his editor at Viking Press, there was on
the backs of the pages, a large part of what might one day be
published as "John Steinbeck's Journal."
.. . During the entire writing of a novel Mr. Covici sees
Steinbeck every few days; often the author reads aloud whatever he has done since the last visit. When "East of Eden" was
finished, Steinbeck sent it to Covici in a large mahogany box
he had made himself .. . Along with the ... box containing the
Ms. went a note from the author, and it is that note which,
without Mr. Covici's knowledge until he found it in the
printed book, later became the dedication borne by "East of
Eden" . . .2
These details, clearly supplied by the publicity department of the
Viking Press and not by the author himself, certainly answered some
questions. What the article did not elucidate was Steinbeck's repeated
comment in the note to his editor that the box still was not full. Moreover,
some of the information in the article was short on detail, even misleading
in places. Hobson refers to Steinbeck delivering the completed manuscript to Covici, and, a few lines later, links this by implication with the
statement that when East of Eden was finished Steinbeck sent it to Covici in
the mahogany box. Steinbeck, however, did not wait until he had completed his manuscript before delivering it to Covici. Although, as the
article reveals, he may have read sections from the manuscript to Covici
during their periodic meetings, he did, in fact, give or send his editor, on a
consistent weekly basis, his manuscript pages as he completed them.
Covici had a typescript prepared from them, and then, also on a weekly
basis, returned the manuscript pages, together with copies of the corresponding typescript pages. 3 Covici, therefore, was intimately
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acquainted with the work Steinbeck was doing during the whole period
of its composition .
Hobson's article, also by implication, suggests that Steinbeck sent the
box containing the manuscript to Covici as soon as he had finished the
book. This statement, too, is not altogether accurate, and thus open to
misinterpretation; for after Steinbeck completed the first draft on
November 1, 1951, he spent the next four months or so revising it. So the
final text, as published, was not completed until March, 1952. The box,
with the first draft manuscript inside and accompanied by the short letter
which became the published dedication to the book, was given to Covici
as a Christmas gift, presumably sometime during December, 1951.4
While the actual date of the gift is not of overriding importance, it is essential to bear in mind that the comment, "And still the box is not full," refers
to the contents of the box - in other words, the first draft of the noveland not, as the book's dedication inevitably leads its readers to believe, to
the published text.
"John Steinbeck's Journal" was published in December, 1969, under
the title Journal of a Novel: The EAST OF EDEN Letters.5 It proved to be an
extremely revealing and deeply absorbing document, although in some
respects - for there is only the published text of the novel to relate to
while reading it-a teasing and somewhat confusing one. It also reveals
that Steinbeck did, in fact, write a long letter, addressed to Covici, which
he intended should appear as a form of preface to the published novel.
This letter, printed as an appendix to the Journal, was, according to Steinbeck, to be regarded as "dedication, prologue, argument, apology,
epilogue and perhaps epitaph all in one." (JN, p. 179) In the "Publishers'
Note" that appears in the preliminaries to the Journal, this prefatory letter
is described as embodying an "imaginary conversation;' in the form of
"an argument which Steinbeck facetiously set up in anticipation of what
he feared might be said about the book by his publishers and the reader:'
(JN, p. ix) The "Publisher's Note" therefore suggests that Steinbeck was
predicting the sort of criticisms his first draft would attract, such as, for
example, that the book was too long, too digressive in nature, structurally unbalanced and chronologically confusing, and that additionally it
presented its main characters in unrealistically black and white terms.
There are grounds, however, for suspecting that this long letter was
written not in anticipation of what might be said, but rather as a retrospective comment on what had already been said by Covici and the other
editors at Viking. The place and date of composition of the letter- "New
York, 1952"- indicates not only that it was written after the Christmas gift
note used as the book's dedication, but also that it was written sometime
after the process of revision had already commenced . Indeed, there is evidence to support the view that the letter was not written until March,
1952, at the earliest, when the process of revision was completed and just
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prior to Steinbeck leaving New York with his wife, Elaine, on a long trip
abroad .6
Also the "Publishers' Note" in the Journal tells that Steinbeck himself
decided not to use the long prefatory letter; but a letter he wrote Covici
from Madrid on April 10, 1951, suggests that it was Covici (or Viking)
who proposed that it should not be used.' Whoever made the decision,
one can appreciate the reasoning behind it. The letter, after all, refers to
some matters that are not altogether apparent in the published text,
and-perhaps more pertinently-points to some of the flaws that still
remained in the book, even after revision . Possibly, it was considered
wise by all concerned not to place readymade ammunition into the hands
of contemporary critics, many of whom Steinbeck had from the outset
been convinced would be waiting to savage the book. The reviews, as it
happened, proved to be, as Steinbeck's always seemed to be, mixed. But
there were far more favorable reviews than bad or indifferent ones, and,
according to Jackson J. Benson, Steinbeck was, in the main, "gratified with
the reception the novel received." (Adventures, p. 732)
In the community of Steinbeck scholars, the novel has over the years
had its staunch admirers and its violent detractors, while the majority
have maintained a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward this longest of
Steinbeck's fictional works, troubled by what they variously see as its
overall structural imbalance, its blatant symbolism, its second-rate
philosophizing and simplistic psychology, its recurring sentimentality, its
occasionally overwrought prose, the implausible behavior of some of its
characters, and its over-explicit reiteration of the fundamental Cain and
Abel theme.
Steinbeck always regarded East of Eden as his "big book." 8 Both before
and shortly after he began the first draft of the novel, he recorded in his
correspondence and his journal his high aspirations. He planned for East
of Eden to be "the longest and the most ambitious and ... best" book he
had ever done (SLL, p . 418); the book he had "always wanted to write and
[had] worked and prayed to be able to write"; the book for which every
previous book he had written had been but an exercise to enable him to
write this one; the book, so he contended, that "must contain all in the
world I know and it must have everything in it of which I am capable -all
styles, all techniques, all poetry." (JN, p . 8) In March, 1951, five weeks into
the writing of the first draft, he told Covici:
This book is very important to m e . I am going to do no going
back until the whole is completed but then it is going to be
overhauled very very deeply. I shall insist on that. This is m y
big book. And it has to be a big book, and because it is new in
form although old in pace it has to be excellent in every detail.
And I don't care how long it takes to make it that way and I
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mean this. You can't train for something all your life and then
have it fall short because you are hurrying to get it finished.
(JN, p . 33)
Certainly, the four months he spent revising the typescript was the
longest period he had ever devoted to the revision of any of his books .
After the novel was published, he asserted: "If East of Eden isn't good, then
I've been wasting my time ." 9
The book had undergone an extremely long gestation and passed
through many evolutions before its eventual publication . As far back as
1933, Steinbeck mentioned to the writer George Albee that he had it in
mind "to write the story of this whole [Salinas] valley, of all the little
towns and all the farms and the ranches in the wilder hills. I can see how I
would like to do it so that it would be the valley of the world." (SLL, pp.
73-74) In a 1938 diary, he recorded his wish to one day "write about my
own people ." 10 In September, 1944, he told his friend Carlton A.
Sheffield: "Within a year or so I want to get to work on a very large book
I've been thinking about for at least two years and a half. Everything else
is a kind of marking time ." (Adventures, p . 553) Three years later, he told
his friend and attorney Webster F . Street that he "would like to stop
everything to do a long novel" and revealed that he had been working for
a considerable time on the notes for such a work. He described that what
he had in mind, after having worked for the past few years "on bits and
pieces of things without much continuity," was "a long slow piece of
work ." (SLL, p. 301) In 1948, shortly after he had stepped up the pace of
his research for the book by examining the files of the Salinas-Californian,
he was predicting, somewhat optimistically as it turned out, that the new
book would be published in 1950. He explained in a newspaper interview at that time that the work would "show the development of the
people, chronicle events, and record the changes" in the Salinas Valley
since the turn of the century. The novel, he went on, would "have no plot
in the true sense of the word" and would be "entirely different from my
previous work." He declared : '1 believe it will be my best." 11
His research for and his thinking about the book continued throughout 1948, 1949, and 1950, but, whenever he was asked, he replied that he
was not yet ready to begin the actual writing. Those years, at least the two
earlier ones, were traumatic ones for him. In May, 1948, his close friend
and erstwhile collaborator and mentor, the biologist Edward F. Ricketts,
died following a horrendous automobile accident. A few weeks later,
before he had time to recover from this blow, his second wife, Gwyn, sued
for divorce, obtaining the custody of their two small children. For a time,
it would seem, Steinbeck went to pieces, seeking solace in the bottle. He
nevertheless did not abandon writing altogether. There was solace, too,
in work. During that three-year period, he produced the script for the
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movie "Viva Zapata"; an affectionate memoir of Ricketts; two not very
memorable short stories, "The Miracle of Tepayac" and "His Father"; and
the third and least successful of his excursions into the play-novella
genre, Burning Bright. There were, in addition, other projects, none of
which came to fruition: a series of short stories, which he destroyed;
several abortive attempts to write other plays; and, in spite of what he had
said to the contrary, a number of false starts on the "big book." Purpose
began returning to his life after mid-1949, when he met Elaine Scott. In
December, 1950, she became his third wife.
Marriage gave him the stability and his new wife the love and understanding that he needed to embark at last on the composition of The
Salinas Valley, the rather prosaic working title he had given the book. By
February, 1951, after what he termed "three years of puzzled thinking,"
(JN, p. 43) he imagined that he had finally crystallized his thoughts and
had worked out a plan for the book, a plan that was in many ways
radically different from the one he had projected in 1948. The death of
Ricketts and the break-up of his second marriage had not only affected
him deeply as a person and modified his thinking but had also changed
his aims in writing the book. What he now envisaged was a book "so
simple in its difficulty that a child [could] understand it," (JN, p. 6) a book
that he would write specifically for his two sons, Thorn and John, then
aged six-and-a-half and four-and-a-half respectively, for them to read
when they were older. In chapters which would be effectively "letters"
addressed directly to the boys, he would relate the history of the valley he
had known for the past 50 years, so that they would in time, as he told
them, come "to know what your father was like and how he lived and
what your grandfathers and great grandfathers were like and how they
lived." As he further explained to his sons: '1f I do not tell you you will
never know and maybe that is not important but it seems so to me." 12 In
these "letter" chapters, as well as telling the boys about the valley and
their ancestors, he proposed to act out the real-life role of father now
partially denied him, passing on to them whatever knowledge and
wisdom experience had taught him, warning them against the pitfalls that
awaited them as they await every man, and teaching them, as one character in the book tells his son: "There's a responsibility in being a person .It's
more than just taking up space where air would be." (EE, p. 455) These
"letter" chapters were to alternate with chapters relating to the history of
a fictitious family, the Trasks, through three generations from 1862 to
1918. He saw the '1etter" chapters as providing counterpoint to the fictive chapters, in that they would provide contrast of pace and color to the
ongoing Trask saga. They would also have the effect of creating in the
reader a greater comprehension of the Trasks themselves and what made
them tick, without weighing down the basic story with too much factual
and historical background or with too much philosophical and psycho-
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logical exposition. Such well-defined segregation of the alternating
"letter" and fictive chapters would enable him to digress at will in the
non-fictive chapters, leaving those readers interested only in plot and
dialogue to concentrate wholly on the Trasks. (JN, p. 7) 13
He began writing the first holograph draft of the book on February 12,
1951, but he did not hold to his original plan for very long. He not only
failed completely to introduce, as he had intimated he would, the history
of his father's family, but he also began to give more and more space to the
fictitious Trasks at the expense of the factual history of his mother's
family, the Hamiltons. While the personal paternal content of the "letter"
chapters was retained and maintained to the end of the draft, it proceeded
on an increasingly intermittent basis. For a time, he persisted in his conviction that the book was more a "history" than a "novel." Anticipating
the possible future criticism that the work was hopelessly loose in construction, he had observed earlier to Covici: "History actually is not formless but a long [view?] and a philosophic turn of mind are necessary to see
its pattern ." (JN, p . 17) On April 23, he was still telling Covici: "It will ...
be said that I could well leave the Hamiltons out of the book because they
do not contribute directly nor often to the Trask development. And I must
be very willful about this, because this is not a story about the Trasks but
about the whole Valley which I am using as a microcosm of the whole
nation. It is not a romanza." (JN, p. 65)
But, of course, it was becoming very much a romanza. A month later,
having written the episode in the Trask narrative where, immediately
after the birth of the twins, Cathy shoots Adam and deserts not only him
but also her newborn babies in order to resume her old profession in a
Salinas brothel, Steinbeck was forced to concede that the book was not,
after all, "primarily about the Salinas Valley nor local people." (JN, p. 90)
He now appreciated that the book required a "general" title to replace the
then working title, My Valley, which, only a fortnight before, he had substituted for The Salinas Valley. (JN, p. 82) The work-in-progress was given its
third title, Cain Sign, one that had appropriate reference to the underlying Biblical theme. But he was still not satisfied, and a further three
weeks on he finally decided on what he called the "beautiful title" under
which the book was published. (JN, p. 104)
On June 26, when he had almost reached the halfway stage, having just
described the Hamiltons's 1911 Thanksgiving gathering and being on the
verge of recording Samuel Hamilton's death in March, 1912, Steinbeck
told Covici: "This is a great section on Hamilton-the last great section
save only one. There will be a Trask section, then the final one on Tom
[Hamilton] and that will be the last important contribution of the
Hamiltons except for small sections. My patterned book is clear to me
now-right to the end. And I am pleased to be able to follow the form I
laid down so long ago. I hope the book will sound a little formless at first
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until it settles in the mind." (JN, p . 112) By the time he had recounted the
deaths of Dessie and Tom Hamilton, two-thirds of the way through the
novel, any effective counterpointing of the factual history of the
Hamiltons with the fictive saga of the Trasks had been virtually abandoned, save for brief mentions of Will Hamilton (and those in a mainly
fictive context) and the sketchy appearances of the childhood figures of
Steinbeck himself and his sister Mary. The Trasks took over completely.
The only remaining counterpointing, other than occasional vignettes of
valley history, seems to have been the discursive paternal homilies.
All this, however charitably one chooses to regard it, does smack of a
certain confusion of intent, although not, as some critics have maintained, total loss of control over the material. The evidence merely indicates that, no matter how doggedly he may have claimed to have held to
the original form laid down '1ong ago;' whatever that long ago was, Steinbeck decided on at least two separate occasions during the writing of the
first draft to modify the design and purpose of the book. These modifications were conscious decisions taken by him, even if imposed by the
limitations of the material he was working with.
To quote one instance: although he claimed that the several episodes in
the Hamilton family history as presented in the novel were true in every
essential detail, he did, in fact, extend the life spans of certain members of
the family in order to stretch the presence of the Hamiltons as far as he
reasonably could into the later reaches of the narrative, thus preserving as
long as possible the counterpointing pattern between the real and the fictive families. Not only did Samuel Hamilton die in 1904, eight years
before the date Steinbeck has him die in East of Eden, but Tom Hamilton's
death occurred five years after that of his sister Dessie, rather than within
the few days that Steinbeck, for good dramatic effect, separates the two
deaths in the novel. 14 To be fair, Steinbeck had, at the outset, prepared the
ground for some manipulations of fact by warning his readers (including,
let us not forget, his sons Thorn and John) that, in telling the history of the
Hamiltons, he was having to "depend on hearsay, on old photographs, on
stories told, and on memories which are hazy and mixed with fable." (EE,
p . 8) But this surely does not justify the deliberate falsification of hard
facts in order to give some sort of structural or emotional shape to his narrative. It can be argued that, precisely on those grounds, he chose a perfectly legitimate literary ploy, and that it matters not one jot to the general
reader if now and then Steinbeck was deliberately inaccurate in
presenting his portrait of the Hamiltons. On the other hand, Steinbeck's
two young sons, to whom at this stage the book was still specifically
addressed, would have been concerned, particularly if they took at face
value their father's avowed object of letting them know what their
ancestors were like and how they lived (and presumably how and when
they died). Repeating legendary stories and suspect reminiscences, espe-
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cially if they are additionally identified as such, is a quite different matter
from altering indisputable facts. The whole rationale of the work as
originally conceived with its alternating chapters of fact and fiction, and
Steinbeck's declared purpose in writing it, began to crumble as soon as, at
an early stage, the stories of the Hamiltons and the Trasks, instead of
remaining on their separate courses in their separate alternating
chapters, began to merge, producing an uneasy alliance of fact and fiction.
There is little doubt that, having completed the first draft, Steinbeck
saw that a great deal more work needed to be done on the text. His words
to Covici, "And still the box is not full," may have been his way of admitting that he had realized that he had not achieved all he had set out to do.
Now, able to see in retrospect what he had been unable to appreciate
while absorbed in the ecstasy of creation, he immediately recognized that
the work was not only unbalanced in its overall structure but also flawed
here and there in its detailed construction . There could be no escaping
the "very very deep overhauling" that he had foreseen way back in
March. He would also have been much auare that he had not written out
his story to its logical conclusion . He had planned to bring it up to the
present time (that is, 1952), but had, in effect, run out of space and creative steam . He intended to write a sequel which would come to the
present-and, by so doing, fill the box. (SLL, p . 431) On the other hand,
his comment that the box still was not full was perhaps an acknowledgment that it was simply not possible, within the confines of a single work,
to encompass, as he had rather grandiosely set out to do, "all in the world
that [he] knew . .. all styles, all techniques, all poetry."
What is certain is that his publishers were dismayed, to put it in its
kindest terms, when confronted with the completed first draft . Steinbeck
could not have been wholly unprepared for their reaction . He had
already, in conversation and correspondence, been warned of how
Covici felt about some aspects of the work. He had shared the organic
growth of the manuscript with his editor and had protested strongly
against Covici's ongoing attempts at offering suggestions and criticism. "I
want to ask and even beg one thing of you," he had written to Covici on
April16, "that we do not discuss the book any more when you come over.
No matter how delicately we go about it, it confuses me and throws me off
the story.... Once it is done, you may tear it to shreds if you wish and I
won't object, and I'll go along with you ." UN, p . 58)
Harold Guinzburg, the president of the Viking Press, was given the
manuscript to read when Steinbeck reached the halfway stage. Covici
reported back to the author that Guinzburg seemed to be "bewildered"
by it. '1 hope," Steinbeck responded anxiously, "you don't mean confused ." UN, p . 128) Guinzburg, obviously having been appraised of Steinbeck's comment, hastily sent a diplomatic letter to the author. Steinbeck
told Covici: "[Guinzburg] has reservations but very wisely doesn't tell
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me what they are now. On the whole he seems to like Eden. And," he
added, "it would be a startling thing to read for the first time." (JN, p. 132)
Indeed, it must have been.
Even if Steinbeck realized the inadequacies of his first draft and the
need to develop the work further in revision, he possibly did not anticipate the degree to which he would be advised, even exhorted, by his publishers and by his agents, to eliminate large sections of the existing
manuscript, paring the work down to its essential storyline by ruthlessly
hacking away all the discursive material that was seen as tending to
smother it. "I've got one hell of a rewrite job to do," he told fellow-novelist
John O'Hara on November 26. (SLL, p.432) In the end, the process
became equated in his mind with that of "dressing a corpse for a real nice
funeral." (SLL, p. 458) The metaphor is apposite. He had always regarded
the books he had written as being like "very well embalmed corpses" on
the shelf, his inquiring mind restlessly looking forward to the next
project, the next challenge, the next experiment. On this occasion, however, his words may have had some deeper meaning. Not only did he feel
that he was conducting the last rites over the remains of his original text,
but that he was burying forever all idea of writing the projected sequel.
By his own admission, Steinbeck cut 90,000 words from his 265,000word manuscript, and then wrote several additional chapters and linking passages that subsequently became necessary. (SLL, p. 456) In his
1979 dissertation, Mark W. Govoni notes that the chapters and passages
Steinbeck retained from the original text underwent little revision, sometimes surviving virtually unscathed into the published book, and that the
principal changes instituted were those involving "shifts in structure
[and] the rearrangement of chapters." 15 However, in a 1981 essay in the
Steinbeck Quarterly, Govoni notes that "the fragments of the typescript of
the second draft of East of Eden .. . are extensively annotated by Covici"
and that "on many pages there are indications (usually pencilled-in comments or cross-outs) that Steinbeck approved of most of the criticisms,
giving Covici considerable editoriallicense." 16
Steinbeck had, of course, the previous April given more or less
unqualified consent to Covici's initiating whatever editing was thought
necessary. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that his words,
"you may tear it to shreds if you wish and I won't object, and I'll go along
with you," were written at an early stage of composition and at a time
when he was sure in what he was doing and what he planned to do. If
those words returned to haunt him in November, then, on the evidence
of Govoni's report, it may be assumed that Steinbeck did not go back on
them, perhaps being pragmatic enough, when it came to it, to realize that
the overall concept of his first draft, even ignoring all the imperfections he
now acknowledged, would simply not be acceptable to Viking nor to the
critics nor even to the reading public of the day. That original concept was
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simply too great a departure from his previous work and his previous
style. 17
Exhausted after the eight-and-a-half months of intensive creation, it
may be that he was still too close to his work to be able to decide for himself the exact nuts and bolts of the revision. What is certain is that all the
revisions, even those that he may have been doubtful about or even
fought against, were carried out with his eventual approval. Indeed, they
could not have been implemented in any other way, necessitating as they
did, according to Govoni, the writing of one complete new chapter and
whole sub-sections in ten other chapters, not to mention other additional miscellaneous material.
What essentially is more to the point is not so much who initiated the
revisions but rather whether or not Steinbeck himself was content with
the final text. Is there perhaps a trace of irony in the letter he sent Covici
when, ostensibly to everyone's satisfaction, the revision was completed?
"I am pleased that the Viking people like the book," he wrote. "''m sure
that pleases me. And of course I hope a lot of people like it." 18
Some idea of the regret he may possibly have felt about the published
text may be deduced from two articles which appeared around the time
East of Eden was published. The first of these is the Laura Z. Hobson "Trade
Winds" feature referred to earlier. Hobson reported:
The author's first notion, when he began actual work on [the
book], was to set down in story form, for his two small sons,
the full record of their ancestors from the time they moved
westward to the Salinas Valley just after the Civil War. His first
draft began that way, with many passages addressed directly
to his children. But somewhere along the line he introduced a
fictional family, the Trasks, and before he knew it the Trasks
had taken over. For a while the author fought back vigorously;
in the end he capitulated, reducing the story of his own family
to its vestigial elements, and finally striking out all the special
passages written to his sons.
This account is too simplistic and again not altogether accurate. The fictional Trasks were not, of course, an afterthought, as the article suggests,
but were an integral part of Steinbeck's design from the very beginning.
Furthermore, while Steinbeck may well have gradually phased out the
Hamiltons as the first draft progressed, he did, as we have seen, endeavor
to extend artificially their presence in the work as long as he could. Also, it
was not until the revision stage that Steinbeck deleted the passages
written directly to his sons. In fact, according to Govoni, he introduced a
long '1etter" to Tom and John quite late on in the first draft. What is interesting and significant in this Saturday Review item is the description of
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Steinbeck "fighting back vigorously" to preserve those particular elements in his book, before capitulating. To whom, though, did he
capitulate-to his own muse or to those who prevailed upon him to
change his text in so drastic a manner?
The second article is a report by Lewis Nichols of an interview with
Steinbeck. This appeared in The New York Times Book Review of September 28, 1952. While Steinbeck was fairly forthcoming on other matters
raised by Nichols, his immediate response, when asked if there was
"nothing" he wished to say about his newly-published novel, was: "Yes.
The research was agreeable." 19
Arguably, the discarded long prefatory letter published in the Journal
can provide further clues on this matter. If one can accept the real possibility that this letter was written after the process of revision had been
completed and not before it had begun, then one is entitled to ask if Steinbeck's questions and answers in the so-called "imaginary conversation"
are indeed as facetious as they have been presented to us, or if something
more should be read into them. At the end of the preamble to the conversation, Steinbeck observes: "[T]he book does not go from writer to
reader. It goes first to the lions- editors, publishers, critics, copy readers,
sales department. It is kicked and slashed and gouged. And its bloodied
father stands attorney." (JN, p. 180) If Steinbeck saw himself as attorney
for the defense before judge and jury, then the "argument" that follows,
taking the form of a series of exchanges between the writer and various
members of the Viking staff, demonstrates that while Steinbeck may ultimately have lost the case he did at least score one or two points on the
way.
In order to make the book conform with E. M. Forster's maxim, "Yesoh dear yes-the novel tells a story," all the carefully-planned balances
and counterpointing Steinbeck was insistent on maintaining have been
sacrificed. The direct references to Thorn and John have disappeared,
although in one or two of the few remaining expository passages the
author does still address the reader. The factual Hamilton chapters,
instead of being an integral element in the book's structure, now seem
little more than an irrelevant intrusion into the fictional narrative. The
stories of Adam Trask and his sons and of Cathy/ Kate, bereft of the discursive chapters and passages designed to complement them, stand
revealed in melodramatic and sometimes hardly credible starkness.
Indeed, Cathy/ Kate seems to dominate the whole book from her first
appearance early on-so much so that The New York Times Book Review
critic, Mark Scharer, described the book's ce ntral theme as "a story of
prostitution." 20 The surviving philosophical passages with their rather
preachy undertones, the sentimentality of certain episodes, the sometimes overwrought prose- all factors for which the book has been
severely criticized- have undoubtedly been accentuated by being
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divorced from the original father-to-sons emotional context. What has,
however, been achieved through the process of the revision is the conversion of a work courageously experimental in nature into a flawed but
publishable and very readable novel. And that, from what little we know
of the first draft, was no mean feat.
Mention of the first draft recalls once more that comment in the published dedication about the box still not being full, and this, in turn,
suggests what is possibly the most intriguing interpretation of Steinbeck's words, an interpretation that may be crucial in any consideration of
the Steinbeck canon.
About a fortnight before he began writing the first draft, Steinbeck
wrote in his journal: "A good writer always works at the impossible." (JN,
p. 4) Steinbeck, it must be said, was never one to rest on his laurels. Even
during what is so often loosely termed his "realist" period in the mid- and
late-1930s, each of his books was different in some aspect from those
preceding it. Indeed, after the publication of The Grapes of Wrath, Steinbeck was already beginning to look beyond the conventional novel itself.
He told Carlton A. Sheffield that he had determined to make a new start;
"I've worked the novel-I know it as far as I can take it. I never did think
much of it-a clumsy vehicle at best. And I don't know the form of the
new but I know there is a new which will be adequate and shaped by the
new thinking." (SLL, p. 194) He began writing a work, which he called The
God in the Pipes, concerning a community of poor people who had made
their homes in the old pipes and boilers discarded by the Monterey
canneries. In many ways, this work was the precursor to Cannery Row.
(1945) Satirical in mood and both absurd and romantic in content, it was
as complete a departure from the eminently successful Grapes as could be
imagined . But whatever plans he may have had back in 1939 for finding
the new form had to be put to one side while he wrote the narrative section of Sea of Cortez and frittered away too much valuable time and energy
by becoming involved with Hollywood and various independent film
makers. With the outbreak of war, he committed himself wholeheartedly
to the war effort, writing propaganda broadcasts for the overseas division of the Office of War Information, and such comparatively minor (if
significant at the time) works as The Moon Is Down, Bombs Away, A Medal for
Benny, and Lifeboat. After a spell as a war correspondent for The New York
Herald Tribune, which took him to England, North Africa and Italy, he sat
down to write Cannery Row, which more or less took him back to 1940 and
The God in the Pipes. In the light of all this, one may speculate on the course
Steinbeck's career might have taken after The Grapes of Wrath had he been
successful in finishing and publishing The God in the Pipes, and if the war
had not intervened .
During the last 20 years or so, the new critics and scholars, unshackling
themselves from the traditionalist view of the Steinbeck canon, have
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recognized that his work had not so much declined during the postwar
years but had, rather, been bravely channelled into a vastly different
phase of creativity. As Robert DeMott has observed: "Cannery Row, East of
Eden and Sweet Thursday represent Steinbeck's tentative forays into metafiction." DeMott referrs to Steinbeck's awareness, as expressed in an
excised passage from the first draft of East of Eden, "of current fictional
orthodoxy and his own independence in hewing to an original line of
approach 'at the risk of being howled down by the "realists".' " 21 Steinbeck also conveyed his fear to Covici, a few weeks after beginning that
first draft: ''You know as well as I do," he wrote, "that this book is going to
catch the same kind of hell that all the others did and for the same reasons.
It will not be what anyone expects and so the expecters will not like it.
And until it gets to people who don't expect anything and are just willing
to go along with the story, no one is likely to like this book." (JN, p. 26) He
told Charles Mercer in 1953 that, while he had not consciously set out in
East of Eden to break down an established novel form, it had occurred to
him that modern authors, by effacing themselves completely from the
novel, had created a stereotype. "I felt that I could tell East of Eden better by
being in it myself," he said. (Conversations, p. 57) 22
Govoni has proposed that East of Eden was Steinbeck's "most intense
and daring effort to attain the unattainable Grail." (Govoni Diss., p. 205) 23
That seems to sum up precisely Steinbeck's predicament after The Grapes
of Wrath . He never found his Grail, the new form for the novel that was
always just beyond his reach. The image of the unfilled box is a metaphor
for his unfulfilled destiny. But if in that first draft Steinbeck attempted the
impossible, that attempt can be seen in retrospect as the nearest he ever
came to brushing the Grail with his fingertips. In his own mind, while he
was writing it, he perhaps believed the Grail to be almost within his grasp.
Disappointed, perhaps even disillusioned, by the lack of enthusiasm of
those whose opinions he valued the most, the unconventional grand
design of the first draft of East of Eden was not one he could ever bring himself to attempt again. He did make a token gesture of sorts in writing the
much-maligned and misunderstood Sweet Thursday, before reverting to
the more conventional form of The Short Reign of Pippin IV and The Winter
of Our Discontent. He contrived to continue his quest for a Grail along a
somewhat different path through his researches into Arthurian legend
and his modern version of Malory. That project proved an even more
impossible task than the first draft of East of Eden. He did not complete it.
It can be argued that those critics and scholars who have over the years
concerned themselves with the development (some say, decline) of
Steinbeck's postwar career have not really been directing their attention
to the right book. What perhaps they should more profitably have been
examining is that first draft, so radically altered during the process of revision, rather than the published text of East of Eden. Once again, one can
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speculate on what the shape of Steinbeck's subsequent career might have
been had he been able to finish filling the box to his satisfaction on this
occasion, and, in the course of so doing, possibly finding his Grail. How
differently might the whole canon now be viewed if the direct progression from The Grapes of Wrath had been to Cannery Row, or if we had had
access to the first draft of East of Eden? Benson has suggested that the
Journal might in the future be more highly regarded than East of Eden itself,
(Adventures, p. 691) and other scholars have pointed out that a full appreciation and understanding of the Journal requires access to the original
manuscript. Perhaps it is more pertinent to suggest that no valid assessment or criticism of East of Eden can be made without reference to both the
original draft and Journal of a Novel.
The question thus arises as to whether or not, badly (even disastrously)
flawed though it undoubtedly is, there is a case for the publication,
suitably edited, of that first draft, the Journal entries being interwoven into
the text as they were written, at the beginning and occasionally also at the
end of each day's work. If we had that, we would at last be able to read
what Covici was privileged to read as the organic growth of the work
progressed. We would then be able to assess for ourselves the extent of
Steinbeck's initial joint achievement and failure (for surely that first draft
was both) and the extent to which the achievement may have been
diminished and the failure rectified by the process of revision . Such a
courageous and unconventional hybrid volume would provide a unique
and comprehensive insight into the process of literary creativity from its
pre-beginnings to its conclusion . One can even just possibly speculate
that it might in time, despite all its flaws (perhaps even, oddly enough,
because of them), come to be recognized as Steinbeck's true masterpiece, the "big book" he had always wanted it to be.
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The ''POLITICAL''
Character of the
Charges against Nixon 1

I

John Adams Wettergreen

T is now nearly 20 years since the first U.S. president in history
resigned from office. The passions and the interests of that day have
somewhat abated. And so it may be possible soberly to consider the
extent to which The Federalist's characterization of the nature of impeachment charges holds true for the case of Richard M. Nixon. Such charges
are, said Publius, " . . . of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be
denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself." 2
Perhaps, too, the passions and interests have dulled which surrounded the great central government reforms that led to congressional
supremacy and that were coincident with the struggle over impeachment. To a degree that this essay seeks to show, an evaluation of those
reforms is rightly bound up with an evaluation of what happened to
Nixon; for we have had two decades's experience with the reforms, just as
we have had that much time to reflect on the efforts to impeach.
Yet there will be at least a residue of resistance to the claim that the
charges against the President were political. Perhaps some will even feel
resentment, believing that the claim is exculpatory. To lessen the resistance and resentment, one needs to move beyond a narrow understanding of the political, which sees politics as the opposite of justice, to the
more comprehensive view offered in The Federalist. There, while House
impeachment and Senate trial are treated emphatically as political events
that should turn upon "real demonstrations of guilt or innocence,"
(p. 440) the discussion is designed to show that the arrangements of the
Constitution are most likely to yield just results, even though such cases
by their nature must involve politics.
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In what follows, The Federalist's comprehensive understanding of
"POLITICAL" is applied to the case of President Nixon. That understanding has two aspects. First is the essentially partisan character of the
politics of impeachment, whose proceedings not only divide the community "into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused," but
also, in "many cases," associate those parties with other "preexistent factions, and will inlist [sic] all their animosities, partialities, influence, and
interest on one side, or on the other." (p. 439) The proceedings are also
partisan because they will inevitably be connected with election and
reelection. According to The Federalist, they "doom to honor or to infamy
the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the
community...." (p. 441--442) Impeachment and trial amount to a
"NATIONAL INQUEST" (p. 440) into the character and conduct of a
public person and can result in "perpetual ostracism from the esteem and
confidence, and the honors and emoluments of his country...." (pp.
442)
The second aspect in which The Federalist portrays the fuller undertanding of "POLITICAL" is the recognition of the non-legal character of
impeachment proceedings. The accusation of a president "can never be
tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense
[impeachment by the House of Representatives], or in the construction
of it [trial by the Senate], as in common cases serve to limit the discretion
of courts in favor of personal security." (p. 441) Being accused of "injuries
done immediately to the society itself" might-like bribery or treasonor might not-like a violation of separation of powers-be contrary to
some statute. To solve this problem that not all impeachment charges will
be contrary to statute, the Constitution specifically provides both that
removal from office is the only punishment for conviction by the Senate
and that "punishment according to law" may await those removed from
office. Otherwise, there would be the temptation to use the criminal law
for political purposes, as is all too common with despotic governments.
Thus, The Federalist is clear: the political jurisdiction of the House and the
Senate extends not only to such statutory crimes as treason but also to
harm done to the authority of the government established under the
Constitution-in that such harm can threaten public tranquillity-and to
injuries to the public good or the national interests.
Because no specific law establishes either the authority of the government or the public good and because both questions can be partisan ones,
impeachment proceedings are of necessity non-legal. For example, when
the authority of the government itself is at issue, The Federalist recognizes, however implicitly, that political principles can be at the heart of
impeachments and their trials. For under the Constitution no act of the
government, as such, can establish its own authority; a government that
establishes its own authority cannot be representative. Even the Consti-
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tution itself (or its system of public law) cannot establish the authority of
its government. So, when there is dispute about where the authority of
the government under the Constitution lies, it is a political issue; and the
government is divided against itself regarding the import of the Constitution . The Constitution itself contains a powerful reminder of these
political realities in providing that its own amendment may be accomplished without the full consent of the central government. So, under the
Constitution, the authority of the government is set by an act of the
people of three-quarters of the states-and every act of the government is
subject to ultimate popular review of its constitutionality. That is the constitutional way of guaranteeing that the government is just; i.e., it is
government by the consent of the governed. Accordingly, every case of
impeachment of a president is likely to involve a matter of fundamental
political principle, because the President, as the duly elected representative for the nation, can claim to hold his office by the consent of the
people .
As the leading principle of free government, popular consent is not an
empty formality; punching a ballot is a sign of consent, of course, but it is
not necessarily the consent upon which free government depends, as is
shown by the example of "elections" in the former Soviet Union. Consent
must be enlightened, if it is to embody the principle of free government.
This enlightened consent, which is necessary for free government, is
moral and political, not intellectual; it does not require a race of
philosophers, which cannot be . Morally and politically, at least a majority
of the citizens must be "dedicated to the proposition that all men are
created equal" in rights, must be vigilant for the protection of those rights,
and must be willing from time to time to sacrifice personal interests for
those rights; otherwise, free government perishes. But implicitly, the
impeachment of a president accuses the people of incapacity for free
government in their choice of chief executive. That is why such an
impeachment is a profound constitutional conflict, a political clash akin to
revolution.
But if the citizenry is incapable of an enlightened choice for the President, then how could it be said to be enlightened in its choice of his
accusers? This is the political dilemma with which The Federalist struggles
in its discussion of impeachment proceedings. This dilemma compelled
the Framers to fall short of a standard of perfection and to settle for provisions in impeachment cases which merely were not "bad and pernicious."
If it was the Framers's intent to establish a civic order free from the strife
over political principles which had characterized all politics heretofore,
as Herbert Storing argues, 3 then they had to break their teeth on
impeachments and their trials.
The political character of the charges against President Nixon cannot
be established in full detail, because impeachment was cut short by his
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resignation and therefore there could be no Senate trial. The resignation
was the result of the President's view that he "no longer [had] a strong
enough political base in Congress" to finish the second term to which he
had been elected. His recognition came not when the House Judiciary
Committee favorably reported three of five accusations on July 30, 1974,
but on August 8, three days after the playing of a tape-recording of the
President's conversation of June 23, 1972, so confirmed the public mind
in the truth of the accusations that even some of the President's
staunchest supporters called either for impeachment or resignation. The
resignation meant that the impeachment charges never got beyond preliminary statement; yet the Judiciary Committee's formulation of and
deliberation on them can be taken as reflective at least of the opinions of
the House.4
The Partisan Character of the Charges
The Judiciary Committee deliberated five charges in public. These are
characterized below in their order with the numbers Ayes and Nays
shown in brackets:
Article I. Violation of Oath to "faithfully execute" the laws
and the Office: by obstructing lawful investigation of break-in
of Democratic National Committee Headquarters [28A-10N] .
Article II. Violation of Oath: by various abuses of presidential authority [28A-10N].
Article III. Violation of Oath: by failure to comply with congressional subpoenas [21A -17N].
Article IV. Violation of Oath: by concealment of military
operations in Cambodia [12A-26N] .
Article V. Violation of Oath: by receiving unlawful emoluments and by evasion of income taxes [12A-26N]. 5
The total of the votes corresponds exactly to what a straight party vote
would have been in the committee: 100 Ayes, 90 Noes. However, the
actual division beween Republicans and Democrats was that Democrats
voted for impeachment 85 times, Republicans 15; Republicans voted
aganst impeachment 70 times, Democrats 20. There were seven committee members, all Democrats, who voted for all five articles of impeachment; and there were eight, all Republicans, who voted against all five
articles. Yet on none of the five articles was there a strict RepublicanDemocrat split: all Democrats voted for Articles I and II, all Republicans
voted against Articles IV and V, but a minority of Republicans voted for I
and II and a minority of Democrats voted against IV and V. Thinking of
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The Federalist, one is inclined to conclude that the oldest, largest
"preexistent" parties were not heavily enlisted for or against Richard
Nixon, and therefore that the charges against President Nixon were not
party-political.
This conclusion is belied to some extent by the vote on Article III, the
central article, which comes closest to mirroring a party-political division, although even here, two Republicans voted for and two Democrats
voted against it. Article III contends that the President acted unconstitutionally in refusing to honor the Judiciary Committee's subpoena of tapes
and other materials. In fact, the impeachment of Richard Nixon as such
was at issue in this article, in that the President's refusal was deemed
unconstitutional because it interfered with the House's "sole power of
impeachment." Therefore, one may conclude-strange as it might
sound-that the general intention to impeach was more party-political
than the particular charges. Put another way: the Democrats were willing
to impeach on any particular charge, so long as it had some Republican
support; the Republicans were unwilling to impeach, but indicated that
the President might be guilty of some impeachable offense .
In seeking impeachment, were the Democrats more impartial, less
inclined to partisan combat, than the Republicans? Certainly the
Democrats on the Judiciary Committee did not act or speak as though
they were dealing from strength. Moreover, when one considers The
Federalist statement (p. 440) that congressmen are likely to be "too often
the leaders, or the tools, of the most cunning or the most numerous faction .. . ; ' Democratic weakness is revealed. The vast bulk of the
Democratic support (as indicated by major campaign-contributions)
came from nationally organized, economic interest groups, and a solid
majority of that came from the various committees of the AFL-CIO. But
nationally organized labor had performed poorly in turning out the vote
against the President in 1972. A solid majority of the Republicans's support (61%) came from various committees of the party, with less than one
per cent from nationally organized labor. Most of the supporting Republican organizations were local or state-wide, whereas most of the
Democrats had party support, if at all, only from their congressional
organizations, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and
the Democratic Study Group Campaign Fund. If this pattern of support in
the committee is typical of Congress at that time, as it seems to be, 6 then
the Republican Party was better organized than the Democratic Party if it
came to a political, i.e., electoral, battle over impeachment. In short,
because the Democratic Party's support was so highly nationalized or
centralized, its interest was to prevent impeachment from becoming a
campaign issue between Republicans and Democrats at the level of
congressional districts.7
It is generally assumed that the Democrats succeeded in the pursuit of
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this interest: the Judiciary Committee's debates were conducted
decorously, the President resigned, and the Democrats overwhelmed the
Republicans in the 1974 elections for the House and Senate. Moreover,
the election seemed to ratify the impeachment proceedings all the more,
because seven of the Republican members of the Judiciary Committee
were replaced by Democrats and because five of those seven were
staunch Nixonites. In any case, the Watergate election-at the least-laid
the foundation for six more years of Democratic hegemony.
Nevertheless, partisanship-in the sense of interest in re-electionwas probably not a strong motive in the impeachment proceedings. Only
three of those who debated the charges-two Democrats and a
Republican-expressed concern that their vote for impeachment would
hurt their chances for reelection. Of course, the character of future
Congresses was at stake in 1974, because so many incumbents, especially among Democrats, decided to retire in that year. The largest
number of new Representatives (92) in a generation was elected to the
94th Congress. One quarter (75) of the Democrats were freshmen. As
will become significant in the last section of this essay, it should be noted
at this point that this "Class of 1974" provided the necessary support for
drastic reforms in the House's use of seniority and in the organization
and scope of committees. These reforms had been discussed with little
success since the mid-1960s, and the actual ground for their implementation was laid in the "lame duck" Congress of 1974. Although individual
reelection was not a major motive behind the impeachment charges, the
issue of impeachment did help solve the Democrats's delicate problem of
providing for a transition to the next generation of political leaders. Such
a transition would have been even more delicate, for the reasons given
above, if a partisan issue of impeachment had clouded the 1974
elections.
But if the kind of partisanship in the Judiciary Committee's debates was
neither party-politicaL nor electoraL it was most definitely personal. The
personal issue, which is the issue of character, arose clearly in the debates
on Article II, which drew the most A yes, and on Article V, which with
Article IV had the most Nayes. Republican Congressmen Wiggins and
Sandman and Democratic Congressman Hungate raised the character
issue in the impeachment hearings, and it continued to be raised
throughout the various hearings on and investigations of the Watergate
scandals. However, perhaps the most famous statement on the matter
was uttered by Senator Erwin, in response to President Nixon's statement that the extensive burglarizing and electronic surveillance of the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations had been ignored by the same
people who now wished to impeach him. The Senator replied:
Murder and theft have been committed since the earliest

77

history of mankind, but that fact has not made murder
meritorious or larceny legal. 8
None of President Nixon's accusers denied that previous Democratic
presidents had burglarized and bugged nor that these activities had been
tolerated by Congress. 9 Yet Nixon's "imperial" actions were qualitatively
equal to and quantitatively less than, for example, Lyndon Johnson's. As
Johnson's most unfriendly biographer explains, President Johnson was
tolerated in office-quite apart from his extraordinary personal power
and from his partisanship-because his domestic policies and politics
were admired and supported. 10 Similarly, Nixon was tolerated in office so
long as he seemed to be moving to end the Vietnam War. But soon after
the signing of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War, the Senate voted
to begin the Watergate investigations.
Out of respect for political propriety, among perhaps other reasons,
Nixon, his supporters, or his opponents could not state publicly that this
particular person's use of presidential power, especially his use for
domestic purposes, was at the center of the contention. Accordingly, Judiciary Committee Chair Rodino insisted, "Our judgment is not concerned
with an individual but with a system of constitutional government."
However, this attempt to disjoin the political from the personal is false.
The Committee was considering whether a particular man, Richard
Nixon, was a threat to our system of constitutional government. That is,
the Committee's charges were not that Nixon had committed criminal
acts or grave acts of maladministration. On the contrary, as shall appear
presently, the substance of the charges was that he had behaved in a
tyrannical or subversive manner, which would, if tolerated, undermine
constitutional government. Although that judgment involved deeply
constitutional and political considerations, it was also altogether
personal.
By implication, the Committee may be said to have judged that previous presidential actions, even if they had been worse than Nixon's,
were tolerable, because they were not intended to be subversive of constitutional government. So not even the Nixonites objected when Republican Congressman Cohen saw Nixon's attempted use for domestic purposes of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue
Service, and the "plumbers" as the beginnings of "an American Gulag
Archipelago," although Nixon supporters did object to those who said it
was a sham for the President to claim that these or similar actions were
necessary for national security.
In sum, the root of the partisanship in the impeachment charges was
not opposition to Nixon's party and not even opposition to his particular
domestic or foreign programs and policies, so much as opposition to his
person or character. In other words, the acts for which the Committee was
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moving to impeach President Nixon were politically intolerable, because
the character of the man who committed them was regarded as
antithetical to constitutional government. That is why, in the wake of the
Watergate scandals, criminal justice procedures could be used-in ways
that Nixon never attempted-to persecute scores of citizens who were
innocently, but politically associated with him. 11
What was there in Richard Nixon's character that could cause such
bitter political contention? Especially since the Watergate scandals,
character in presidential politics has been a focus of political scientists
and journalists. However, analysis has concentrated on the pyschological or socio-pathological aspects of presidential character. But in
political reality, moral character is relevant. Each of the impeachment
articles charged Nixon with the same moral defect: he violated his oath of
office. The violation of an oath is the most serious kind of lying because an
oath is the most solemn and deliberate declaration of intention. Thus,
someone whose oath cannot be trusted, cannot be trusted at all. In
theological language, he is damned; in political language, he is
unprincipled.
Therefore, above all, the partisan character of the charges against
Nixon is revealed in the claim, explicit in all of them, that he was not a man
of principle. This political charge is not only personal but it also goes to
the question of what moral or political principles an official must hold to
be worthy of popular election. Most Americans-even most political
scientists-would find it difficult to admit that the Constitution permits
tests of political ideology for officers. That, however, is the gravamen of
impeachment, trial, and permanent removal from office: this man's
character-his lack of moral-political principle-was such that, even if a
majority did elect him, he ought never to have held office. But it is clear
that Nixon at least professed a principle: he claimed to be concerned with
"national security" and so with the authority of the Presidency insofar as
it is essential for national security.
The Non-legal Character of the Charges
President Nixon and his defenders maintained that an impeachable
offense ought to be a legal as well as a political violation. They further
maintained that-at least as a matter of prudence, if not of statutory or
Constitutional law-the legal standards for proof of guilt (no hearsay
testimony, proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," specificity of charges, etc.)
ought to obtain. However, the Judiciary Committee held, in the words of
Representative Hungate, "The issues here are broader than criminality,"
and so adhered to a putatively non-legal standard of proof, "clear and
convincing evidence," and to a specificity of charges that would be
intolerable in criminal law. Indeed, the Committee voted in Article II not
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to limit its accusations to "unlawful activities." 12
Despite these considerations which show that the impeachment
debates and the charges that emerged from them had a non-legal character, dispute continues over whether President Nixon was guilty, in a technical, legal sense, of some violation of some statute, as though the fundamental issue of impeachment were "how to insure that the president is
legally accountable" to Congress. 13 It was politically important in 197 4 for
President Nixon to look legally guilty of something, and the "smoking
pistol," which was the tape-recording of a conversation of June 23, 1972,
is generally believed to have supplied proof of his criminal activity. The
revelations of that tape did move major Republican supporters, who had
insisted so strongly on legalistic standards for proof and for formulations
of accusations, to call for impeachment or resignation. However, that tape
is no more incriminating than others, especially those of September 15,
1972, and March 21, 1973. Indeed, in some respects the June 23 tape is
exculpatory, because it provides evidence for the President's claim to
have been concerned with the Watergate break-in from the beginning
insofar as it bore on national security. Further, no fundamental legal issue
is resolved by this tape, because it seems to show that the cover-up
resulted not only from the President's calculation of his narrow political,
electoral, advantage but also from his concern for national security. The
narrow advantage involved the wish to keep the public from knowledge
that Attorney General John Mitchell was involved in the financing of the
break-in; the national security concern would have been that public
knowledge of the source of the funds for the break-in would compromise intelligence operations.
The decisive importance of that tape, what made it a "smoking pistol,"
was its demonstration that, contrary to what his closest supporters and
advisors said they believed, Nixon had known early that members of his
personal staff were implicated in the break-in. Thus, even those closest to
him were at least implying that they could not trust him. In this manner,
the legal issue reduced to the personal issue, the issue of Nixon's
trustworthiness.
When the Judiciary Committee refused to report Article IV on the
Cambodian operation as an impeachable offense, it was generally
admitted that similar deeds by previous presidents did excuse these
actions by Nixon. The congressional leadership of both parties was an
accomplice in the Cambodian and previous secret military operations, so,
as Representative Butler put it, "We can't impeach ourselves ...." 14
Furthermore, a majority of the Committee seemed to recognize that military success-both in general and in the case of Cambodia-might sometimes require concealment.
Obviously, the Committee did not mean to foster the inference that the
domestic burglaries and huggings during the years of previous presi-
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dents were being overlooked or excused because the House leadership
had been an accomplice and because these operations were necessary for
domestic successes. Rather, the Committee meant that the principles and
practices of foreign policy are different from those of domestic policy.
That is, the Committee acted as if it understood that one rightly treats
friends and fellow citizens differently from foreign enemies. Accordingly, the Committee tolerated, and a few members admired, Nixon's
deviousness in the conduct of foreign war. Yet, no member of the Committee ever articulated the distinction of foreign from domestic policy,
which could have made sense of their debates on Article IV. On the contrary, the Cambodian and other similar successful operations were
deplored as at best necessary evils, while the War Powers Act of 1973 was
praised by almost all members of both parties as the means to prevent
such operations in the future. For that act, it was supposed, would make
future Presidents legally responsible to Congress.
This same strange incapacity to distinguish adequately between fellow
citizens and enemies and its consequence that fellow citizens were
treated like foreign enemies is said also to characterize Nixon. Indeed, the
root of all the President's troubles, the Special Investigative Unit (S.I.U.)
or "plumbers" was created, because he regarded as inadequate the institutional distinction between foreign intelligence operations (which were
the province of the Central Intelligence Agency) and domestic intelligence operations (which were the F.B.I.'s responsibility). In particular,
the President supposed that the institutional distinction did not allow for
the possibility that the domestic political advantage of some Americans
could in fact coincide with the advantage of our enemies, when a foreign
war is itself the object of partisan contention. So, however inaccurately
Nixon might have drawn the distinction between fellow citizens and
enemies, he was mindful that there is such a distinction. Moreover, he
was capable of acting upon it in a principled or unselfish manner and
actually did so in the case of the "plumbers." Daniel Ellsberg's theft of the
Pentagon Papers benefitted both domestic and foreign causes; that is,
Ellsberg acted for the advancement of the policies preferred by The New
York Times as well as by the Soviets. However, one domestic reason for the
S.I.U. investigation of Ellsberg was to preserve the reputations of previous Presidents, especially of Kennedy and Johnson, more than Nixon's
own; for the papers that Ellsberg stole did not bear directly on Nixon's
conduct of the war.
Reduced to a simple matter of personal political principles, the complex conflict between Nixon and his accusers came to this: the President
supposed that "national security" is the basis of domestic unity; his opponents presupposed that "the system of constitutional government" is the
basis of domestic unity. The President in fact doubted that our system of
constitutional government could produce national security; while in
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Congress, there was doubt about protection of rights. Both sides in the
impeachment conflict needed to consider that, at least in the period 196474, constitutional government was not working very well, not for the
security of the nation and not for the security of individual rights. To the
extent that this problem was recognized, President Ford's declaration on
the occasion of Nixon's resignation-"Our Constitution works"-was
cold comfort, for all that his words seemed to mean was that domestic
insurrection had been avoided.
In general and in the circumstances of 1974, the limit of Richard
Nixon's own political principle is easily seen. As everyone knows,
"Patriotism is the last refuge of scoundrels." But the maxim does not mean
that only scoundrels appeal to national security as the defense for their
actions, but rather that national security includes the security of
scoundrels only accidentally. In other words, patriotism implies that
there is something about the nation which is worth securing. However, at
least with regard to the Vietman War and related matters, the common
opinion in 1974 seemed to be that the nation was unworthy. For example,
not one member of the Judiciary Committee defended American actions
in Vietnam, and almost all denounced the war in one way or another.
Hence, the Committee was willing to tolerate a secret war in Cambodia,
only because it believed that such a war was necessary for us to get out of
Vietnam; but, henceforth, the Committee hoped, the War Powers Act
would provide for "no more Cambodias" because it would have
provided for "no more Vietnams."
By its actions, although not its words, the Committee accepted the
national security motive for Watergate and its cover-up. That is, it did not
explicitly reject Nixon's claim that "national security," i.e., the settlement
of the Vietnam War, required his reelection in 1972. More importantly,
the Committee did not even take up the charge that "dirty tricks" had
corrupted the election of 1972. That charge had been the basis fo r the
investigation of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities, which in turn were the bases for Articles I and II. Moreover, in
the opinion of Senate Committee Chair Ervin, President Nixon's "most
reprehensible act" was sabotage by "dirty tricks" of the Democratic Party
and especially of the moderate candidates for its presidential
nomination.J 5
By ignoring this charge and failing to take up the claim that "national
security" required Nixon's reelection, the House Judiciary Committee
passed over the crucial question of consent, the difficult question of the
authority of free government, as discussed previously. Rather than raise
this touchy matter of the wisdom of the electorate, the Committee hoisted
the President on his own petard: if Nixon had to be reelected for the sake
of the war's settlement, then achieving that settlement allowed his
removal from office. Once the war seemed settled, it was possible to say,
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as Congressman Cohen, a Republican accuser, did say," . . . the future of
America is not dependent upon the success or survival of any one man in
public office." Therefore, there is much truth in the remark of one of
President Nixon's most ardent accusers, Congressman Conyers:
"Richard Nixon, like the President before him, is in a real sense a casualty
of the Vietnam war. ..." 16
The Principled Character of the Charges
The partisanship of the political principle of the President's accusers is
less obvious, because the country is in recent decades not accustomed to
partisan contention over the constitutional system as a whole, but rather
partisan differences seem usually, even exclusively, to occur within that
system . In fact, however, the most bitterly partisan and personally
vituperative political events in our history-the campaigns of 1800, 1860,
and 1932-were fought out over the meaning of the Constitution. 17 And,
in fact, this kind of political principle was a factor in all five articles of
impeachment and was concretely present in Article III, which charged
that the President had unconstitutionally undermined the "sole power of
impeachment" by refusing the Committee's subpoenas. The President, it
was said, had violated the principle of separation of powers. The author of
Article III was a Republican, Congressman McClory, who understood the
relevance of separation of powers as follows :
(This] is a case where the Congress itself is pitted against the
Executive. We have this challenge on the part of the Executive
with respect to our authority, and if we think of the whole
process of impeachment, let us recognize that this is a power
preeminent, which makes the Congress of the United States
dominant with respect to the three separate and coequal
branches of government. It bridges the separation of
powers ....
Article III was intended to pose a clear case of political authority, as
distinguished from power. Representative Owens saw this clearly:
The President is the only individual in this country who can
refuse to honor a subpeona, and that is quite simply because
he is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and he is
head of the executive branch, and we have not the physical
ability to overcome his resistance to a congressional subpoena .
As this line of thinking went in the Committee, constitutional political
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authority requires that the Congressional "power to compel evidence in
an impeachment inquiry must be considered absolute." 18
A few members of the Committee supposed that the Supreme Court
had authority to decide all major conflicts over political authority.
However, as The Federalist states, the Court (e.g., in United States v. Nixon)
lacks "the degree of credit and authority" necessary to resolve the ultimate dispute of impeachment and trial by Congress of the President. (p.
441) As noted earlier, even if it were true that the Court possesses absolute authority to say what the law is, questions of impeachment are not
essentially legal questions.
The point to be made here is that as a matter of political principle, the
Committee, through approval of Article III, asserted that congressional
supremacy is our system of constitutional government and that Nixon
had been subversive of that system.
The refusal to honor the Judiciary Committee's subpoenas was judged
to undermine the Constitution, because the evidence demanded was
"deemed necessary ... to determine whether sufficient grounds exist to
impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States." Yet, when it
voted for this article, the Committee had already voted twice to impeach
on the basis of evidence supplied by the President. Of course, it could
have been said in defense of Article III that a legal, as distinguished from a
political, proof of guilt might have been possible, if the President had
supplied additional evidence. However, neither Article III nor anyone
who voted for the article raised this point.
Article III was unreasonable, however, because in addition to simple
exercise of the "sole power of impeachment," it aimed to force the Presi dent's acquiescence in his own impeachment.
The assumption of legislative supremacy and therefore the violation of
the spirit of free government that is characteristic of Article III might be
taken as merely a rhetorical excess of the constitutional crisis of 197 4. Yet
the later reorganization of Congress-and of governance as a wholewas done for the sake of the principle of the political absolutism found in
Article III. Occurring mostly after the elections of 1974, the reorganization was the project of the curre nt generation of political leaders at least as
much as of the generation that accused President Nixon. And its practical
result, as shall now be discussed, was the establishment of the regime of
congressional supremacy as "our sytem of constitutional government."
The Congressional Regime
The partisa n and non-legal character of the impeachment charges, it is
now evident, added up to a grave difference in political principles
between the President and the members of Congress. The President
insisted upon his personal responsibility for national security. Congress
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did not deny that the President has this responsibility, but affirmed that
every exercise of that responsibility ought to be subject to congressional
approval. In other words, the claim was that presidents ought to be legally
accountable to Congress. But no laws limiting the Executive's responsibility for national security were in force until 1973. None was in force
during the election of 1972, when the political issue might have been put
to the American people at the polls. Accordingly, the Judiciary
Committee was compelled to make the political case against Richard
Nixon. The principle of that case is congressional supremacy, for the
Executive cannot be responsible to the nation, i.e., to the electorate, for its
security or anything else, if every execution of that responsibility is subject to review by Congress under laws made by Congress. Nixon was, and
understood himself to be, personally opposed to the regime of congressional supremacy. 19 Therefore, he was guilty as charged of subversion of
"our system," even though that system could not yet exist in 1974 because
it was founded in and by the impeachment struggle. Put another way, if
Nixon had succeeded after 1972, the regime of congressional supremacy
would have failed.
Although the political case for congressional supremacy was made in
and by the impeachment debates, congressional supremacy still required
legal superstructures, because it functions by holding the President
legally responsible to the Congress. The first major part of these
superstructures, the War Power Act, was erected before the impeachment hearings. Literally hundreds of similar acts were passed in the wake
of the Watergate scandals. 20 These established various kinds of '1egislative vetoes," by which Congress aimed to set detailed legal limits to
administrative discretion, especially that of the President. More significant than these acts was the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, usually called the Budget Reform Act. Here the
intention was not only to limit executive administrative discretion
("impoundment control") but also to establish new administrative
authority for the Congress. By passing this act, Congress did not repeal
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, insofar as it gave administrative
authority over plans of public finance and expenditure to the President,
but it did establish its own administrative authority over the same
spheres, supposing them to be the roots of public policy.
As John Marini argues in his study of the politics of budget control,
congressional budgeting is a good indicator of the efficacy of congressional supremacy. In the decade following the passage of the Budget
Reform Act, Congress has proven progressively unable to comply with
its requirements. Indeed, only in the first year following its passage did
Congress prove able to comply fully with it. Since that time, Congress has
been forced increasingly to the expediencies of appropriations acts
passed after the end of the fiscal year and extension of continuing resolu-
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tions into the next fiscal year, in order to maintain the pretense that there
is a "congressional budget process." Then, on May 5, 1984, the House
voted by a two-thirds majority of those present to abandon even the
pretense, when it waived the requirement that there must be an initial
budget resolution before there could be any action of Fiscal Year 1985
appropriations bills, and for Fiscal 1986 it dropped its own requirement
for budget resolutions altogether. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act has
failed in similar fashion . Some observers incorrectly deplore this mode of
public finance and expenditure for its "decentralization." This mode is
not decentralized; it is maintained by the concerted actions of a branch of
the central government. It is more correct to say that, in the wake of President Nixon 's resignation, something like what Woodrow Wilson called
"Congressional Government" has been establishedii
Wilson noted that congressional government, whose chief feature and
defect is lack of "definite authority and power in the actual control of
government," was characteristic of free government under the Constitution and that its immediate upshot in his time was the attack upon executive authority implicit in the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson.
Much the same is said in this essay, but there is a difference. Throughout
his career as a political scientist, Wilson supposed that an approximation
to party government, with the President as the party's chief, would
remedy the ills of congressional government. This prescription has
proven ineffective; the Republican and Democratic parties played little
part in the waning and waxing of congressional supremacy over the past
century. Moreover, there is little difference between congressional
Republicans and Democrats when it comes to the War Powers Act, the
Congressional Budget Act, the legislative veto, or the other mainstays of
the regime of congressional supremacy. As has been seen with respect to
the political attack on executive authority in 1974, the partisan issue was
personal and principled-a question of which people in particular and
with what principles ought to hold office .
Wilson was correct in his diagnosis that congressional government,
which is an attempt by Congress to exercise national administrative
authority, is doomed to fail. Even so, in order to secure congressional
supremacy, Congress went much further in the wake of the Watergate
scandals than it did in Wilson's time. The development of the legislative
veto of foreign and domestic administrative actions and the creation of a
congressional budget process are only the most obvious steps taken. Less
obvious but equally important, was the almost perfect division of
administrative authority that Congress effected after 1974 between
independent and executive branch agenciesY This "bicameralization" of
administration went hand-in-hand with amendments to the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946_23 These allowed and even encouraged
"participation" by congressmen in every single step of the regulatory
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process, something which would have been regarded as unethical before.
Moreover, legal appeals against administrative agencies were discouraged. One important spin-off from this politicization of the administrative process was an increase in lobbying activities of corporations, as
well as of other interest groups. (The Federal Elections Commission is
Congress's attempt to administer that development.) Nevertheless, as
correct as Wilson may have been about recognizing the existence of congressional government and diagnosing its ills, he was incorrect
etiologically.
The cause of congressional government is not to be found in the
American Constitution as such or as intended by the Founding Fathers.
Administration, The Federalist reminds us, "falls peculiarly within the
province of the executive department," although "administration of
government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the
body politic, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary...." 24 The proper
concern of the traditional American political parties has been administration in its largest sense. Thus, when it tries to administer specific regulations, Congress acts like a party or faction, and not as the national
deliberative body it is supposed to be. The particular cause of congressional partisanship in 1974, as has been seen, was personal: revulsion at
the thought that, for however few months, the future of America did
depend upon one man-a man who hated the administrative state and
the bureaucratization of America. There is something admirable about
this revulsion, in that a republic should not be dependent upon any one
man; but insofar as the attitude proceeds from envy, there is also something unjust about it.
There is, moreover, something unconstitutional and therefore
dangerous to the public good, about the revulsion. For the Constitution
does provide that, in part, the fate of the United States does depend upon
one person. The placement of the executive power into the hands of one
person is a leading feature of the American constitutional government.
That unity is needed for sound administration-as distinguished from
legislative deliberation; unity can provide better the capacity to act in the
administration of foreign or military affairs, which require the "energy,
secrecy, and dispatch" not to be found if there is a multiplicity of administrators. True, a unitary executive's capacity to act with "energy, secrecy,
and dispatch" can also be a considerable domestic political advantage to
him; no one can doubt this proposition who has read of President
Franklin Roosevelt's use of secret operations against Ambassador Joseph
P. Kennedy, his political rival at a time when war against Germany was as
contentious a domestic political issue as the Vietnam War in 1972.25
Certain it is as well that President Nixon used, or attempted to use for
domestic political advantage, his unique position of authority over matters of national security. Is there any doubt, however, that Nixon's reelec-
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tion was necessary for the Paris Agreement to End the War in Vietnam?
Could President George McGovern really have done better after the
political fortunes of the previous two presidents had been ruined by that
war? Certainly, no such doubt was expressed by members of the Judiciary Committee, not even by those who favored Article IV.
The Framers understood that, from time to time and above all in the
administration of war, the future of the nation could well depend upon
the one man holding the office of President. In other words, they understood that the Presidency is monarchical. Because monarchical power is
by definition personal, the one-person or unitary Executive is likely to
become revolting to the most egalitarian elements of a republic . Impeachment charges are a natural expression of such revulsion.
Nevertheless, if the Framers were correct regarding the necessity to
place the executive power in one person, Nixon's accusers acted with
dangerous imprudence when they made their personal antipathy toward
him the principle of a new congressional regime. And that, I conclude, is
the chief "POLITICAL" lesson to be gleaned from the charges against
President Richard M. Nixon.
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Ceci n'est pas un essai

T

Robert Wexelblatt

HIS is not an essay. An essay is an attempt, a trial. I am not
attempting to do anything here, not trying to prove this or that. I
don't even want to convince you that I understand anything better than
you do, a good sign that this is not an essay. Essays have titles like "On
Marriage," "The Tyranny of the Gene: The Phenomenology of SocioBiological Texts," or "Dishing the Dirt in South Texas." This is by no
means an essay, since its title is a denial not only that it is an essay, but a
denial of titles.
Certainly this is not a formal essay, much less a scholarly one. Missing
are the rigid structure of the first, the footnotes of the second. This is not
even an informal essay. Informal essays cultivate an entre-nous spirit, but
there are no confidences between you and me here. Nor is this an essay
written in response to some essay-assignment. What teacher would
assign an essay which is so obviously not an essay? How could it be
graded?
But, if this is not an essay, what is it? Well, it is not a narrative or a prosepoem. It is not part of a novel, nor even a set of stage directions. It is not a
letter, a short story, a vignette or feuilleton. Actuallly, it isn't anything
much at all; it is certainly not an essay. If it must be something, then I suppose it is a text. But knowing this is a text is not knowing very much. It is
logical to call it a text, but then syllogisms usually don't tell us what we
didn't already know. All men are mortal. Socrates is a man . Therefore
Socrates is mortal. Of course this is a text-what isn't? -but this is not an
essay. Even if it were to be included in a book of essays, still it would not
be an essay. It would perhaps have the appearance of being one, as a
window can reflect what is around it but itself is transparent. Such reflections are only tricks of physics, the sort always exploited by illusionists.
Not that I wouldn't relish writing an essay. If I knew anything I
wouldn't hesitate to write an essay on it. I would enjoy introducing my
topic, then luxuriate in its development, and finally pull myself up to my
full height and draw my conclusions. Or at least I would summarize.
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Los Angeles County Museum of Art, La Trahison des Images (Ceci n'es t pas une pipe) ,
Rene Magritte, purchased with funds provided by the Mr. and Mrs. William
Preston Harrison collection .

Maybe I do know a thing or two, but none that is really suitable for an
essay.
Since this is not an essay, I am not an essayist. To be perfectly honest, I
have written essays, even a lot of them, and when I was writing them I was
doubtless an essayist. However, right now I cannot claim the status for
myself as what I am writing now is so obviously not an essay. I am quite
sure of this because I am by profession a teacher and every year I have to
read hundreds of essays written under duress by my students. I know an
essay when I see one.
Rene Magritte executed his famous oil painting The Treachery of Images
(Ceci n'est pas une pipe) somewhere around 1929. Magritte's joke consists
in pointing out that the object he made is a painting and not a pipe, an
image which would be treacherous indeed should we confuse it with
something in which we could smoke tobacco (a weed that is also
treacherous). Magritte's picture is a work of modern art that insists
painting should not imitate externals as in the bad old days of scientific
perspective. Incidentally, the particular kind of pipe Magritte did not
paint is called a bent billiard. Perhaps Magritte was only providing us
with an amusing instance of an ancient idea; that is, how we are all the
time deceived by things that aren't what they appear. How many political
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speeches, for example, are not political speeches like Pericles's Funeral
Oration? How many reports on original research are not actually
original? But if Magritte's painting is not a pipe, at least it is definitely a
painting, perhaps a painting with far-reaching aesthetic and moral
implications. But this is not an essay, so what is it? Only a text lacking any
pretension to implication.
When we read essays we do not live a vicarious life through them, as
we do with novels and even plays. The essayist is not interested in getting us to suspend disbelief any more than he or she wishes to trouble us
with indirection . This is a great truth about real essays, that they are
intended to be direct. The pioneers of the form, Montaigne and Bacon,
don't beat about the bush. In fact, if this were an essay in the Baconian
tradition, it would probably be over by now.
I once knew an essayist who took pride in the pointedness of his style,
but still more in the unexpectedness of his conclusions. For example, he
ended a serious essay on funeral customs with a light anecdote about
yogurt cultures, and an essay on the excesses of billboard advertising
with a lugubrious paragraph on the decline of the democratic spirit in the
United States since the end of the Civil War. His style is pointed, but these
endings on which he so prides himself are, in fact, merely mannerisms. It
is precisely through their mannerisms (such as saying "it is precisely")
that essayists tend to betray themselves. If this were an essay my own
mannerisms would have shown up by now, but they haven 't.
The political logic which has led critical theory to raise high the status
of the Reader dictates the abasement of the Author, just as if they were
two funicular cars. The concept "author" is, if one insists on seeing it this
way, inextricable from such reactionary isms as fascism and Calvinismthe one totalitarian, the other predestinating. The liberation of the many
is always bad for the aristocracy. But are the liberators hankering after
power? If this were an essay then a really adept critical theorist should be
able to prove not only that its language betrays its intent, but that the
reader is more important that the essayist, or even that the essayist is a figment of the critical imagination. In view of this I'm just as glad this is not
an essay.
If this were an essay it would have probably laid out its limits, right at
the outset, as T. S. Eliot does so clearly in "The Frontiers of Criticism"
(1956) : "The thesis of this paper is that there are limits, exceeding which
in one direction literary criticism ceases to be literary, and exceeding in
another it ceases to be criticism." Whatever this is, it has no limits in any
direction , except perhaps in its deep desire to become an essay, which it is
not .
The essays I like best are written by poets and novelists. One reason is
that poets and storytellers write most things better than anybody else,
including essays. Another reason, I suppose, is that they are enjoying a
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bout of unabashed intentionality. Where critics, historians, and sociologists can't help tightening up when they write an essay, these imaginative writers go all loose. After all, they know any genre can be fun. At
present I am not feeling either tighter or looser than normal; consequently, this is not an essay, no matter how much it may be trying to look
like one.
Even without looking ahead, sensitive readers can feel the end of an
essay coming, just as experienced music-listeners will sense the approach
of a finale . Both are aware that the theme is about to be hammered home
with the resolution of a nail going into a coffin. This apprehension that
things are coming both to a head and to a close is also a little like standing
impatiently on a station platform and feeling the vague rumble of the
approaching train through your feet, then hearing its first traces-all
before you actually see it. Nothing of the sort here, no rumble, no finale,
no hammering-for a conclusion presupposes energies the conclusion
can bring to rest. A conclusion requires a problem that is nearing its solution, or at least a willingness on the essayist's part to puff up some
hortatory sermonizing: And so we see see; In conclusion we may say;
Having examined all the ramifications of the problem ....
Though this is the end of "Ceci n'est pas un essai," as this is not an essay
it need not end at all or, conversely, it might well have ended somewhere
else. All the same, even if this is not an essay, it cannot escape the
mortality which is equally the lot of essayists and most of their essays.
What comes out of nowhere will, eventually, return there.

93

How Serious
Was Sidney Fein?

S

Robert Wexelblatt

lONEY Fein's whole intellectual enterprise was a sort of burlesque.
Fein was a trickster, a mocker, a jester at the court of high seriousness. He himself believed in nothing at all, certainly not those putative
"doctrines" which it must have pleased him to see tagged with the
eponym "Feinian." Sidney Fein was an ironist and, in this sense at least, a
true heir to Socrates. But the chiefest irony, as it turns out, was not Fein's;
it was that the seriousness of his world was so high that it couldn't get any
of his jokes. Wouldn't get them. Perhaps some or even many of those
academics among whom Fein hovered like a black fly in summer did
indeed see that he was joking, that he was a genuine pain in their haunch;
yet they did not dare to permit the jokes to be released, so to speak, into
the sealed air of their offices, lecture halls, their conferences, disciplines,
or minds. After all, laughter is both a cause and an effect of levity and
these scholars may instinctively have understood that for their livelihoods, no less than for the stability of their solar system, gravity was
indispensable.
Let me put forward an illustration. If Fein's name has been associated
with one idea more than others, it is surely the notion of Critical or
Feinian Classification. Even in its simplest form one can see that Critical
Classification is really just the demolition of the notion of classification
itself, a reductio ad absurdum of the whole enterprise. Here is the
paragraph from Diptych on Terrestrial Representation where Fein begins to
develop his theory of classification.

The strategies of both the classical botanists and the Romantic
zoologists are workable but incomplete. The one looks at
visible differences and similarities among plants, the other at
functional or organic structures over time. The trouble, of
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course, is that both give excessive credit to their own names, to
the phylum, family, genus, species, subspecies, and so forth.
The taxonomists really believe, that is, that taxonomy is the
method of nature, that classification forms a sort of one-to-one
template with the Creation. The mistake is characteristic of
those who have read too little good poetry.
Notice that this is sheer negation. Fein seeks to demolish the work of the
centuries, to dismiss the patient labors of Cuvier and Agassiz with an epigram. His flippancy would be breathtaking if one were intended to take it
seriously.
Feinian Classification itself is presented with a solemnity that is deceptive and best understood as mock-heroic, suggesting that the "good
poetry" Fein had in mind for the taxonomists was all by Alexander Pope:
Whether we choose to classify by visible structure or
organico-historical functional evolution we arrive at the same
impasse, namely the paradox that nature is at once conservative and dynamic. The first method would be roughly adequate were nature only concerned to uphold the stasis
achieved in Genesis on the first sabbath, while the second can
lend classification no more authority than a snapshot of a distance runner in action. Moreover, when we adapt either
method to those objects that constitute a greater and greater
portion of our landscape-that is, all the things we have ourselves made, not excluding methods of classification-the
need for a better, a more critical method of classification
becomes obvious. Two cars are both cars, both may even be
Buicks, but let one be a stationwagon owned by a suburban
family and the other a muscle car owned by an unemployed
alcoholic plasterer. Here the class "Buick" is of no great significance as compared to the unapparent distinction between the
owners and what one may expect from their driving. The
objects themselves were not manufactured to be similar but
different; the similarity consists solely in the fact that "Buick"
refers to a complex economic arrangement rather than an
actual species of automobile. Even the term automobile itself is
problematic when one considers the cultural determinants
that govern its meaning.
In that last sentence one can hardly fail to notice that Fein is really starting
to enjoy himself. And this sense of wallowing in a kind of repressed
hilarity becomes clearer the further he goes.
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The problem is more vexed than clarified by grammar, for we
distinguish between apple and this apple, orange and this orange.
Apple and orange do not, of course, exist except as classifications, which is to say not at all. The most we can say is this
apple and that orange exist. When we compare apples and
oranges we notice their differences in appearance, taste, color,
structure, provenance, smell, juice, etc. We even notice that
two oranges, even a navel and a valencia, resemble each other
as compared to any variety of apples, even macintoshes and
romes, and it is this distinction that gives rise to the false
abstractions apple and orange.
All of which, we might note, is merely Fein's playful reversal of the
absurd colloquialism, "You can't compare apples and oranges."
It makes one's head spin to think how instantaneously Feinian
Classification was embraced by mathematicians and philosophers of the
intimidating, number-crunching sort. They are the ones responsible for
its cachet and for many drops of that complex and arcane perfume that
shimmers around the name of Sidney Fein . "But when we apply Feinian
Classification, the problem entirely evaporates .. .." one of them said
years ago to absolutely stunning effect in the midst of an incomprehensible conference paper, and a notion that began as a kind of parlor trick
turned into an intellectual fixture. But what, after all, does Fein's idea
come down to? Why do I call it a joke, a parlor prank? Well, the idea is
neither complex nor original, for all it comes to when rigorously applied
is that everything is literally in a class by itself. Fein merely resurrected
Ockham's medieval nominalism and played it for what ought to have
been laughs.
I repeat: Feinian Classification is the end of classification. His
declassification of knowledge frees the mind from stereotypes, it's true;
however, it also thrusts us into a bewildering and anarchic wonderland
where nothing is enough like anything else to make sense . So, one could
say also that Feinian Classification is the reappropriation of early childhood, of that stage in our development between infancy and proto-adult
consciousness in which every encounter is an utter novelty, every object a
fresh discovery, every individual unique as the phoenix. His joke returns
us to that brief ontological moment when all play is work and all work is
play, when every object is a toy and each person a playmate . This is
likewise the age at which we excel as abstract artists, before being compelled by either outer or inner necessity to transmogrify the vibrant
childlike art of vivid expression into the clumsy and childish art of crude
imitation.
This return to the childlike, though hardly the pin in the pinwheel of
Fein's comic method , still conveys som ething of his general modus
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operandi. For example, consider "Devouring the Mother" in the collection called Want, Desire, and Need. As always, Fein writes in his Buster
Keaton style. In this piece he develops with perfectly deadpan earnestness his reductionist theory of the Ambivalence of Conscience in terms of
post-infantile orality. The joke here also consists in reducing adult
perplexities and anxieties to the simple and, so to speak, knee-high
perspective of a four-year-old. Moral dilemmas always take the form of
conflicts between two goods and two bads, Fein rather obviously begins,
and never between good and bad. Why is conscience felt to "bite," he then
asks himself. It is hardly to show real depth of scholarship that he cites
"agenbite of in wit"; rather, he does it as a parody of the polymath's love of
using banalities from other fields, above all from literature, the lingua
franca of every genius. All right, why does conscience bite? Simply
because, he says, our original moral dilemma and the pattern for all subsequent ones is established when we are weaned-unless, Fein adds,
weaning should occur after toilet training (another little joke) . He
reasons thus: it is good to suck the mother's breast, to "devour" as much
of her as one can; and yet the demand not to do so-and thus to please the
mother and save her from the pain of one's suddenly erupting teeth-is
also a good. The child is weaned, of course, but at the price of turning that
dental aggression on itself. Only later on, after we have undergone the
laminations of language and culture, can we speak of "the voice of
conscience." We really ought, says Fein with his straight face, to speak of
"the canines and bicuspids of conscience." This send-up of Freudian
analysis and Kantian logic has turned out to be surprisingly popular with
the Freudians and Kantians though. Perhaps one shouldn't be surprised,
for it was the distinguishing knack of Sidney Fein precisely to be taken
most seriously by those of whom he was most making fun .
What better illustration of this could one ask than Fein's political views,
out of which no less than half-a-dozen doctoral dissertations have already
been teased? The extended monograph Fein coyly titled Aristocratic
Democracy is in fact one of his subtlest satires. This political treatise is often
referred to as Fein's "most unexpected production," a rather foolish
description given that Fein never wrote twice on the same subject, was
bound to get to politics sooner or later, and in any case had no particular
field of expertise from which to make "unexpected" forays . Nowadays,
"Fein Studies" has itself become a field .
But from irony, to cases. Why should I want to call Aristocratic Democracy
a satire? The verb to satirize insists on an object- what then is the object
of Fein's lampoon? The object, as usual, is multiple. For example, Fein's
core argument that democracy can only work when the many choose
"aristocrats" to lead them is at once an attack on political hacks who like to
make a virtue of their mediocrity and on those plutocrats-or trustbearing offspring of plutocrats-who despise the common good, are
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ignorant or cynical about power, and whose civic responsibility extends
about as far as the next charity ball. Once again Fein in his politics returns
to the world of childhood. Here is one of his most characteristic passages:
Aristocracy and democracy are more than apparent
opposites; they are paradoxically conjoined in our natures.
Boys and girls-the gender really does not matter, only the
age-are instinctively democratic but just as impulsively
hierarchical, even sacral, in their view of power among themselves. Thus, all children hate bullies-i.e., tyrants-and yet
will quite happily submit themselves to the most distinguished of their number not only without complaint but with
the enthusiasm of cultists. Like all good democrats, they enjoy
voting and yet are satisfied to be influenced by a due regard
for the natural authority of the aristocrat, whom they seek to
emulate. They believe in the sovereignty of law-indeed, no
humans so relish rules as children of the game-playing ageand yet, being children, they esteem the rule-giver even above
the rules. Nevertheless, and this is a crucial point, children will
never exempt the nobles among them from the rule s. Nor will
the nobles seek such exemption. Such an eventuality would
mean the dissolution of the children's polity as it would of any
other society that wished to see itself as democratic.
Fein includes also sophisticated parodies of certain political opinions,
as in the following send-up of one brand of conservatism:
Just what should be democratic in a democracy? Or, more to
the point, what institutions should not be democratic? Taking
democracy in its purest sense of "rule of the many," no one
could seriously deny that scarcely anything in a democracy
apart from the government (or, let us say, portions of the
government) should be democratic. Thus, armies,
engineering firms, universities, printing plants, farms, merchant ships, orchestras, and hospitals for the criminally insane
are all run pretty much by the same principles under
democracies as they are under monarchies or military
juntas- albeit with certain easily imagined exceptions that
may all be traced back to the nature of governmental
authority.
Fein's parody becomes more obvious still in the metaphor-ridden
parts of the book, such as in the following unintelligible python of a sentence:
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When one weighs up such will-of-the-wisps as a "general
will" or a "vox populi" whose structural referents are occulted
or illegible or at least subject to such varieties of interpretation as to support endless and pointless debate, whose collective and discursive qualities are such as to require a more or
less interminable archaeological expedition under the crust of
a landscape that is all the while undulating even as
demometricians attempt to map out its strata, then one begins
to feel that the sheer mathematics of a democratic society will,
in effect, yield only an unreckonable stack of figures whose
sum must amount to less than its discrete and irreducible
surds.
Fein's argument reaches its bathetic crescendo in his concluding contrast of the "democratic aristocrat" with the "aristocratic democrat." The
more he insists on his distinctions, the less of a difference there is. Distinctions without differences : this is Fein's way of poking fun at what passes
for political debate, what passed for it in his day as in our own.
The democratic aristocrat is fully cognizant of his or her
excellence and, while willing to subordinate that excellence to
the good of the mediocre, he or she will by no means submit to
the will of the mediocre. The aristocratic democrat, on the
other hand, achieves excellence precisely through and not in
spite of a similar subordination, while raising the tone of the
average by means of his or her articulation of its views and
interests, etc., etc.
One can only guess how Fein must have chuckled when he read the puffs
from two ex-Presidents and three senators on the dustjacket of
Aristocratic Democracy. Fein is not, as one says, "our universal genius ." He
is more like our universal solvent.
Dissolution is the governing purpose of Fein's oeuvre, though he
accomplishes it as quietly as rain upon limestone. In keeping with his
one-shot-only treatment of topics and genres, Sidney Fein, so far as we
know, composed only a single poem. While it has no title, I believe we
may confidently fill this blank with the word poetry itself. Unlike the other
works I have cited, this double decilinear is not a tall well known. It is to be
found on page 37 of Volume IV, no . 2 of a long-defunct literary journal
called Lethe. Forgetfulness may be the fate of all writing, and will surely be
the fate of these verses. But, before oblivion overtakes us all, here is the
collected poetry of Sidney Fein, that subtle underminer of forms, that
unobtrusive hoister with windy petards.
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People who write poems talk to themselves.
The lyric ego is a naked nerve.
Do you read poems and never write them?
You're rare as an unambitious actor.
Is this the beat that launched a thousand ships?
This rode in triumph through Persepolis?
Poetry is fine, of course-but poets?
I feel, cries the poet, or so you think.
All these lines contain just ten syllables.
People who write themselves talk to poems.
Raw nerves, sticky lips-hard people, poets.
Eloquence does not become a raw nerve.
People write themselves who talk to poems.
Some poets gargle behind sticky lips.
People who love paradoxes are hard.
People who talk to themselves aren't poets.
Hard people suffer their paradoxes.
Can these lines be rearranged to make sense?
Has sense been rearranged to make these lines?
People who write talk poems to themselves.
How serious was Sidney Fein? Well, serious enough. It is with his voice
as he says it is with the voice of the people, a matter for archaeology. He
too cut his teeth on the soft breast of .traditions by which he was
nourished and which he loved, yet found himself doomed to harm. Fein
felt both the pain and glory of his critically classified uniqueness, that
spiritual privilege and personal tragedy. In his last work, the commencement address he delivered on the occasion of receiving an honorary
doctorate of letters and which he chose to call "We Who Are About To
Die," a text made up of virtually nothing but allusions as if in penance for
his originality, Fein himself offers up a summary of his life's work, its
seriousness, its mockery, and above all its child's vision of the world:
It was the artist Cezanne who prayed, "to see with the eye of

the newlyborn." And so Cezanne did. And so he may teach all
of us to see. It is the same newlyborn eye that forever sees the
Emperor marching through the town in his imperial nakedness. Who knows whether we may not behold much the same
scene should we, in the fullness of time, be transported to
some other life where, newlyborn all over again, we shall at
last see without these dark, bespattered mirrors.
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The Spanish Cavalier

T

Paul Asen

HEY'REgetting Room 427 ready for the next tenant. Appraisers are
in there now-vultures wearing eye glasses, who know the score.
They offer three figures for the mirrors and the fixtures that had cost him
four . The barre, hand-shaped and sanded by the students, is being
dismantled. They wait until the job is done, and write down an offer of 50
dollars for what had cost two hundred for the wood alone .
In his heart and in his mind, Pinsky is a dancer still. Yet his knees had
betrayed him . First the right had gotten red and swollen: then the left was
badly twisted in a fall on stage. He had sued the theater. He'd blamed the
doctor who had treated him. He had blamed a friend who had sent him to
the doctor. When he learned for certain he could dance no longer, he discovered something he'd always known, that he loved to teach .
His mother had been with him at the end, thank God. She had been a
dancer, too-a magnificent woman with long, flowing hair and deep-set
black eyes. She had kissed the lids of his eyes for him once again just as
she'd done when he had been a little boy, but she could not conceal her
disappointment; she bit her lip. She had warned him a dancer's career
would be short, and he'd always shown an aptitude for science. He might
have become a surgeon instead, she had thought. He had always scored
so well on the standardized tests in high school. His mother had died
quietly in January while he was out at the movies.
Pinsky sits in a folding chair, gazing across Market Street at the forbidding sky. His legs, sheathed in khaki pants from Sears, are crossed; his
arms folded defiantly before him . His shirt, a faded pink, is frayed at the
edges of the collar. The sleeves are rolled up . His arm had been in a cast
for months; the re sult of a fall from a ladder. The bills have been draining
him.
They remove a bank calendar from one wall. It leaves a clear spot. It's
last year's, turned to October. Now, it's March. A few days before, they
had offered 50 dollars for the upright piano. Pinsky had said "No ." He had
told Lorraine to take it. She had been one of his three remaining students
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at the time he'd been forced to close up shop-an energetic red-faced girl,
who shook the boards as she hit, even as he implored her (with tears in
his eyes at times) to please step softly or she would injure herself. He had
assured her she could dance if she worked hard. She half-believed, but
would return embarrassed from the auditions and complain to him.
He had barely broken even teaching, the past few years. There had
been 40, 50 people in a class not long before, and he'd offered a Jazz Class
in the late afternoon, as well as Ballet.
His classes are too hard, too old-fashioned, they say. He calls the students "pupils" and works them the same way his teachers had worked
him.
It's now a different time, a different place.
The sky is darker by a shade. Rain is on its way, perhaps. Yet he must go
out. He must get out.
Jimmy is gone, died the year before-an old boxer with darkened eyes,
who had been his friend. And Billy, too, retired that same month-a
Methodist who, like himself, would deplore the gory violence on the
streets. A child of two yea~s cannot remain innocent in these times, he
thinks. Who is this new man, this sharp young man, who has brought him
down?
He stops at the same pleasant shop on VanNess: clean, uncrowded,
wood-paneled. The waitress is tall, perfectly tanned, buxom-attractive,
if not young. She is an actress, or has been one, or has always seemed like
one to him. She smiles warmly as he sits at the counter, and brings him a
cup of coffee and an ice box cookie before he gets a chance to ask for them.
"How are you today?" she says.
"How should I be?"
"You should be fine; the cast is off. You can move the arm now."
He points to an L-shaped discoloration near the elbow.
"''m crippled," he says.
"No, you're just not a dancer anymore."
He imagines himself in a scarlet ruffled blouse, performing in a
Flamenco dance.
Something in the waitress's coloring makes him think of someone he
dated 20 years before, a Mexican girl named Dorothea, tall and energetic.
Her legs had been long, and bronzed, and magnificent on stage.
He just about asks the waitress out. He'd thought she was hinting at
something, but now he's not so sure, and she's over at the other side of the
counter talking to a young, sturdily built guy in a sheepskin coat, wearing
a red bandanna about his neck.
A message is sticking out from under the front door of his furnished
studio on Clay. Jo-Anna will be returning soon, it says. She had been his
five-times-a-week student who left to take a position in Boston that pays a
good deal more than she earned out here.
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They had been together as lovers for near! y two years. She had thought
him a Jew at first. Once, he'd insulted a Jewish watchmaker, and she stood
with her hands on her hips at the corner of Sacramento Street and
accused him of speaking against his own people. He refused to talk to her
for a week, until she apologized. His mother and late father had been
Greek Orthodox; he was active in the church as a young man.
A while later, they're seated at the circular table gazing out the bay
window at two boys, a blonde in a red nylon vest and a dark, taller boy in a
peacoat, fighting for possession of a yellow tricycle.
A Scottie dog is barking at the feet of the one dressed in blue.
"Yes, darling, it's true," Pinsky says. "They're closing me down ." He
isn't pleased with whatever it is he's sipping from the porcelain cup he
holds by its cracked handle; the Lipton tea she brought back from the
bodega.
"I can't believe they're doing this to you," she says. A month ago she
would have said "doing this to us."
"It's the life of the artist. We must go on."
"I shouldn't have left you," she says, and comes over to stand behind
him, looking like Mrs. Alving in Ibsen's "Ghosts."
"If you'd stayed, it would have been the same." He hadn't wanted to be
a burden. She was still young, while he was nearly dead.
Boxes are lying about-frayed wires, nuts, bolts, some rusty and
interspersed among coiled rope and electrical fixtures; worn dancing
shoes (beige, black, and white); romantic paperback books; The Wall Street
Journal. Piled in one corner of the small closet are materials from a boating course he took when one of his friends had owned a yacht. He has
saved everything.
The walls are covered with mementos-from Ballet Theater, from
"Can-Can," from the lucrative T.V. dates on whatever show was being
made in town. He is still handsome, though his nose (to him) looks
bulbous. But he had been handsomer then, no question.
The phone rings. Alex is calling. He is a lithe, red-haired young man
who took up dance at 30, and is now a teacher himself, at a small community college nearby. Alex had tried to help. He had said he felt like
Puck, traversing the world in search of students for the great Oberon.
He'd known he was not really Puck, he said, because he had come up
empty-handed.
"I've been away, I'm sorry," Alex says.
Pinsky leans against the worn tangerine bolster pillow on the studio
couch he's n ever gotten used to . "You were my best pupil," he says.
"Where will I study now?"
"There are still good teachers."
"Thanks," Alex says. "Good luck," he adds, and hangs up.
He hasn't heard from Teddy. She must be back in town by now
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(shacked up with someone, he thinks), but she hasn't come to class, or
called.
They go to dinner at Grotto Number Nine, Fisherman's Wharf. The
maitre d', a small, sleek man seats them without fanfare in the corner.
Pinsky has on his brown woolen slacks (they itch a bit), and a beige dress
shirt he picked up from a discount shop. Jo-Anna looks fine in a navy
blouse, a Scottish plaid shirt, and black boots.
He puts on a bib to eat cracked crab and talks about going to see an old
Fred Astaire film near Ghiradelli Square, which they do.
They come straight home. A leg on the table seems loose, so he kneels
down and fools with it. She sits in the canvas chair, and looks at a novel
with a woman in a low-cut dress and a policeman on the cover.
They make love unenthusiastically. Though Jo-Anna has never looked
better, it bothers him that her eyes aren't quite right.
Jo-Anna says she has met someone she likes in Boston, though they
haven't started dating yet, she claims.
Early the next morning, he watches from the gate as the most familiar
part of her lower calf disappears past the stewardess, and on into the
plane.
He takes out a list on a legal-sized sheet. Toothpaste; his shirts are
ready; he must return to the studio to pick up his plants, the ones that are
still alive. Lorraine's new number is written someplace. Where is it now?
Where the hell is it?
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Laura B. Kennelly
Helen with Insomnia, at the Clavier
Paris was not the first. Did you think he was?
How quaint.
There was Agamemnon, yes. His own brother.
On my wedding feast he fondled my breasts,
laughed, called my husband a lucky man.
After a while I grew tired of resisting,
it seemed more trouble than it was worth.
We lay together; I loved his arrogance,
his booming voice, his insatiable lust.
He loved me. But loved her, Clytemnestra, too .
He said .
I think he loved power rich life more.
But his was a nasty family: ate each other.
That he didn't carry me off was all right .
It was less all right with Odysseus. No one
ever dreamed that when I walked long walks at
night I did not walk alone. No one ever saw
how we twined and tangled and became one,
startling night birds from the trees we sported
under. His stories, his laugh, his lips I could
have hung on forever.
But he
was a hearth lover too. Stuck on status quo:
There she sat, always patiently waiting, lovely
Penelope . Slight smile on her perfect face-Oh,
I excited him more, but he's really a
coward and, don't you know, it would have broken his
dear wife's heart and ruined
his boy.
By the time Paris came, I was more than ready.
It's boring, you know, to be an old man's toy.
Of course I jumped: A foreign city, passionate
lover. (I never thought, then, to wonder why he
was so experienced, so knowing.) Yes I went
with him.
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Arms warm around me, legs long-muscled
against mine, lips claiming
taking-night after night
I paid his mother's dues, sacrificed at her altar
faithful daughter, tuned to love
tribute freely given, never refused.
Yet now he wanders from me and
the battlefield, chasing women, fleeing
slaughter, crying ''Mama"
till she sweeps him to safety in a golden mist.
And the only real man here is tied to
Andromache. I've seen the looks he gives me
but looks are all I get.
Drives me crazy. He's got what I want,
A man like that knows how to love his wifewhich (don 't laugh) means
that I can never have him .
But just once, I'd like to strip that
plumed helmet off his head, loosen the armour plate,
touch his skin and bring him to fevers
only I generate, feel his sweat dripping on
my body stretched beneath his -.
And, yes, it's too bad about the war, unfortunate, reallybut Venus, after all, is not Minerva .
Love cannot be expected to think about everything.
Me, you despise for falling for easy lies.
Don't.
What you need to know is, Paris was not the first.
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Aida: Coda
This is certain: the oboe
sounds singly
then cellos pick up violins
and so it starts again .
The same each performance;
why won't Aida learn?
How can Radames over and over
and ever and ever fall for her?
Over and over, same refrain.
Beautiful? Oh yes, beautiful.
But why can't Radames ever learn?
Amneris, not Aida, d eceives
her father and her father's gods for him .
Aida, dutiful daughter,
over and over, ever and ever betrays.
No sliding, soaring solo can justify
her death or his . Bloodless, yes, yet
death still, a silent singular embrace.
And Amneris, willing ever to
surrender Radames to another's life,
left weeping alone, mourning love's fools.
I put my trust in Amneris.
After the finale over and over,
ever and ever she will walk,
moonlight streaming by the Nile,
dreaming of Radames; then
returning to his Lieutenant's
hearth and bed tending those
who live.
Now the oboe, the cellos, the violins,
packed away, await Aida's next day;
and life, as it must,
kisses death
and leaves the play.
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Lara to Zhivago
I have lived buried in flesh
and suns have risen to light
the love I had been longing
for. Once met, no room for fear,
free as infants we found feast,
nurtured fair words and fine love .
Now expensive conscience love
limits, confines to spirit; shuns fleshengage~ not in carnal feast.
And in winter's coldest light
whirls in unextinguished fear
undissolved by strong longing .
January's cold skies cover longing.
Sharp, snow-scattered shards love
shuns that knows no fear
save splitting soul from flesh
and forcing dark where light
might surprise, supply a feast.
Would we could celebrate a feastthat loosening, releasing longing
when body touches body in the light,
rehearsing ancient rites with love
whose priests delight in flesh,
speak the truth of love, not fear.
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Fallen, frozen lives may fear
release to pleasure, feast
that comes when flesh meets flesh .
In this Pauline kingdom, we are longing
not for despair; we are seeking richest Love
overall showering sparkling light.
And thus it is that splendid spring light
burns away; forsakes cold winter fear;
grants patience with my weary love,
winter starved, afraid of feast,
of comfort, a baby-longing
return to warm, secret flesh .
My love, do not fear-light flesh
or fear generation's light-longing.
Hold me so souls may finely feast .

109

Contributors

Michele Z. Allen, senior litigation paralegal at a San Jose law firm,
received her B.A . in political science from San Jose State University this
Spring and plans to enter law school to prepare for a career in
prosecution.
Paul Asen is a taxi driver and a free-lance writer who works and lives in
New York City. He was graduated from the University of California at
Berkeley in 1964. He studied acting with Stella Adler and Harold Burman
and writing at the New School for Social Research. Kansas Quarterly has
also published his fiction.
Marc Herman, assistant professor of psychology at Eureka College,
Illinois, had a dozen years of practice as a clinical psychologist before
entering academia. He holds a Ph.D. from Wayne State University,
Detroit, and has published on educable mentally retarded children and
on child neglect.
Fenwicke W. Holmes, retired colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps, followed
23 years in the armed services with 22 more in the private sector, most of
them in information resources managem ent for Del Monte Corporation.
His B.A. in philosophy is from the University of California at Los Angeles.
Laura B. Kennelly, editor of Grasslands Review, teaches at the University of
North Texas from which she received a Ph.D. Her scholarly articles have
appeared in such publications as journal of American Studies and Clio. Her
poetry has been published by Redneck Review, Stone Drum, Lucky Star, and
Carbuncle 3, among others.
D. Mesher, associate professor at SJSU, has previously published more
than 20 essays, mostly on 20th century American writers. During the 80s,
he was for five years general manager of a tool company in Portland,
Oregon. His Ph.D. is from the University of Washington. He taught in
Bath, England, for the Spring, 1992, semester.

Roy S. Simmonds, a retired civil servant who worked in London and
Essex, has just completed a full-length study of John Steinbeck's life and
work during World War II. The University of Alabama Press published
two earlier books, The Two Worlds of William March (1984) and William
March: An Annotated Checklist (1988) .
Mary Tookey, retired professor of English of Eureka College, Illinois, is a
poet and a scholar. A collection of her poems, A Will Windward, was published in 1989 by Edwin Mellen Press. Her articles have appeared in
numerous journals, such as Explicator, the North Dakota Quarterly, and the

Midwest Quarterly.
John Adams Wettergreen, professor of political science at San Jose State
from 1968-1989, was also a journalist whose commentary appeared in
The Washington Times, The Chicago Tribune, and The San Jose Mercury News.
He was a fellow of the Relm Foundation and of the Heritage Foundation.
He died in May, 1989, at the age of 45.
Robert Wexelblatt is a professor in the Division of Humanities and
Rhetoric, College of General Studies, Boston University. In 1990, his
collection of short stories, Life in the Temperate Zone and Other Stories, and in
1991, his collection of essays, Professors at Play, were published, both by
Rutgers University Press and both containing work that first appeared in
this journal (we are proud to say) .
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